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ABSTRACT
Despite the depth and breadth of U.S. credit markets, low- and moderate-
income communities and minority borrowers have not historically enjoyed full 
access to credit. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted to 
help overcome barriers to credit for low- and moderate-income communities, 
and minority borrowers.  Scholars have long leveled numerous critiques 
against CRA as unnecessary, ineffectual, costly, and lawless.  But I argue,
using recent empirical evidence, that CRA has enhanced access to credit for 
low-income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers at relatively low cost.
I contend that market failures and discrimination exacerbate credit problems in 
low-income and minority communities and justify CRA. Critics argue that if 
such problems exist, there are better alternatives to CRA.  By contrast, I argue
that CRA should not be abandoned in favor of existing alternatives, such as the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Home 
Owner’s Equity Protection Act, and government subsidies, and that CRA 
compares favorably with other alternative forms of regulation and subsidies
that could be deployed.  In sum, contrary to previous legal scholarship, I 
demonstrate using recent empirical evidence that CRA has been successful in 
expanding access to credit for low-income, moderate-income, and minority
households at a reasonable cost.  I also suggest further enhancements to CRA 
designed to respond to valid critiques and to build on its past successes.
© 2004 Michael S. Barr
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the depth and breadth of U.S. credit markets, low- and moderate-
income communities, as well as minority borrowers, have not enjoyed full 
access to those markets.  Community advocates have long argued that 
“redlining”—a practice of not lending to borrowers in neighborhoods with 
higher concentration of minority households—has, at least historically, limited 
the flow of capital from depository institutions for homeownership in minority 
communities.  Enormous progress has been made in expanding access to home 
mortgage lending,1 but there is evidence that minority borrowers still face 
discrimination.  Others have argued that low-income communities generally 
have lower access to capital than they would in a fully functioning market 
because of market failures in addition to discrimination.  For example, 
information externalities and collective action problems may have impeded 
credit markets in low-income communities.2 More recently, as capital from 
“subprime”3 and other lenders has increased in low-income areas, consumer 
advocates have argued that the increased flows of credit have in some cases 
been accompanied by “predatory” or abusive lending practices targeted at 
minorities, the elderly, and other segments of the population.
In response to these and other concerns, Congress has enacted a wide range 
of federal laws and subsidy programs that affect the provision of credit.4 This 
article focuses on perhaps the most controversial of these laws: the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA).5 Passed in response to concerns about 
redlining of minority and low-income areas,6 and market failures in low-
1
 This article focuses on home mortgage lending.  Home mortgage lending is an important 
aspect of financial security for low- and moderate-income borrowers, has attracted the greatest 
attention in the literature, and has different market and regulatory features from other forms of 
credit.  I take up issues of short-term consumer debt and transactional financial services in 
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004).
2 See infra Part III.
3
 The label “subprime” refers to the status of borrowers who pay higher interest rates at least in 
part because they are thought to have credit histories below the quality of prime borrowers.  
Subprime lenders are lenders who specialize in lending to such borrowers.  For a more 
thorough discussion, see infra Part III.
4 See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, Focusing on Fannie and Freddie: The Dilemmas of Reforming 
Housing Finance, 23 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 43 (2003).  I take up the broader topic of different 
modes of credit market regulation in a work in progress, Democratizing Access to Capital.
5
 29 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2902, 2903, 2906 (2000); 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(3) (2000) (CRA 
requirement for interstate mergers); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831y (CRA Sunshine 
Requirements); Id. § 1843(l)(2) (2000) (CRA requirement for financial subsidiaries engaging 
in expanded financial activities).
6 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 17, 604 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (“[CRA] is intended 
to eliminate the practice of redlining by lending institutions.”).  In its structure, CRA focuses 
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income communities,7 CRA encourages federally insured banks and thrifts to 
meet the credit needs of the entire communities that they serve, including low-
and moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound banking practices.8
Federal banking agencies examine banks and thrifts periodically on their CRA 
performance and rate the institutions.  Regulators consider a bank’s or thrift’s 
CRA record in determining whether to approve that institution’s application 
for a deposit facility, which encompasses mergers with or acquisitions of other 
depository institutions.  Such applications also provide the public with an 
opportunity to comment on the CRA performance of the institution.
CRA has strengthened over time, particularly during the 1990s, because of 
both legal and market developments.9  Legislative changes to CRA enacted in 
1989 required regulators to disclose publicly the institution’s rating and 
performance evaluation.10  Also in 1989, a bank regulator denied for the first 
time, on CRA grounds, an application for merger.11  Changes to the regulations 
implementing CRA issued in 199512 focus CRA evaluations more on objective 
performance measures rather than more subjective and process-oriented factors 
that regulators had previously used and that scholars, banks, and community 
organizations had often criticized.  These new regulations require banks and 
thrifts to disclose information about their small-business, small-farm, and 
community-development lending.  Under the 1995 regulations, large banks, 
small banks, and wholesale or limited-purpose institutions have tailored 
examinations.  Large banks are evaluated on a three-part test of their lending, 
investments, and services.  Institutions are rated under four categories: 
outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve, and substantial noncompliance.  
These legislative and regulatory changes occurred during a time of 
increasingly intense consolidation in the banking industry, providing greater 
opportunities for community organizations and regulators to evaluate bank and 
thrift performance under CRA in the context of merger applications.  With the 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley “Financial Modernization” Act of 1999,13
CRA was again strengthened.  Banks and thrifts must have a satisfactory CRA 
on market failures, rather than on discrimination per se, but as I discuss in Parts III & IV, 
market failures and discrimination are intertwined.  
7
 For the theories underlying CRA, see infra Part III.
8
 29 U.S.C. §§ 2901.
9 See, e.g., the discussions with lenders and community organizations described in ERIC S. 
BELSKY ET AL., INSIGHTS INTO THE PRACTICE OF COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT LENDING, 
A SYNTHESIS OF CRA DISCUSSION GROUPS (Joint Center on Housing, Harvard U., Working 
Paper CRA00-1, 2000), at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/governmentprograms/
cra001.pdf.  I discuss CRA’s effectiveness in further detail infra, Part IV.
10
 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
103 Stat. 183 (1989).
11
 Continental Bank Corporation, 75 FED. RESERVE BULL. 304 (1989).
12
 12 C.F.R. 228.41 et seq. (2004).
13
 Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999).
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record if they, or their holding companies, are to engage in newly authorized 
financial activities, such as certain insurance and securities functions.14
CRA has been since its enactment, and remains today,15 the subject of 
extensive debate.  For example, in July 2004, two of the four federal banking 
regulators pulled out of a joint CRA rulemaking process.  The Office of Thrift 
Supervision made a unilateral announcement that it was going to curtail CRA 
examinations for nearly 90 percent of institutions that it regulates, those 
holding less than $1 billion in assets, and all indications are that the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation will soon follow suit.16  If the two agencies 
follow through, their plans would seriously undermine community 
development in a vast number of low-income communities. The Federal 
Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have balked 
at this move, and Congress is debating whether and how to intervene.17
Legal scholars question vigorously the theoretical and empirical claims that 
motivated CRA, and many advocate eliminating the policy.18  A large body of 
literature suggests that competition in credit markets has driven (or will drive) 
out discriminatory19 or abusive practices, and that market failures are 
illusory.20 Critics of CRA argue that CRA is trying to address a nonexistent 
problem.  Moreover, they argue that problems in credit markets are insufficient 
to justify intervention, and that even if intervention is warranted, CRA is the 
wrong policy to pursue. Earlier legal scholarship suggested that CRA was
14
 12 U.S.C. § 2903(c) (2000); Id. §1843(l)(2) (2000).
15 See, e.g., Michelle Heller, Reg Relief? Senator Puts Everything on the Table, AM. BANKER, 
June 10, 2004, at 1 (noting that CRA is high on Senate Banking Committee list for regulatory 
relief).
16
  Michelle Heller, FDIC Seen Siding with OTS on CRA, AM. BANKER, July 20, 2004, at 1.
17 Id. I discuss these developments further in Part VII.
18 See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: 
Helping Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634 (1994); Jeffery W. 
Gunther, Should CRA Stand for "Community Redundancy Act"?, 23 REG. 56 (2000); Keith N. 
Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory Obstacles to Development Lending, 
17 YALE J. ON REG. 197 (2000); Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community 
Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1561 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment 
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993); Craig E. Marcus, Beyond the 
Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a 
Market-Based Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 710 (1996); Peter P. Swire, Equality of Opportunity and Investment in Creditworthiness, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1533 (1995) [hereinafer Swire, Equality of Opportunity]; Peter P. Swire, 
Safe Harbors and A Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 
349 (1993) [hereinafter Swire, Safe Harbors]; Lawrence J. White, The Community 
Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
281 (1993).  Criticisms of CRA are discussed in detail in Part II.
19
 This view is usually derived from Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in
DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter and Albert Rees eds., 1973), and 
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lacker, Neighborhoods and Banking, 81 ECONOMIC QUARTERLY 13 
(1995).
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having little, if any, positive effect, and at a high cost.  For example, Jonathan 
Macey and Geoffrey Miller attempted to demonstrate the weak foundations 
and high cost of CRA in the wake of the 1989 reforms, charging that CRA 
undermines the safety and soundness of the banking system, and empowers 
community group rent-seeking at the expense of bank profitability.21
This Article systematically rebuts prior criticisms of CRA and lays a solid 
theoretical and empirical foundation for the Act.  The Article first establishes 
the theoretical and empirical case for the persistence of credit market 
imperfections and discrimination. Of course, at the most basic level, no market 
is perfect.22 This Article explores why such market imperfections might be 
relatively greater in low-income communities, or more appropriate as targets of 
government intervention, given the social benefits of expanded access to 
capital.23 The Article argues that market failures and discrimination do 
warrant CRA in particular as a governmental policy.  
The Article deploys recent empirical analysis to re-evaluate and ultimately 
refute (or at least cast doubt on) many of the critics’ claims about the costs and 
benefits of CRA.  Such evidence shows that CRA appears to have created far 
greater benefits than previously contended in the legal scholarship.  Earlier 
articles suggested that the costs of CRA were exceedingly high; this article 
argues that, although some costs incurred are unnecessary, such costs have 
been overstated.  In addition, this Article argues that some of the costs 
incurred, for example, those caused by the lack of bright line rules under CRA, 
also represent benefits, previously ignored, in the form of increased citizen 
participation and local, contextual “rulemaking.”  In sum, I contend that CRA 
has a reasonable foundation,24 and that it can be defended as socially efficient, 
in the sense that the benefits of CRA likely far exceed the private costs.25
Some critics argue that CRA should be eliminated in favor of other 
regulatory steps taken to improve access to capital in low- and moderate-
21 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18.
22
 The existence of transaction costs, for example, implies that markets are not perfect.  Cf. 
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
23
 For discussion of circumstances disfavoring government intervention to correct market 
failures, see, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 8-10 (3d ed. 2000).
24 See infra Parts III-IV.
25
 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is achieved when the benefits of a policy exceed its costs, 
regardless of whether  winners in fact compensate losers for their costs. N. Kaldor, Welfare 
Propositions of Economics and Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); 
J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).  Pareto efficiency 
is achieved when no one is made worse off by a transaction.  See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The 
Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991) (criticizing use 
of the Pareto principle); see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 31-32 (1994).  
I take up distributional arguments for CRA in Part VI.  For the argument that social welfare 
needs to include distributional consequences, see John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 
ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); but see
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax 
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that distributional issues 
should not be addressed by legal rules).
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income areas, such as targeted subsidies or fair lending laws. By contrast, I 
argue that CRA seems particularly effective when compared with other types 
of existing credit market regulation. I also analyze CRA compared with other 
modes of regulation and subsidy that CRA’s critics contend should be pursued
instead of CRA, if governmental intervention should occur at all.  I show that
tax and transfer systems, different forms of subsidy, and rules backed by fines 
all suffer from deficiencies that make them problematic as alternatives to CRA.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II recounts the scholarly critiques of 
CRA.  Part III elaborates the theories of market failure and discrimination that 
rebut the theoretical critique and establish the need for CRA.  Part IV analyzes 
the recent empirical evidence regarding the costs and benefits of CRA and 
argues that the case for CRA is strong.  Given that critics often contend that 
CRA should be abandoned in favor of other alternatives, Part V analyzes CRA 
in the context of other existing home mortgage credit market policies, and Part 
VI compares CRA to other alternative models of regulation and subsidy.  Part 
VII suggests policy reform s. Part VIII then concludes. 
 
II. CRITIQUES OF CRA
The Community Reinvestment Act has been widely criticized.26 This Part
summarizes the key arguments against CRA.  These may be grouped into five 
main critiques: CRA constitutes poor regulatory design with high costs and 
contradictory goals.  Arbitrary enforcement of CRA presents opportunities for 
rent-seeking by community organizations and regulators, who subvert CRA for 
private purposes.  CRA distorts the market and impedes financial market 
efficiency. CRA provides little benefit for low-income communities. Lastly,
there are better alternatives to CRA.  After laying out these arguments in detail 
in this Part, the remaining Parts look at the available evidence and actual 
regulatory and market practices to assess these contentions.  
First, critics charge that the CRA statute is vague, blunt, and contradictory.  
CRA’s goals, such as they may be adduced, have been criticized as self-
contradictory or out-dated.  CRA expects banks to expand credit to households 
to whom they would not otherwise lend but maintain safety and soundness, 
which critics deride as mutually inconsistent.27 The Act does not make explicit 
whether it is targeted at discrimination,28 or explain whether low-income 
communities or individuals are to be helped.  CRA may be designed to address 
market failures, to combat discrimination, to achieve redistributive goals, or 
perhaps to advance an old-fashioned notion of “local” depositors’ funds being 
lent locally (an ideal now irrelevant in global credit markets).29
Opponents of CRA argue that these mushy, overlapping goals lead to 
mushy, inconsistent regulation and that all these goals conflict with bank safety 
26 See, e.g., sources cited supra, note 18.
27 See Gunther, supra note 18, at 56; Hylton, supra note 18, at 197, 238.
28 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 637.
29 See Klausner, supra note 18, at 1561-64; Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 366.
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and soundness regulation. To the extent that CRA forces banks to lend locally, 
CRA undermines the ability of banks to diversify their lending geographically, 
undermining the soundness of their portfolio.30  To the extent that CRA forces 
banks to lend to less creditworthy borrowers, CRA increases the risk of the 
bank’s lending.  Moreover, critics charge, in economic downturns, when banks 
must necessarily reduce their risk profiles, CRA examiners would give them 
bad ratings just for prudent reductions in risk.31
Opponents charge that CRA distorts the market in a manner that 
undermines the banking system. They dispute the existence of market failures
and argue that CRA forces banks to engage in unprofitable, risky lending.32  It 
deters efficiency-enhancing mergers33 and cost reductions through closures of 
low-return bank branches.  Critics deny that one can justify CRA as a quid pro 
quo for a net subsidy from the federal government to banks.  Even if a net 
subsidy exists (which some commentators doubt34), critics say the appropriate 
response would be to eliminate the distortion directly, not enact CRA.35
Critics also contend that CRA distorts the market in a way that actually 
hurts low-income communities.  Opponents argue that banks can avoid their 
vague CRA obligations by moving out or staying out of low-income and
minority neighborhoods so that their “assessment” area for lending excludes 
such communities.36  Defining communities by the geographical “accident” of 
deposit facilities, they argue, is itself a difficult process with perverse effects 
on bank locational decisions.37  They argue that CRA creates incentives to 
avoid branches in poor neighborhoods in the first place, in order to avoid 
having to comply with CRA by lending in those communities.38  Requiring 
banks to lend wherever they take deposits is bad economics, critics allege, 
because it undermines innovation, specialization and scale economies.  In their 
view, CRA impedes specialization because it requires banks to invest in 
learning about all their communities, rather than permitting banks to invest the 
high fixed costs of such knowledge in one area.39  CRA thwarts innovation 
because it requires a high level of lending once an initial investment in 
branches in a poor area is made.  CRA undermines the ability of banks to 
30 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 324.
31 See Gunther, supra note 18, at 60.
32 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 654; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1578; Macey & 
Miller, supra note 18, at 295; White, supra note 18, at 282.
33 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 322-23.
34 See, e.g., Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and 
Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 3 (1999).
35 See, e.g., Macey and Miller, supra note 18. 
36 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 296, 340; White, supra note 18, at 287.
37 See Klausner, supra note 18, at 1584.
38 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 296; Hylton, supra note 18, at 238. 
39 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 655; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1574; Swire, Safe 
Harbors, supra note 18, at 355.
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benefit from scale economies40 and to internalize the positive externalities of 
their lending because it requires many institutions to lend in the community.41
Thus, critics contend that CRA has provided little benefit.  They argue that 
economic growth, bank deregulation, technological innovation and competition 
would have driven banks to lend in low-income areas even without CRA.42
Headline-getting loan commitments are a public relations boon but simply 
represent what the banks would do anyway.43 They further argue that any 
benefit that does accrue to low-income communities is effectively an 
unwarranted cost to lenders, since any lending induced under CRA would 
necessarily be less profitable and more risky to undertake.  Others contend that 
city renewal policies and community development financial institutions were 
responsible for increased lending.44  Critics contend that lending not covered 
by CRA and lending by banks and thrifts outside their CRA assessment areas 
spurred the lending increases in low-income areas, so CRA could not have 
been responsible for any increased lending in these communities.45
Critics argue that CRA gives regulators unfettered discretion that they 
wrongly use to benefit some interest groups over others.  For example, Macey 
and Miller decry the manner in which CRA empowers activist pressure groups, 
who, they allege, engage in rampant rent-seeking by holding banks hostage to 
give the groups funds for their own purposes.46  Others charge that inner-city 
developers gain advantage from the regulation.47  One scholar contends that,
presumably because of scale economies and the commodification of mortgage 
markets, large banks benefit from CRA relative to small banks so that they
impede any changes to CRA.48  Critics further posit that the bank agencies 
themselves are major beneficiaries of CRA because it gives them a lever to use 
against banks in mergers they are concerned about for other reasons or allows 
them to pursue political goals unrelated to CRA.49  According to this view, the 
power of interest groups and regulators under CRA leads banks to engage in 
CRA compliance in a way that does not actually help low-income or minority 
communities.  Banks, motivated by the desire to satisfy pressure groups and 
regulators, engage in wasteful spending on public relations and headline-
making loan commitments,50 and spend inordinate hours and dollars on 
compliance and generation of data reporting and other wasteful paperwork.51
40 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 652, 655; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1574-75.
41 See Gunther, supra note 18, at 58; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1577; cf. White, supra note 
18, at 285.
42 See Gunther, supra note 18, at 56; Hylton, supra note 18, at 205.
43 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
44 See Hylton, supra note 18, at 205.
45 See Gunther, supra note 18, at 58.
46 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 333-37.
47 See Hylton, supra note 18, at 237.
48 See id. at 198.
49 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 342.
50 See id. at 295, 330-33; see also Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 638.
51 See Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 361; White, supra note 18, at 283.
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CRA enforcement has been described as costly, arbitrary and 
inconsistent,52 depending on the strength of local community groups, 
competitive factors in the financial sector and the decisions of banks to merge, 
and the whims of regulators.  There is reported to be wide variation in 
toughness of regulators, both among agencies, and within agencies by 
geographic region.53   The costs of compliance are alleged to be extraordinarily 
high,54 and scholarship suggested that the 1995 regulatory reform did not 
reduce compliance costs or enhance shareholder value.55
CRA has been described as overly blunt because it does not differentiate 
between originating and holding loans,56 or between wholesale and special 
purpose banks and other commercial banks.57  Critics also say it fails to give 
appropriate weight to innovation rather than numbers of loans made.58  Others 
charge that CRA uses loan rejection rates as a measure of performance, when 
this would punish banks for outreach into harder to serve communities,59 and 
penalizes minority-owned banks that do not serve the community, when 
regulators should understand that these banks serve important other purposes.60
Moreover, CRA is bad economics, in the critics’ view, because it places a 
regulatory burden on one type of financial institution (banks and thrifts) while 
letting comparable institutions (credit unions, independent finance companies) 
and other financial market participants (insurance companies, securities firms) 
off without any similar obligations.61  In this view, it is irrational to apply CRA 
to banks and thrifts, but not to other financial companies, or, for that matter,
every participant in every market, including, say, packagers of frozen peas.
Finally, critics argue that if one wants to achieve CRA’s goals, superior 
alternatives exist. They argue that if CRA is rooted in distributional goals, 
these can best be met through the tax and transfer system, rather than legal 
rules.62  Others argue for in-kind demand-side subsidies, supply-side subsidies,
or tax incentives.63  Others urge enforcement of existing anti-discrimination 
52 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 637; Hylton, supra note 18, at 203; Macey & Miller, 
supra note 18, at 295; Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 362.
53 See KENNETH H. THOMAS, THE CRA HANDBOOK (1998).
54 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 641; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1590; Macey & 
Miller, supra note 18, at 295.
55 See David B. Ely & Kenneth J. Robinson, Is the Community Reinvestment Act in need of 
Further Reform? Evidence from Equity markets during the 1995 Reform Process, J. FIN. 
SERVICES RES., Feb. 2003.
56 See Klausner, supra note 18, at 1587.
57 See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 315-316.
58
 The 1995 CRA regulations take account of this critique.  See infra, Part VII.
59 See Hylton, supra note 18, at 233.
60 See id. at 238; Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 296, 340-41.
61 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 655; Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 312-13; 
White, supra note 18, at 287-90.
62 Cf. Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 368 (responding to tax and transfer system as an 
alternative to CRA).
63 Cf. Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 368 (describing the subsidy alternative).
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law.64  Some contend that the market solution—in particular, the growth of the 
subprime mortgage market—answers any concerns about underserved low-
income communities.65 Other scholars call for an increased focus on 
community development banks and peer-lending based on ethnic 
communities.66  Within the framework of CRA, some scholars call for 
tradeable CRA obligations akin to those used in environmental regimes,67
while others call for safe harbors under CRA for the top bank performers.68
In sum, critics contend that CRA suffers from poor design, forces banks 
and thrifts to make unsound loans, impedes the efficiency of the financial 
services sector, promotes rent seeking, imposes high compliance costs with 
burdensome reporting requirements and regulatory uncertainty, does little 
good, and therefore should be eliminated.  Some of these arguments have 
strong theoretical force.  Market failures are difficult to establish empirically, 
and “[t]he existence of important credit market failures is uncertain.”69
Moreover, it is unclear whether financial institutions will respond to incentives 
in desired ways.  The regulatory discretion embedded in CRA could create 
agency problems and increase regulatory costs.  Moreover, incentives are 
targeted to some, but not all, financial intermediaries, so the incentives may 
simply shift the composition of lending and not expand it or change its terms.70
This debate cannot be decided in the abstract, nor on the basis of anecdotal 
evidence. I evaluate these criticisms of CRA in Parts III and IV.  Part III
explains the theoretical justification for CRA, while Part IV assesses the 
criticisms in light of recent empirical evidence that takes account of regulatory 
changes and market experience during the 1990s.  I demonstrate that CRA has 
considerable benefits and much lower costs than previously suggested, and that 
other policy criticisms of CRA are misguided.  Parts V and VI address critics’
remaining arguments, discussed above, that existing or potential alternatives 
are preferable to CRA.  I show that CRA compares favorably with these 
alternatives on many dimensions.  In conclusion, I contend that CRA’s critics 
have it wrong.  On balance, CRA should be supported.
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRA
64 See White, supra note 18, at 283-84.
65 See Gunther, supra note 18, at 57.
66 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 654-57; Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 354-
59, 367-68.
67 See Calomiris et al., supra note 18, at 652; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1580.
68 See Swire, Safe Harbors, supra note 18, at 353-69.
69 JONATHAN ZINMAN, THE EFFICACY AND EFFICIENCY OF CREDIT MARKET INTERVENTIONS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 1 (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 
July 2002) (citing Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Some Evidence on the Empirical 
Significance of Credit Rationing, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1047 (1992)). But see Mitchell A. 
Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Effect of Creditor Competition on Firm-Creditor 
Relationships, 110 Q.J. ECON 407 (1995) (finding empirical support for credit constraints).
70
 ZINMAN, supra note 69, at 2.
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The theoretical support for CRA derives from three bases.  First, CRA 
addresses market failures from imperfect information, collective action 
problems, agency costs, and neighborhood externalities that are more acute in 
low-income neighborhoods and for low-income borrowers than in credit 
markets generally.  Second, CRA helps to reduce discrimination against 
minority borrowers and communities.  CRA was not designed to address racial 
discrimination against individual borrowers directly, but the significant 
correlation between race and income, and between race of homeowner and 
racial composition and income of neighborhood, gives CRA leverage to 
overcome barriers to credit faced by minority households. In some ways, this 
leverage is greater than that of fair lending laws.71 Third, CRA could help to 
break down inefficient barriers between the bifurcated prime and subprime
credit markets by enhancing competition between prime and subprime lenders
in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.  CRA can help make the 
subprime and prime markets more efficient by completing the market.
A. MARKET FAILURE
Credit market imperfections impede lending in low- and moderate-income 
communities.  First, information externalities and asymmetries may lead to 
credit rationing that excludes credit worthy borrowers and causes banks to 
overlook profitable loans.72 Information externalities can produce credit 
constraints because the efficiency of bank lending is in part a function of 
“market thickness.”73 Second, collective action problems exacerbate 
information externalities and inhibit entry into these communities.74 CRA 
could help to mitigate these credit constraints by providing “an effective 
commitment device to coordinate lending….”75 Third, agency costs make it 
difficult to align corporate interest in profitable lending with the behavior of 
loan agents, which CRA can help to address by providing additional incentives 
to reform corporate structures.  Lastly, neighborhood externalities provide 
grounds for governmental intervention.76  I take up these points in turn.
Information externalities contribute to lower rates of lending in low-income 
communities than would be socially optimal.  Borrowers in low-income 
neighborhoods find it more difficult to obtain mortgage loans in part because 
lenders lack sufficient information on home sales in these thin markets, that is, 
71 See infra Part V (comparing CRA to fair lending laws).
72 Janusz Ordover & Andrew Weiss, Information and the Law: Evaluating Legal Restrictions 
on Competitive Contracts, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 399 (1981).
73 William W. Lang & Leonard I. Nakamura, A Model of Redlining, 33 J. URB. ECON. 223 
(1993).  Market thickness refers to the amount of economic activity, as measured by number of 
participants, or number or total value of transactions, over some time period.
74 Petersen & Rajan, supra note 69.
75 ZINMAN, supra note 69.
76 See, e.g., JACK M. GUTTENTAG & SUSAN M. WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 
(1980).
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markets with a relatively low level of economic activity.77  The small number 
of transactions in a low-income community will make appraisals difficult.  
Any one financial institution will not want to be the only participant in a 
market with uncertain collateral values.  The reduction in market participants 
will further decrease the amount of information available about property values 
and reduce the liquidity of other loans to that neighborhood.  Lenders will not
want to lend in areas with low levels of liquidity.  Property values will decline 
as the market becomes less liquid, reinforcing the downward trend in lending.
The information required to offset this trend is costly.  In low-income 
communities, such information externalities are likely to be more costly to 
overcome, and the benefits of overcoming them are likely to be smaller, than in 
high-income neighborhoods.78  Creditors will face the up-front costs of 
developing expertise in neighborhoods that they have not previously served, 
and about which there is less information available from other creditors, 
appraisers, and real estate professionals.  In addition, creditors will need to 
spread the fixed costs of finding information about low-income neighborhoods 
over fewer transactions and smaller loan sizes.79  Creditors will have to train 
their personnel to search for creditworthy borrowers and sound residential
neighborhoods in locations where lenders have not previously conducted a 
large number of transactions.  Such information creates positive externalities
that benefit all lenders.  Information about collateral values and the existence 
of creditworthy borrowers will likely—if lenders report credit histories—inure 
to the benefit of all lenders.  Thus, the lender that invested in the additional 
information will not be fully compensated for its investment.
Lenders that do enter the market will charge higher prices to offset these 
risks.  Lenders may seek to internalize more of the benefits of customer 
information by not reporting credit histories to the credit bureaus.80  By failing 
to report credit histories, they gain market share, which would induce them to 
spend more on information and lend more. Borrowers, however, will face 
higher prices and will not be able to demonstrate to other lenders, including 
prime lenders, that they are creditworthy.  Moreover, the higher prices may 
drive more borrowers out of the market or increase defaults, making it less 
likely that other lenders will be willing to serve the market.
77 See STEPHEN ROSS & JOSH YINGER, THE COLOR OF CREDIT (2002) (analyzing Lang &  
Nakamura, supra note 73); Paul S. Calem, Mortgage Credit Available in Low- and Moderate-
Income Minority Neighborhoods: Are Information Externalities Critical?, 13 J. REAL EST. 
ECON. 71 (1996); David M. Harrison, The Importance of Lender Heterogeneity in Mortgage 
Lending, 49 J. URBAN ECON. 285 (2001); Klausner, supra note 18, at 1569-70; David C. Ling 
& Susan M. Wachter, Information Externalities and Home Mortgage Underwriting, 44 J. 
URBAN ECON. 317 (1998).
78 See generally Klausner, supra note 18, at 1569-70.
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Reporting Practices, Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council Advisory Letter, Jan. 18, 2000, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2000-3a.txt.
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In addition to neighborhood information externalities, asymmetries in 
information between lenders and borrowers that are costly to overcome can 
also lead to credit rationing.  Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss have 
demonstrated that credit rationing can occur when seemingly similar borrowers 
differ in unobserved ways in their willingness and ability to repay.81 If lenders 
charge higher interest rates to compensate themselves for the uncertainty 
regarding the risk of a given pool of borrowers, they will face higher default 
rates.  Adverse selection would mean that riskier borrowers will take out loans 
from the bank because they cannot get access to lower-priced loans elsewhere.  
These riskier borrowers will tend to default more often because moral hazard 
increases as interest rates increase, and because higher-priced loans will simply 
be more difficult for low-income borrowers to repay.  These incentives 
increase the likelihood low-income borrowers will default even if they did not 
present a similar risk of defaulting on a lower-cost loan. 
It is costly to overcome information asymmetries regarding low-income 
borrowers.  These borrowers often lack credit histories, and may not even have 
a bank account,82 so determining their creditworthiness is more difficult and 
costly.  Many low-income households could provide indicia that they are likely
to repay their loans, such as a strong record of paying rent and utilities on time, 
but banks are not used to relying on such information.  There is not yet a 
clearinghouse or standardized method of determining creditworthiness on the 
basis of these factors,83 making these other measures of creditworthiness more 
uncertain than the standard credit scores produced by the credit bureaus.  
Additionally, low-income households often have lower levels of educational 
attainment, and thus may require more assistance in completing loan 
applications.84 Creditors might rationally choose not to spend the additional 
sums necessary to lend to creditworthy borrowers in low-income communities. 
Creditors considering whether to enter a low-income market also face 
collective action problems.  Information externalities and other factors may 
delay some lenders’ entry into an otherwise profitable market, further 
diminishing the economic prospects of the area and reinforcing other lenders’ 
decisions not to lend.  Even if there are credit worthy borrowers and sufficient 
collateral values, a lender might rationally avoid the risk of lending in an 
uncertain market because other lenders are not lending there.  One can 
characterize this delayed entry as a collective action problem.85  By contrast, if 
81
 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
82 See Barr, supra note 1, at 121 (showing that 22 percent of low-income households lack a 
bank account).
83
 For innovative pilots in this regard, see, e.g., “Pay Rent, Build Credit” at 
www.payrentbuildcredit.com.
84 See Klausner, supra note 18.
85
 Contrary to previous scholarship, see Klausner, supra note 18, at 1577, I argue that CRA is 
an effective response to collective action problems because it does help banks and thrifts 
coordinate their lending.  See infra Part IV.
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lenders know that others will participate, their collateral is more likely to have 
knowable values, their collateral and loans are more likely to be liquid, and 
property values may be able to rise more quickly, all other things being equal.
The strength of other institutions in a community also reinforces
differential access to capital.  For example, to the extent that higher-income 
communities could, in theory, exhibit information externalities or collective 
action problems, such failures are overcome by real estate developers and 
agents (who gather and disseminate information about price and quality),  
neighborhood associations (who enforce rules such as lawn maintenance that 
bolster uniform reliability of collateral values), and the like.  These institutions 
are generally weaker or unavailable in low-income communities, and their 
absence exacerbates market failures.  CRA has helped to bolster these 
community-based organizations in some communities, which in turn reinforces
the effectiveness of CRA in overcoming market failures.
Neighborhood externalities that result from credit market failures also 
undergird CRA.86  Neighborhoods with low access to credit see declines in 
property values, increased vacant properties, and other indicia of distress.  
Households find it more difficult to get credit if they live in distressed 
neighborhoods.  Lower access to credit can increase neglect of properties.87
Adjacent property owners may decide not to invest in maintenance or to move 
out of the neighborhood.88  Conversely, increased access to credit and 
homeownership can help to turn neighborhoods around, increasing property 
values for adjacent properties and neighborhoods.89  Government policies 
designed to increase homeownership can thus have positive externalities in 
communities not directly affected by the government programs.90
B. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
CRA was not enacted to address racial discrimination against particular 
borrowers.  That role was assigned to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 
1974 (ECOA).91 Yet CRA had its origins in claims that banks were 
“redlining” borrowers living in low-income, minority communities, and CRA 
has helped to open up mortgage markets for minority borrowers.  Thus, in this 
Section, I explore the theory and evidence regarding credit market 
discrimination as a basis for CRA.92
86 See GUTTENTAG & WACHTER, supra note 76; Klausner, supra note 18, at 1570-71.
87 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 18, at 1571.
88 See GEORGE C. GALSTER, HOMEOWNERS AND NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT (1987).
89
 Ingrid Gould Ellen, Michael H. Schill, Scott Susin, & Amy Ellen Schwartz, Building Homes, 
Reviving Neighborhoods: Spillovers from Subsidized Construction of Owner-Occupied 
Housing in New York City, 12 J. HOUSING RES. 185 (2001); Michael H. Schill, Ingrid Gould 
Ellen, Amy Ellen Schwartz, & Ioan Voicu, Revitalizing Inner-City Neighborhoods: New York 
City’s Ten-Year Plan, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 529 (2002).
90 Id.
91 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691f (2000). The Federal Reserve Board implements ECOA under 
Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 (2004).
92 See Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
1431 (1995) (arguing that CRA should be understood as a response to racial discrimination).  
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The standard view, derived from the work of Gary Becker, is that, in the 
long run, in a perfect market, discrimination will disappear.93 Long- run 
equilibrium will probably occur sooner in credit markets than in, say, labor 
markets, because credit markets are more efficient.  Nonetheless, at a given 
point in time, one would need to specify the parameters of Becker’s model to 
test his hypothesis, and competing theories suggest that the model is too 
limited.  Credit- rationing theory can explain the persistence of lending 
discrimination.  In addition, Becker’s model assumes that only racial animus is 
illegal; however, statistical discrimination, in which lenders use factors 
correlated with race as proxies for creditworthiness, violates ECOA.94  Lastly,
price discrimination can persist in segmented credit markets. 
Credit rationing enables discrimination to persist even in competitive 
markets.  Credit rationing can occur because of asymmetric information, 
adverse selection and moral hazard.95  If credit rationing occurs, identical 
marginal applicants will be treated differently; some borrowers will get loans 
while others will not, and lenders will not charge differential prices to sort 
borrowers by risk.  The single-price model in Stiglitz and Weiss accurately 
describes the prime credit market dominated by banks and thrifts,96 while the 
subprime market differentiates by risk. Since lenders in credit-rationing
models do not provide loans to all members of a class of identical loan 
applicants, they could discriminate without losing profits (absent legal liability 
under anti-discrimination laws).  Moreover, tests of lending discrimination 
But see Klausner, supra note 18, at 1563-64 (arguing that ECOA, not CRA, should address 
racial discrimination).  For a defense of the view that CRA should be seen as a legitimate 
response to racial discrimination in addition to ECOA, see Part IV.
93 See BECKER, supra note 19.
94 Compare ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77, and FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY FAIR LENDING EXAMINATION PROCEDURES (1999) 
[hereinafter FFIEC] (explaining that statistical discrimination violates fair lending law), 
available at http://www.ffiec.gov, with BECKER, supra note 19 (arguing that discrimination 
only occurs if the institution foregoes profits in order to satisfy the “taste” for discrimination);
see also infra Part V (comparing CRA to fair lending laws).
95 See Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 81 and accompanying text.  Under an alternative theory, 
Ferguson and Peters show that even with symmetric information, credit rationing can occur 
when a lender’s marginal cost of making a loan to a given class of borrowers increases with 
the size of the lender’s portfolio for reasons unrelated to borrower creditworthiness.  Michael 
F. Ferguson & Stephen R. Peters, Is Lending Discrimination Always Costly?, 21 JOURNAL OF 
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 23 (2000).  Such portfolio effects might arise, they argue, from 
higher resale or management costs from risk diversification, or regulatory costs, see MICHAEL 
F. FERGUSON & STEPHEN R. PETERS, A SYMMETRIC-INFORMATION MODEL OF CREDIT 
RATIONING (University of Cincinnati, Working Paper, 1997).  Credit rationing could also 
occur when lenders use low interest rates but high denial rates to separate low-risk from high-
risk borrowers. Paul S. Calem & Michael Stutzer, The Simple Analytics of Observed 
Discrimination in Credit Markets, 4 J. OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION 189 (1995); see also David 
Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor, Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolist and 
Competitive Credit Markets, 28 INT’L ECON. REV. 671 (1987) (showing credit rationing when 
low-risk borrowers lack downpayments to distinguish as low-risk).
96 For discussion of the subprime market, see infra, Part III.C.
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based on profitability would not identify lending discrimination, because 
lenders who discriminated would be just as profitable as lenders who did not.
Statistical discrimination could be profitable if race is correlated with an 
aspect of creditworthiness that is costly to observe directly. It is rational for 
financial institutions to avoid information costs by making statistical 
assessments about creditworthiness, even if such factors are correlated with 
race.  Competitive markets will not drive out statistical discrimination in the 
short term.97 Still, statistical discrimination will be less accurate than a direct 
measure of individual creditworthiness.  As technology and innovation drive 
down the costs of obtaining such measures, one would expect statistical 
discrimination to diminish in competitive markets over the long term.98
The evidence on discrimination in credit markets is hotly contested.99
Disparities in the rates at which whites and African Americans (among others) 
are denied home mortgage loans continue to be large.  But disparities alone do 
not prove discrimination; the empirical debate revolves around controls for 
creditworthiness and other factors that legitimately affect lending decisions. 
The debate intensified with the release of the first Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) data containing race in 1991 and the publication of a study by 
economists at the Federal Reserve Board of Boston in 1992.100 The Boston 
Fed Study found that African Americans were nearly twice as likely as whites 
to be denied home mortgage loans after adjusting for an array of variables 
related to risk.101  The study has come under a barrage of attacks,102 but 
rebuttals have affirmed the study’s central findings.103 On balance, the 
evidence suggests that disparities between African-American and white 
borrowers persist.104 Matched pair testing has also found differential 
97
 The short term and long term are not defined here.  In the context of higher education, 
Justice O’Connor suggested that affirmative action would no longer be needed in 25 years.  
Grutter v. Bollinger, Slip Op. No. 02-241, at 31, 539 U.S. __, __ (2003).  Alan Kreuger has 
pointed out that 25 years may not be long enough, given that the black-white wage gap is cut 
in half only over a generation.  N.Y. TIMES Apr. , 2003, at __.
98 See Stuart I. Greenbaum, Twenty-Five Years of Banking Research, 25 FIN. MGMT. 86 
(1996). But see Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Credit Discrimination A Law and 
Economics Analysis, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 787 (1995) (arguing that discrimination reduces the 
returns to investing in creditworthiness for minorities, which would perpetuate discrimination); 
Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, Self Selection and Discrimination in Credit 
Markets (1998) (unpublished manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland) (describing 
equilibria in which borrowers sort themselves among discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
lenders based on their creditworthiness and discrimination persists).
99 See generally ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77.
100 See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING THE 
HMDA DATA (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper 92-97, 1992) (initial 
publication); see also Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting 
HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996) (final publication with responses to critics).
101 See Ross & Yinger, supra note 77, at ___. 
102 See, e.g., ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77, at __ (analyzing these studies). 
103 See, e.g., id. at __ (analyzing these studies).
104 See generally id.
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treatment.105 These disparities suggest either disparate treatment of, or 
disparate impact on, minorities.106 Studies of redlining on the basis of 
neighborhood composition face greater empirical challenges and provide 
inconclusive results.  Two studies have found that largely African-American 
census tracts received fewer loans than other tracts, after controlling for tract 
characteristics, while one study suggests that there may be redlining on the 
basis of income.107 In sum, recent analysis suggests that “extensive 
underwriting discrimination existed in 1990, and there is no more recent 
evidence to show that this discrimination has gone away.”108
In addition to discrimination in loan denials, price discrimination can also 
occur because of market fragmentation.109 Prime lenders offer a single price to 
borrowers who meet their criteria and ration credit among the others.
Subprime lenders offer differential pricing of loans on the basis of risk and
other factors. Although the growth of risk- based pricing in the subprime 
market has broadened the eligible pool of borrowers,110 differentiated pricing
may also result in racial discrimination. Using credit scores, creditors can 
determine the price at which they would be willing to lend to a particular 
borrower, but the subprime market’s fragmented nature prevents all potential 
borrowers from learning about lenders’ pricing schemes.  This permits lenders 
to distinguish among similar borrowers in pricing loans.  Creditors price loans 
based on factors other than risk, including a borrower’s willingness to pay.  
Differential pricing can facilitate market clearing, but these pricing techniques 
lead to systematically different prices for minorities than for whites.
Under ECOA, price discrimination is unlawful.111 Price discrimination
occurs in a range of credit markets.112 Comprehensive loan pricing data are 
105 See, e.g., MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING EVIDENCE
(Margery Turner & Felicity Skidmore eds., 1999).
106 ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77, at 211.
107 See id. at 230 (citing Stephen L. Ross & Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Redlining, the Community 
Reinvestment Act, and Private Mortgage Insurance (1998) (unpublished manuscript); ROSS  & 
YINGER, supra note 77, at 232; see also Consent Agreement, United States v. Chevy Chase 
Federal Saving Bank, No. 94-CV-1824-JG (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1994). Income redlining does not 
violate ECOA, although it would affect an institution’s performance under CRA.
108 ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77, at 367-68.
109See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? NON-TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND 
GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2002).
110 See infra Part III.C (discussing growth of subprime market).
111 See, e.g., Consent Agreement, United States v. First National Bank of Vicksburg, No. 5-94-
CV-6(B)(N) (S.D. Miss., Jan. 21, 1994).
112 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Expert Report, Cason v. Nissan, No. 3-98-0223, (M.D.T.N. May 25, 
2001); AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?, supra note 109; ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77; 
Business Access to Capital and Credit, A Federal Reserve Board Research Conference, March 
8-9, 1999; Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a 
New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995). 
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not available for home mortgages.113 Studies have focused on “overages,” the 
amount by which negotiated loan rates exceed the lender’s minimum rates set 
forth on “rate sheets” for loan officers.114  Strikingly, mortgages obtained by 
African Americans more often contain overages, and much higher ones, than 
mortgages obtained by others.115 African Americans fare worse in negotiations 
with mortgage brokers and loan officers.116
Other factors may reinforce discrimination.  Automatic credit systems can
have a disparate impact on minorities if the factors used are correlated with 
race, and allow disparate treatment if brokers treat borderline cases differently.  
Firms adopt reward structures for loan officers that favor high-income areas,
with higher concentrations of white borrowers. Loan officers or brokers may 
discriminate but their practices might go undetected by creditors because of 
agency problems.117 Banks may underinvest (from a social perspective) in 
branches or in training loan officers in how to make loans in underserved,
minority neighborhoods.  Credit discrimination might lead minorities to 
underinvest in creditworthiness, diminishing their prospects for a loan.118
Discrimination in the housing market119 or the labor market may be transmitted 
to credit markets.  Differences in the collateral values of homes or fears of 
racial integration could depress housing prices, leading to lower sales, fewer 
loans, and higher interest rates in minority neighborhoods.
C. PROBLEMS IN THE SUBPRIME SECTOR
113
 The Federal Reserve Board now requires certain price data for high cost loans to be 
reported. Home Mortgage Disclosure; Final & Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 7,221 (Feb. 15, 
2002). 
114
 On the problem of the differential effects based on race of yield spread premiums, which 
compensate brokers for getting borrowers to accept higher interest rates than they qualify for, 
see HOWELL E. JACKSON & JEREMY BERRY, KICKBACKS OR COMPENSATION: THE CASE OF 
YIELD SPREAD PREMIUMS (Harvard working paper, 2003).
115 ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77, at 223-27, 307.
116 Id. at 307; see also Harold A. Black et al., Is There Discrimination in Mortgage Pricing? 
The Case of Overages, 27 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 1139 (2003); Henry Buist et al., Residential 
Lending Discrimination and Lender Compensation Policies, 27 J. AM. REAL EST. & URBAN 
ECON. ASSOC. 695 (1999); McKinley Blackburn & Todd Vermilyea, Racial Discrimination in 
Home Purchase Mortgage Lending among Large National Banks (2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Moore School of Business, U. of S. Carolina). Possible explanations 
include borrower anxiety based on experience with past discrimination, greater risk aversion, 
higher levels of information asymmetry, or discrimination by the originator or broker.
117 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 8-15 (1991) (discussing agency costs).
118 See Swire, supra note 98 (arguing that discrimination reduces the returns to investing in 
creditworthiness for minorities).
119
 For the history of discrimination in government housing policy and in real estate markets, 
see generally, Anthony Pennington-Cross & Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal Housing 
Administration in the New Millennium, 11 J. OF HOUSING RES. 357, 358 (2000); ROSS & 
YINGER, supra note 77; MARGERY TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN 
HOUSING MARKETS (Nov. 2002), at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/ 
Phase1_Report.pdf. 
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Banks and thrifts have increased their lending to low- and moderate-
income borrowers in ways that suggest that CRA is working.120  But subprime 
lending—a sector outside CRA’s purview—has grown dramatically at the 
same time.121 Subprime lenders specialize in making loans to borrowers with 
impaired or limited credit history.  Most subprime loans are refinance loans.  
Although refinancing may be used to obtain better rates, subprime refinance 
loans are usually used for home improvement or consumer purchases, to pay 
for education expenses, or to consolidate other consumer debt.122 With new 
sources of funding available from the secondary market, and advances in 
information and risk management, subprime lending has grown sevenfold from 
1994 to 2002, reaching $241 billion, or 9 percent of the market.123  In 2001, 
there were nearly 200 subprime and manufactured home lenders.124
The subprime market is plagued by serious problems.  Some subprime 
borrowers who could have qualified for loans from prime lenders end up in the 
subprime market, paying higher rates.  Research suggests that between 10 and 
35 percent of subprime borrowers could qualify for prime mortgage loans.125
Some minority borrowers may have been improperly “steered” to higher cost 
lenders.126 Moreover, studies have documented abusive practices in the 
subprime sector.127 These practices have included “flipping,” repeatedly 
refinancing a loan in a short period of time.  Flipping subjects a borrower to 
high fees, including prepayment penalties, which diminish the borrower’s 
home equity without providing significant benefit.  Loans have been “packed” 
with additional products (such as credit life insurance) without the borrower 
understanding that the products were optional or unsuitable. Loans have
included fees unrelated to risk or servicing, and which are structured to 
disguise their true costs.  Some brokers have made home mortgage loans 
without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.  These so-called “asset 
based” loans were often made by brokers who earned high fees and were less 
120
 For a fuller discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.
121
 For evidence that CRA nonetheless can be demonstrated to have been an important factor in 
driving increased lending in low-income areas, see infra, Part IV.
122 See National Home Equity Mortgage Association, Frequently Asked Questions, at 
http:///www.nhema.org/About/Questions.htm. 
123 See Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Texas Association of Bank Counsel 
(Oct. 9, 2003).
124 HUD, HUD SUBPRIME AND MANUFACTURED HOME LENDER LIST, available at
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2003).
125 FREDDIE MAC, AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING: MAKING MORTGAGE LENDING SIMPLER AND 
FAIRER FOR AMERICA’S FAMILIES (2002).
126
 Alternatively, minorities may misperceive their own creditworthiness, believe that prime 
lenders would deny their loans, or make bad choices.
127
 For a full discussion of such practices, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME 
MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT (2000).  I co-directed this report while at Treasury.
See also Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century, 16 NOTRE DAME J. 
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2002).
Credit Where It Counts 20
concerned about their reputations among lenders. In other cases, “unscrupulous 
mortgage brokers, lenders, home improvement contractors, appraisers, and 
combinations thereof” engaged in “outright fraud” as well as “deceptive or 
high-pressure sales tactics,” and often “prey[ed] on . . . the elderly, minorities, 
and individuals with lower incomes and less education . . . .”128
While credit risk is a key determinant of whether a borrower receives a 
prime or subprime loan, a recent study suggests that “credit risk alone may not 
fully explain why borrowers end up in the subprime market.”129  For example, 
borrowers who are older, Hispanic, or search less for interest rates are more 
likely to end up in the subprime market.130 Having a subprime loan is an 
important determinant of refinancing with a subprime loan even after 
controlling for relevant factors: Sixty percent of subprime borrowers who 
refinanced did so with subprime loans rather than prime ones,131 indicating that
subprime borrowers get stuck in the subprime market. Subprime borrowers are
more dissatisfied with the mortgage process than prime borrowers.132
The price that borrowers pay is a function not only of using a subprime 
lender, but also of negotiating with mortgage brokers, who dominate the 
subprime market.  Brokers are compensated for getting borrowers to pay 
higher rates than those for which the borrower would qualify. Such “yield 
spread premiums” are widely used.  In loans with yield spread premiums, 
unlike other loans, there is wide dispersion in prices paid to mortgage brokers.  
Within the group of borrowers paying yield spread premiums, African 
Americans paid $474 more, and Hispanics $590 more, than white borrowers; 
thus, even if minority and white borrowers could qualify for the same rate, 
minority borrowers are likely to pay much more.133 Minority borrowers and 
white borrowers tend to go to different lenders and “some lenders use 
particularly aggressive rate-setting rules with minority customers.”134
Moreover, borrowers in the subprime market form a pool whose risk 
characteristics are worse and more widely dispersed than borrowers in the 
prime market.135  Even though there is rough risk-based pricing in the 
subprime market, defaulting borrowers create an externality that raises interest 
rates on all subprime borrowers.  Regulation of the subprime sector is in part a 
response to the problem of incomplete contracts.  Borrowers cannot contract 
128 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, supra note 127, at 2.
129
 Marsha J. Courchane et al., Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 
J. REAL EST. FINANCE & ECON. (forthcoming 2004).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See JACKSON & BERRY, supra note 114, at 125-28; see also JACK GUTTENTAG, ANOTHER 
VIEW OF PREDATORY LENDING 8 (Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 
01-23-B, Aug. 2001) (“According to the brokers, [a] major determinant of profit per loan is the 
sophistication of the borrower relative to the sales skills of the loan officer”).
134 ROSS  & YINGER, supra note 77, at 344.
135
 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 119.
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with one another to allocate the costs of the negative externality of default.  
Foreclosures concentrated in low-income neighborhoods can also cause 
negative externalities to neighboring property owners.136
Some critics believe that the subprime market’s growth obviates the need 
for CRA, but I argue in Parts IV and V that CRA is uniquely positioned to 
overcome the bifurcation between the prime and subprime markets by 
enhancing competition from banks and thrifts.  Overcoming that bifurcation 
would improve market efficiency, reduce racial discrimination, and speed the 
process of correcting other market failures.  Lending by subprime specialists 
does not replace lending by banks and thrifts.  First, subprime creditors 
specialize in refinance loans rather than in home purchase originations.  That 
is, subprime lenders free-ride on the information generated by firms engaged in 
home purchase lending.  Second, subprime lenders have failed to report credit 
scores for sound borrowers in order to capture the informational benefits from
their investment.  As a result, the positive externalities from increased lending 
in low-income areas are not realized.  Third, borrowing from a subprime lender 
signals to prime lenders that a borrower is a bad credit risk.  Rather than 
increasing access to prime lending, subprime borrowing helps to keep 
borrowers in the subprime market, where borrowers pay more for credit.  
Moreover, minority households are much more likely to remain stuck in the 
subprime market even after accounting for creditworthiness.
D. SUMMARY
Market failures, racial discrimination, and bifurcated credit markets justify 
CRA.  CRA helps to overcome information externalities and collective action 
problems by helping to coordinate bank lending.  CRA responds to racial 
discrimination by encouraging banks and thrifts to lend in low-income areas 
and to low-income borrowers, where and among whom minorities are 
disproportionately represented.  CRA could offer a strong response to the 
market failures that have arisen from bifurcated credit markets.  In Part IV, I 
explain how CRA is effectively overcoming many of these barriers.
IV. NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT CRA IS EFFECTIVE
Part III offered theoretical foundations for CRA.  This Part explores recent 
empirical evidence showing that CRA, on balance, constitutes defensible 
policy. The first Section relies on empirical evidence, part of which I directed 
at the Treasury Department, to demonstrate that CRA has a positive impact on 
access to credit, despite the empirical difficulty of isolating CRA as a cause of 
recent, positive developments in credit markets.137 The second Section 
136 Id.
137 It should be re-emphasized that in this Part, as in the discussion of market imperfections, 
empirical studies in an area as complicated as credit markets cannot prove any contention with 
certainty.  Technological and economic change exacerbate this difficulty, as do the multiplicity 
of regulations and the pervasiveness of subsidies.
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analyzes how the costs of CRA are generally overstated.  In particular, the 
claim that CRA induces banks and thrifts to make dangerously unprofitable 
loans is not substantiated by the data.  Similarly, I present evidence to rebut 
claims of rampant rent seeking and other costs. Even a rough sense of the 
costs and benefits of CRA adduced thus far suggests that it is socially efficient.  
The third Section shows how other arguments that CRA is the wrong policy 
response miss the mark.  Parts V and VI address the remaining arguments of 
the critics that alternatives to CRA should be preferred.
A. THE BENEFITS OF CRA ARE SUBSTANTIAL
Initiatives by financial institutions over the last decade suggest that CRA –
in combination with other factors – is helping banks and thrifts to eliminate or 
reduce barriers to credit.  With impetus from CRA, lenders have: formed 
multi-bank Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and loan consortia 
to reduce risk, overcome collective action problems, and share the costs and 
benefits of developing information about low-income markets; invested in 
locally based Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to 
develop specialized market knowledge, share risk, and explore new market 
opportunities; engaged in special marketing programs to targeted communities; 
experimented with more flexible underwriting and specialized servicing 
techniques to determine if a broader range of applications could be approved 
without undue risk; and funded credit counseling to improve the 
creditworthiness of potential borrowers.  Many larger institutions have 
developed specialized units within their organizations that focus on the needs 
of low- and moderate-income communities.  A positive lending cycle has 
begun in many communities: once lenders know that others will be making 
loans to a community, they face less liquidity risk, gather and disseminate
information more quickly, and produce positive information externalities.  
Experience suggests that increased lending to low-income communities has 
occurred, and that such lending has not led to the kind or the extent of 
unprofitable, excessively risky activity predicted by critics.
Studies have found evidence that CRA improved access to home mortgage 
credit for low-income borrowers during the 1990s, as CRA enforcement 
increased. One study found that the share of CRA-eligible loan originations by 
banks, thrifts, and their affiliates in the 1990s increased; it also found evidence 
of gains to minorities and low-income areas from all lenders , which the authors 
attribute in part to increased fair lending enforcement.138  Other researchers 
have found evidence consistent “with the view that the CRA has been effective 
in encouraging bank organizations, particularly those involved in 
consolidation, to serve [low- and moderate-income] and minority borrowers 
and neighborhoods.”139  Lending to low- and moderate income borrowers grew 
138
 Douglas D. Evanoff & Lewis M Siegal, CRA and Fair Lending Regulations: Resulting 
Trends in Mortgage Lending, 20 FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO ECON. PERSP. 19 (1996).
139 Robert B. Avery et al., Trends in Home Purchase Lending: Consolidation and the 
Community Reinvestment Act, 85 FED. RESERVE BULL. 81 (1999). See also Glenn B. Canner & 
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much faster than lending to other groups in the 1990s, which may have been 
attributable to both CRA and other factors.140  A case study found that one
lender had extended loans to low-income and minority borrowers with lower 
credit scores than it normally required, at least in part because of CRA.141
Research that I directed at the Treasury Department found that, in absolute 
terms, between 1993 and 1999, depository institutions covered by the CRA 
and their affiliates made nearly $800 billion in home mortgage, small business, 
and community development loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers 
and communities.142 The number of CRA-eligible mortgage loans increased 
by 39 percent between 1993 and 1998, while other loans increased by only 17 
percent.143 Affiliates are included in CRA assessments only at the lender’s 
discretion.  Even excluding all affiliates, banks and thrifts themselves
increased their lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas by 
10 percent, compared with no growth at all for these lenders in their other 
markets.144  Over this period, the portfolio share of CRA-covered lender and 
affiliate loans going to these borrowers and areas increased from 25 to 28 
percent as these institutions increasingly focused on underserved markets.145
Lenders covered by CRA primarily specialize in prime lending.  In the 
prime market, covered lenders and their affiliates increased their market share 
of lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas from 66 percent 
in 1993 to 71 percent in 1998.146 Yet the dramatic expansion of non-covered 
lenders in the subprime refinance market meant that banks and thrifts lost 
market share overall in low- and moderate-income communities.  Fully 85 
percent of non-covered institutions’ growth is attributable to lending by 
Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 77 
FED. RESERVE BULL. 859 (1991).
140
 Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Risk, Credit Scoring, and the Performance of Home 
Mortgages, 82 FED. RESERVE BULL. 621 (1996).
141 MICHAEL LACOUR-LITTLE, DOES THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT MAKE MORTGAGE 
CREDIT MORE WIDELY AVAILABLE? SOME NEW EVIDENCE BASED ON THE PERFORMANCE OF 
CRA MORTGAGE CREDITS (Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. , May 4, 1998).
142 See ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AFTER FINANCIAL 
MODERNIZATION: A BASELINE REPORT (U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Apr. 2000) [hereinafter 
LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT]; ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 
ACT AFTER FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION: A FINAL REPORT (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter LITAN ET 
AL., FINAL REPORT].  The author directed this research project while serving at the Treasury 
Department.  For further analysis of these reports, see ERIC S. BELSKY ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF 
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT ON BANK AND THRIFT HOME PURCHASE MORTGAGE 
LENDING, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Aug. 2001). 
Mortgage loans made between 1993 and 1998 constituted $467 billion of that total.  See LITAN 
ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra, at ES-3.  In 1998 alone, CRA-covered institutions and their 
affiliates made $135 billion in mortgage loans to these borrowers, an 80 percent increase over 
their lending in 1993. See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra, at ES-3.
143 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 142, at ES-3.
144 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 142, at 46.
145 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 142, at ES-4.
146 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 142, at ES-7.
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specialists in subprime and manufactured home lending.  More than 77 percent 
of this subprime lending growth is attributable to refinances rather than home 
purchase loans.147  As a result of the growth in subprime refinance lending, 
non-covered institutions increased their overall market share of lending to low-
and moderate-income borrowers and areas from 35 percent in 1993 to 37 
percent in 1998.148  Thus, banks and thrifts increased their home purchase 
lending, while others focused on subprime refinance loans.
HMDA data also show improvements in lending to minority and low-
income borrowers, although HMDA data need to be treated with caution.149
From 1993 to 1999, the number of home purchase loans made to Hispanics 
increased 121.4 percent; to Native Americans, 118.9 percent; to blacks, 91.0%;
to Asians, 70.1 percent; and to whites, 33.5 percent.  Over that period, the 
number of home purchase loans extended to applicants with incomes less than 
80 percent of the median increased 86.2 percent, much higher growth than any 
other income group experienced.  In 1999, conventional home purchase loans 
extended in neighborhoods that are predominantly minority were up 17 percent 
over the previous year, compared with 6 percent growth in other 
neighborhoods.150
Without more evidence, however, one cannot attribute the rapid growth in 
lending to low-income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers and areas to 
CRA.  A series of other factors undoubtedly contributed to these gains.  First 
and foremost, strong economic growth during the 1990s led to rapid income 
growth and lower unemployment rates for minorities in many of the largest 
central cities.  Real interest rates for mortgages were at low levels during much 
of this period.  Second, financial and technological innovation helped drive 
down the costs of assessing creditworthiness, offering mortgage products, 
effectuating transactions, and funding loans through securitization.  Third, 
extensive consolidation in the financial services sector heightened the potential 
to magnify the adverse consequences of poor performance under CRA on 
major transactions.,  Consolidation also enhanced competition for the delivery 
of credit in many markets, including low-income communities.  Fourth, it is 
difficult to disaggregate the effects of CRA, HMDA, ECOA, Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) lending, and the government-sponsored enterprise 
(GSE) Affordable Housing Goals, which all operated in intensified ways on 
different mortgage market participants during this period.
Controlling for the effects of these factors, however, the Treasury research 
that I directed found that CRA provides important benefits.  Evidence 
benchmarking banks and thrifts against non-CRA lenders facing similar market 
147 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 142, at 43.
148 See LITAN ET AL., BASELINE REPORT, supra note 142, at ES-6.
149 See, e.g., WILLIAM APGAR ET AL., JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: ACCESS TO 
CAPITAL IN AN EVOLVING FINANCIAL SERVICES SYSTEM 34-35 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 JOINT 
CENTER CRA REPORT].
150
 HMDA data are available at http://www.ffiec.gov/hmcrpr/hmda03.pdf.
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and legal conditions (other than CRA) suggests that CRA is effective. The 
report found that CRA lenders (with or without their affiliates) increased their 
CRA-eligible home purchase lending faster than those not regulated by CRA 
from 1993 to 1999.151 Similarly, analysis of CRA lending across metropolitan 
areas with divergent economic circumstances and divergent levels of home 
mortgage activity reinforces the view that CRA helps expand access to home 
mortgage credit for low- and moderate-income borrowers.152 Case studies of 
metropolitan areas also support that view.153 On these measures, CRA appears 
to make a difference.154  Additional analysis of this data by authors of the 
Treasury report—controlling for economic situation, demographics, housing 
market, market organization, Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
insurance, secondary market sales, and other factors—found that “CRA has 
increased the flow of credit to [low- and moderate-income] borrowers and 
areas by CRA-covered lenders and their affiliates over the period studied.”155
The Joint Center on Housing at Harvard University followed up this 
research by examining the behavior of CRA lenders, the portion of CRA-
eligible market share held by banks and thrifts, and price changes and turnover 
rates in low-income neighborhoods.156  This research again found that CRA 
has positive effects.  The models used in the report do not “reveal[] with 
precision the exact magnitude of the impact of CRA,”157 and so should be 
interpreted cautiously.  By one measure, however, the report found that the 
effect of CRA on home mortgage lending to low- and moderate-income 
borrowers and areas was equivalent to the effect of a 1.3 percentage point
decrease in unemployment.158 The report found:
CRA lenders have changed their behavior. CRA lenders originate 
a higher proportion of CRA-eligible loans than they would if CRA did 
not exist, and they seem to reject fewer CRA-eligible loan 
applications than they would if CRA did not exist.
151 See LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 142, at ES-4.
152 Id., at 36.
153
 Id., at 62.
154 See id., at ES 3-4.  This research stands in contrast to the approach taken by Gunther, supra 
note 18 (arguing that CRA is ineffective).  Gunther examines data from 1993 and 1997, years 
that because of differences in refinancings are not comparable.  Gunther fails to distinguish 
between home purchase and refinance loans, and between prime and subprime lending.  He 
also excludes loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers outside of low- and moderate-
income areas even though such loans count for CRA purposes and are important in expanding 
opportunity for low-income households.  Lastly, Gunther repeats arguments that CRA lending 
is unsound, ignoring the contrary evidence from the Federal Reserve Board’s report, see infra
note 176 and accompanying text.
155 BELSKY ET AL., supra note 142, at 22.
156 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 149, at 59.
157 Id. at 58.
158 See id. at 59.
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CRA lenders appear to have captured a higher share of the CRA-
eligible lending market than they would have if CRA were not in 
place.
CRA-eligible neighborhoods seem to have more rapid house price 
increases and higher turnover rates than other neighborhoods, which 
is consistent with an expansion of credit in those areas.159
In reaching these conclusions, the report used two key variables: one
measuring lending within as opposed to outside assessment areas, and one 
denoting whether community groups had signed CRA agreements.160 Some 
findings from the study are open to conflicting interpretations.  On the one 
hand, the growth of the subprime market may mean that CRA is less important 
than it once was, or even undermine the suggestion that CRA has improved 
lending by banks and thrifts, since the growth of subprime lending has been 
much stronger.  In addition, some portion of the increased lending by CRA-
covered, prime lenders represented levels of lending that shifted from subprime 
lenders to prime lenders, rather than a net increase in loans.  Moreover, much 
of the increase in lending that the Joint Center attributed to CRA came from 
lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers in middle- and high-income 
neighborhoods, with presumably lower neighborhood effects.
On the other hand, each of these points is amenable to a contrary and often 
more plausible interpretation.  The Joint Center’s approach may actually 
understate the effect of CRA on changing banking practices both within and 
outside assessment areas.  Banks may change their business practices to meet 
the credit needs of low-income communities, and then apply those changed 
practices across all of the areas that they serve, low-income or not, and not 
simply within their assessment areas.  The costs of developing products and 
training personnel may make consistently applying these business practices 
across all lending areas more efficient.  Moreover, if bank performance under 
CRA has a demonstration effect on other lenders, and helps to thicken the 
market, as information externality theory would predict, then the success of 
CRA contributed to the relative growth in low- and moderate-income lending 
by non-CRA regulated lenders.  As the Joint Center report notes, the “fact that 
many large independent mortgage companies (i.e., mortgage lenders not 
subject to CRA) have been stunningly successful at serving the lower-income 
market is highly suggestive that this dynamic has indeed played out and that a 
reasonable portion of the CRA-eligible market is now being served 
economically.”161
In addition, in the absence of CRA, banks and thrifts may not have 
behaved the same as independent mortgage firms in lending to low- and 
moderate-income borrowers, but worse, given their higher costs of funds and 
159 Id. at 58.
160 Id. at 61.
161 Id. at 60.
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business plans that tend to focus on higher cost services to higher income 
clientele.162 Thus, comparisons between bank and nonbank lending to low-
income borrowers would tend to understate CRA’s impact on banks and thrifts.  
Furthermore, a focus on CRA lending in low-income neighborhoods is too 
narrow.  CRA lending to low-income borrowers outside of poor neighborhoods 
improves social mobility by helping low-income borrowers move to better 
neighborhoods and is an important element of CRA’s success. In addition, 
GSE affordable housing goals and fair lending laws likely increased lending by 
nonbanks and banks, so it is difficult to measure what mortgage companies 
would have done in the absence of these laws.  Lastly, even if some gains in 
prime lending merely represent a substitution of subprime lending for prime 
lending, such shifts lower prices and move industry practice in low-income 
neighborhoods towards the standards of the prime market, which provides 
significant benefits to low- and moderate-income and minority households.
Thus, the evidence on home mortgage lending confirms that, at bottom:
CRA-regulated entities still lead the market in the provision of 
mortgage capital to lower-income people and communities, especially 
lower-income minorities. Detailed multivariate analysis confirms that 
CRA-regulated lenders originate a higher proportion of loans to 
lower-income people and communities than they would if CRA did 
not exist. Moreover, lower-income neighborhoods targeted by CRA 
appear to have more rapid price increases and higher property sales 
rates than other neighborhoods.163
Evidence from small business markets also reinforces the view that CRA 
has been effective.  The 1995 changes to the CRA regulations required large 
commercial banks and savings associations to report on small business lending 
for the first time. In 2002, the most recent year for which data is available, 
banks and thrifts subject to CRA’s small business reporting requirement made 
$111 billion in loans to firms with revenues under $1 million, nearly double 
the 1996 figure.164  Banks and thrifts made $27.8 billion in community 
development loans in 2002, $10 billion more than they had made in 1996.165
A recent empirical study found that CRA “does increase lending to small 
businesses as intended.”166 The study suggests that CRA increases the number 
of firms that can access credit by four to six percentage points.167 The study
162 See, e.g., LACOUR-LITTLE, supra note 141; Glenn B. Canner et al., DOES THE COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA) CAUSE BANKS TO PROVIDE A SUBSIDY TO SOME MORTGAGE 
BORROWERS?, (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2002-19, 2002).
163 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 149, at 135.
164
 CRA National Aggregate Table 1, at http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/ 
RetrieveTablesNA.htm?as_Year=2002&as_table=1+Originations.
165
 CRA National Aggregate Table 3, at http://www.ffiec.gov/webcraad/ 
RetrieveTablesNA.htm?as_Year=2002&as_table=3++Community development lending.
166 ZINMAN, supra note 69, at 2.
167 See id. at 20.
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found that CRA generally increased access to credit for small firms, as 
intended by CRA, but did not find any evidence that CRA increased access to 
credit for small firms located in low- and moderate-income areas, holding 
other factors constant.168 Moreover, the study determined that the increased 
lending to small businesses induced by CRA provided benefits to the real 
economy—increased payrolls and reduced bankruptcies—without any 
evidence that such lending crowded out other financing available to small 
businesses or adversely affected bank profitability or loan performance.169 It is 
somewhat remarkable that studies of CRA’s effect on small business lending 
show any effect at all, given that small business data collection is relatively 
new, data are not as comprehensive, and the examinations for small business 
lending are not as well developed as for home mortgage lending.  
Aside from lending activities, financial institutions have also increased 
their community development investments in low-income communities under 
CRA.  Although comprehensive data on investments are not available, one can 
assemble some broad aggregate statistics using data from other regulatory 
provisions.170 For example, national bank community development 
investments totaled $15 billion from 1965 to 2002, with well over half the
investments coming during the last decade.171 Such investments are in addition 
to community development loans, which totaled $42.3 billion in 2003 alone.172
Changes in financial services industry may mean that CRA covers less and 
less of the financial services world.  Banks and thrifts’ share of financial assets 
has declined dramatically since the end of World War Two, from 60 percent to 
about 25 percent today.  Moreover, for business organization reasons unrelated 
to CRA, banks and thrifts may pursue a greater portion of their lending activity 
through affiliates not covered by CRA, particularly mortgage finance company 
affiliates.  According to the Joint Center, the reach of CRA is likely declining:
In combination, the changing industry structure, along with the 
fact that CRA expanded the capacity of all industry players to better 
168 See id.
169 Id. at 3.
170
 12 C.F.R. Part 24 (2004), implementing 12 USC §§ 24 (Eleventh), 93a, 481, & 1818 
(investments designed to promote the public welfare) (2000).  Banks are only required to use 
the “Part 24” authority for investments that would otherwise not be authorized for national
banks, so data collected under this authority understates CRA-eligible investments. 
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http://www.occ.treas.gov/cdd/2002Part24Dir.pdf, at 4 & 6 (visited Aug. 18, 2004) (author’s 
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serve lower-income borrowers, has diminished the extent that CRA-
regulated organizations now lead the market. Econometric analysis 
suggests that on average over the period 1993 to 2000, CRA may 
have increased the share of loans going to CRA-eligible borrowers by
2.1 percentage points (or from 30.3 to 32.4 percent). Estimates for 
individual years suggest, however, that the CRA impact has declined 
from 3.7 percentage points in 1993 to 1.6 percentage points in 
2000.173
In part, this decline may be less momentous than community-based 
organizations suggest: although assets subject to CRA are declining as a share 
of financial assets, such assets continue to grow in absolute terms. Moreover, 
as CRA-covered institutions develop new products, train employees, and alter 
organizational structures to meet the credit needs of low-income communities, 
such changes may have important influences on uncovered affiliates of banks 
and thrifts.  In addition, CRA enforcement through mergers and acquisitions 
will continue to be important. Consolidation in the banking industry, after a 
brief respite during the recession of 2001–2002, has picked up again, and long-
term forecasts suggest that more will likely come.174  Furthermore, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act made expansion into new activities, such as insurance and 
securities, contingent on banks’ CRA performance.  Therefore banking 
organizations will have to pay attention to their CRA performance for many 
years to come, as they seek to enter new financial markets.
Admittedly, market and technological forces are tending to reinforce access 
to some types of credit, particularly home mortgage loans that are now easily 
commodified, as some critics of CRA have suggested.  Nonetheless, market 
pressures will also mean that financial intermediaries are under increasing 
pressure to serve the highest end of the market.  Increasingly, community 
banks and thrifts, and community development financial institutions, may find 
that a larger portion of the local market (in particular the market for small 
business loans) is of less interest to larger banks and thrifts.  This will open up 
new business opportunities for smaller institutions, while CRA’s effect on 
larger institutions will likely push advances in commodified lending markets, 
including home mortgages and credit-scored small business loans that can be 
sold into the secondary markets.
In sum, recent evidence shows that CRA provides important benefits to 
low-income communities.  Other factors undoubtedly contributed to the 
growth in lending to low-income communities during the 1990s, but careful 
studies have found support for an independent and important role for CRA.  
Given the difficulty of finding such effects in policy analysis generally, these 
findings are remarkable.
173 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 149, at 135.
174 See, e.g., Playing to the endgame in financial services, THE MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (Aug. 
2004).
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B. THE COSTS OF CRA HAVE BEEN OVERSTATED
1. Profitability
While CRA undoubtedly has costs, recent empirical evidence suggests that 
those costs were significantly overstated by CRA’s critics.175  CRA loans 
appear to be reasonably profitable. A Federal Reserve Board report issued in 
2000176 casts significant doubt on the claims made by critics about the likely 
performance of CRA loans.  The report found that most institutions responded
that CRA lending was profitable or marginally profitable: 82 percent indicated 
that CRA-related home mortgage lending was profitable, 86 percent indicated 
that CRA-related home improvement lending was profitable, 93 percent 
indicated that CRA-related community development lending was profitable, 
and 96 percent indicated that CRA-related small business lending was 
profitable.177 The median difference between return on equity for CRA home 
mortgage loans and all such loans, and between CRA small business loans and 
all such loans, was zero.178  Most respondents reported that CRA lending was 
as profitable or more profitable than all lending.179  The profitability of serving 
these borrowers and communities helped drive the increase in CRA-eligible 
lending by banks and their affiliates between 1993 and 1998.180
Many respondents reported other benefits from such lending, which 
suggest that CRA lending, while strengthening communities, is also profitable 
for banks.  Eighty-one percent of respondents, for example, developed new 
business opportunities from their CRA small business lending.181 Seventy-one 
percent of respondents cited “source of additional profits” as a benefit of their 
community development lending, and 96 percent cited promoting “community 
growth and stability.”182 These broader societal benefits also represent benefits 
for the banks operating in these communities because they reduce the risk of 
bank lending in those communities, further contradicting the notion that CRA 
forces banks to engage in unprofitable activity.
2. Risk
CRA loans appear not to be overly risky.  The loss rates that surveyed 
banks and thrifts reported for CRA loans are quite low. The median difference 
in charge-off rate between CRA home mortgage loans and all such loans was 
zero.183 The institutions responding to the survey reported weighted median 
175 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 319-22.
176
 The Performance and Profitability of CRA-Related Lending, Report by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, submitted to Congress pursuant to section 713 of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (July 2000) [hereinafter Performance and Profitability].
177 Id. at xvii, chart1a, xix, chart 3a, xxi, chart 5a, and xxiii, chart 7a.
178 Id. at 46 & 58.
179 The exact percentages of as “profitable” or “more profitable” responses were: 56 percent 
for home purchase and refinance loans, 72 percent for home improvement loans, and 84
percent for small business loans. Id. at 45-46, 52, 58.
180 See supra text accompanying note 143.
181
 Performance and Profitability, supra note 176, at table 8.
182 Id. at table 6.
183 Id., at table 3c.
Credit Where It Counts 31
charge-off rates of 0.18 percent on CRA-related home mortgage loans and 0.40 
percent on CRA-related small business loans.184 About 70 percent of 
respondents reported credit losses for CRA home mortgage lending that were 
the same as or less than other such lending, and 91 percent of respondents 
reported credit losses for CRA small business loans that were the same as or 
smaller than for all small business loans.185  Community development loans 
had a median charge-off rate of zero.186 Separate analysis by the Federal 
Reserve Board indicated that CRA lending loss rates were stable from 1993 to 
1998, even as CRA lending increased dramatically.  Generally speaking, the 
categories of loans made pursuant to CRA—home mortgage, small business, 
multifamily, and community development lending—have had relatively low 
loss rates.
3. The Risk-Access Tradeoff
Pushing further into low-income markets has not weakened banks’ 
profitability and soundness as White, Macey and Miller, and others predicted.  
As one would expect, the performance of CRA “special programs” is not as 
strong as the performance of CRA loans in the institutions’ general portfolio.  
Special programs account for only 17 percent of CRA-eligible lending as the 
Federal Reserve Board defines it.  These programs serve as the banks’ and 
thrifts’ lending “laboratories,” employing new and innovative strategies – such 
as lower downpayment requirements – to deliver credit to underserved 
borrowers.  Once these strategies are refined, they are often “graduated” to 
borrowers in the institution’s core product lines.187 Despite the programs’ 
experimental status, the Board reported that 61 percent of respondents found 
CRA special programs to be profitable.188 Moreover, most institutions reported 
low delinquency and charge-off rates; the median charge-off rate on these 
programs was zero.189
The survey finding that CRA loans are generally profitable is consistent 
with other studies.  Federal Reserve Board economists determined that, after 
adjusting for creditworthiness and the benefits of the home mortgage interest 
deduction, banks do not offer borrowers substantially lower mortgage rates to 
make CRA-eligible loans.190  Earlier studies found that institutions with strong 
CRA performance were as profitable as those with less CRA activity.191
184 Id., at table 3e (home mortgage), table 5e (small business). 
185 Id., at table 3d (home mortgage), table 5d (small business).
186
 Id., at table 7c.
187 See Robert B. Avery et al., CRA Special Lending Programs, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 711 
(2000).
188
 Performance and Profitability, supra note 176, at table 14a.
189 Id., at table 14c.
190 GLENN B. CANNER ET AL., DOES THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA) CAUSE 
BANKS TO PROVIDE A SUBSIDY TO SOME MORTGAGE BORROWERS? (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & 
Econ. Discussion Series No. 2002-19, 2002).  The upper bound on such a subsidy, if any, is 
“tiny.”  Id.
191 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING BY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (1993); Glenn B. Canner 
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Similarly, an earlier survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City had 
found CRA lending to be profitable, though not as profitable as other 
lending.192
 That is not to say that the Federal Reserve Board’s survey found no 
differences in the performance of CRA loans and other loans.  As noted by the 
Board’s report,193 previous studies had found that borrowers with lower 
incomes were more likely to have their loans become delinquent,194 and that a 
combination of negative home equity195 and a “triggering” event such as job 
loss was correlated with delinquency and default.196  Affordable home 
mortgage products with significant layering of risk were also found to be more 
prone to default.197  However, research also concluded that although borrower 
and neighborhood income were inversely related to delinquency rates, the 
differences were slight, and loan-to-value ratios were far more important.198
Moreover, lenders compensate for such differences in deliquency rates by 
charging higher interest rates.
4. Mergers and Acquisitions
Critics overstate the contention that CRA is a costly barrier to efficient 
mergers and acquisitions.  Treasury Department analysis shows that CRA 
likely imposes little costs from disapproval or delay of mergers, acquisitions, 
or other applications subject to CRA review.199  From 1985 to 1999, only 692 
out of 92,177 applications subject to CRA review received any adverse public 
comment—less than 0.7 percent.  Of those applications, most received adverse 
& Wayne Passmore, The Community Reinvestment Act and the Profitability of Mortgage-
Oriented Banks, 7 FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 1  (FRB, July 1997); Glenn B. Canner & 
Wayne Passmore, The Relative Profitability of Commercial Banks Active in Lending in Lower-
Income Neighborhoods and to Lower-Income Borrowers, PROC. 32D ANN. CONF. ON BANK 
STRUCTURE & COMPETITION, FED. RES. BANK OF CHICAGO (1996); David Malmquist et al., 
The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending, 11 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 169 (1997). 
192
 Larry Meeker & Forest Myers, Community Reinvestment Act Lending: Is It Profitable?, 
1996 FIN. INDUSTRY PERSP. 13.
193 See generally Performance and Profitability, supra note 176, at 6-14.
194
 James A. Berkovec et al., Discrimination, Competition, and Loan Performance in FHA 
Mortgage Lending, 2 REV. ECON. & STAT. 241 (1988); George M. von Furstenberg & Jeffery 
R. Green, The Effects of Race and Age of Housing on Mortgage Delinquency Risk, 12 URBAN 
STUD. 85-89 (1975); George M. von Furstenberg & Jeffery R. Green, Home Mortgage 
Delinquency, 29 J. FIN. 1545 (1974). 
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 Dennis R. Capozza et al., Mortgage Default in Local Markets, 25 REAL EST. ECON. 631 
(1997); Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman, Residential Mortgage Default: A Review 
of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 341 (1992).
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 Chester Foster & Robert Van Order, An Option-based Model of Mortgage Default, 3 
HOUSING FIN. REV. 351 (1984); Kerry D. Vandell & Thomas Thibodeau, Estimation of 
Mortgage Defaults Using Disaggregate Loan History Data, 2 J. AM. REAL EST. & URBAN 
ECON. ASSOC. 292 (1985). 
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public comment or regulatory scrutiny on both CRA and other grounds.  Only 
1 percent of the applications receiving comment were denied, 4 percent 
withdrawn, and 1 percent returned (for reasons that may or may not have 
related to CRA), leaving 94 percent approved. Thus the agencies denied less 
than one tenth of one percent of the applications subject to CRA review.  
Adverse CRA comments also generally lead to little delay. Since CRA’s 
enactment, the bank agencies processed 63 percent of applications facing CRA 
protests within 90 days, and processed 88 percent of such applications within
180 days.  This has improved under the 1995 CRA regulations: almost 75 
percent of all applications subject to CRA review are now decided within 90 
days and more than 94 percent are decided within 180 days.  Regulators 
exercise their discretion to ignore frivolous comments.
Of course, the lack of delay or denial is not evidence that CRA is either 
ineffective or without cost.  Banks and thrifts presumably internalize the risk of 
delay or denial and modify their behavior to minimize that risk.  A recent study 
found that CRA had a significant effect on expanding lending to low-income 
communities, controlling for bank characteristics.  The study found that banks 
increased their lending to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in 
anticipation of the regulatory and public scrutiny from CRA that accompanies
mergers.200  The effects were more pronounced for larger institutions, which
face the most public and regulatory scrutiny, and the effects became stronger 
as public and regulatory attention increased under CRA during the 1990s.201
This altered behavior might constitute a cost if CRA loans were not profitable, 
yet the Federal Reserve Board’s evidence suggests that CRA lending is 
relatively profitable.202
5. Rent Seeking
Macey and Miller argued that CRA creates fertile ground for “extortion” 
by community groups using the application process to force banks and thrifts 
to make grants to their organizations.203 But available evidence suggests that 
rent seeking under CRA is not of the size or scale alleged.  As noted above, 
only a small percentage of applications receive public comment, and few are 
delayed or denied on that basis.  The fact that community protests get banks 
and thrifts to issue voluntary pledges or make agreements with community 
groups to do more lending is not improper.  Moreover, NCRC analysis 
suggests that only a small fraction of “CRA agreements,” which are 
themselves a small fraction of CRA activity, result in payments—for services 
200 RAPHAEL BOSTIC ET AL., REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND CONSOLIDATION: THE CASE OF 
COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS AND THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT 18 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. WP-2002-06, 2002).
201 Id. at 15-16.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 175-180.
203 There are theoretical grounds for believing there is less rent-seeking than suggested, given 
the highly public nature of CRA examinations, merger reviews, and “protests.”
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or otherwise—to the community groups making the “protest.”204  Even with 
respect to agreements involving payments, one must examine whether the 
payments are appropriate payments for services in furtherance of making 
sound loans (such as home buyer credit counseling), or are used for some 
unrelated purpose.  Recent disclosures required under the “sunshine” 
amendments to CRA have revealed little evidence of the rent seeking feared.
6. Compliance Costs
Banks and thrifts also face other costs of compliance, such as paperwork 
burdens and the geocoding of loan data, but they are difficult to measure.  The 
bank and thrift regulators estimated in 1999 that the annual compliance burden 
from CRA for data collection and reporting was about 550 to 625 hours per 
year for large banks, and about 10 hours per year for small banks, totaling 1.25 
million hours per year and costing $35.4 million industry-wide.205 That year, 
such a compliance burden would have constituted essentially zero percent of 
the $6 trillion in bank assets and 3 billion hours of total bank employee time,206
and less than two- tenths of one percent of the cost of bank regulation.207 These
estimates for large banks are much higher than they had been at the time of the 
1995 reforms, as regulators had underestimated geocoding costs, but such costs 
have likely decreased since 1999.208  Moreover, the 1995 regulations 
streamlined CRA compliance for small banks.  Small banks are not required to 
collect or report small business or small farm lending data under CRA and 
examiners evaluate their performance based on data collected either in the 
normal course of business or pursuant to other regulations, including HMDA.
Surveys of bank compliance officers also suggest that the 1995 reforms 
reduced the compliance burdens of CRA.  The overall compliance costs of 
CRA do not rank high, relative to previous years, in the most recent ABA 
survey of compliance burdens.209 CRA ranked ninth out of twenty laws and 
regulations studied, just after Flood Insurance Rules.210 This rank represents a 
204 See National Community Reinvestment Coalition, CRA Commitments, 1977-1998 and 
internal Treasury analysis (on file with author).
205
 Submission for OMB Review, Comment Request, 64 Fed. Reg. 29083 (May 28, 1999).
206
 Sheshunoff Database, December 1998 (CRA-Banks and Thrifts with Assets Over $250 
Million).
207
 This calculation derives from Gregory Elliehausen, The Cost of Bank Regulation: A 
Review of the Evidence (April 1998), at 23, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/1990-99/ss171.pdf (noting that total costs of 
bank regulation in 1991 were $15.7 billion).  Presumably, the total cost of bank regulation 
increased between 1991 and 1999, thus the two-tenths of one percent estimate if anything 
overstates the relative cost of CRA data reporting.
208 Geocoding costs have likely come down significantly since then, now that the fixed costs of 
new systems have been absorbed and loans can be entered automatically rather than manually.
209 The Nationwide Bank Compliance Officer Survey, ABA BANKING JOURNAL, June 2003, at 
35.
210
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Privacy, Truth in Lending, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act, Truth in Savings, Fair Lending, Flood Insurance, CRA, and Electronic Funds Transfer 
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dramatic improvement over just a decade ago, when CRA often topped the 
ABA survey for most burdensome regulation before the 1995 reforms.211
7. Uncertainty
Some lenders are concerned that uncertainty about what will be required of 
them in the CRA examination itself raises compliance costs.212  Costs may be 
higher because lenders spend more time documenting activities that turn out to 
be relatively unimportant to the examination, or because uncertainty induces 
them to undertake activities that in their best judgments are not safe and sound.  
One might categorize banks undertaking more CRA-eligible activity than 
necessary to achieve the bank’s desired rating as a cost, even if the activity is 
profitable and sound.  Although this additional activity may have an 
opportunity cost from the bank’s perspective, the additional CRA activity, if 
prudent, also confers a social benefit that must be weighed in addition to the 
profit to the institution.
Although Macey and Miller charged that the pre-1995-reform CRA process 
was so vague as to give regulators unfettered discretion,213 recent evidence 
suggests that CRA was generally consistently applied during the early 1990s.  
A recent study analyzing CRA examinations for several thousand commercial 
banks from 1990 to 1996 found that the scheduling of CRA examinations and 
the persistence of examination ratings tracked home mortgage loan levels and 
other key, objective factors.214 In scheduling examinations, “supervisors 
allocate[d] their resources toward institutions with observed CRA compliance 
inadequacies.”215  Moreover, the “level of residential lending” influenced the 
CRA ratings of banks.216 The study concluded that “CRA enforcement during 
this period reflected, at least in part, objective evaluation criteria.”217
Regulator consistency has likely improved under the 1995 reforms, which 
focus more on objective lending measures.
8. Shareholder Value
Shareholder value is another possible measure of compliance costs.  One 
study argued that the 1995 CRA reforms had little effect on shareholder value 
and so did not reduce compliance costs.218 The general problems faced by 
211 See Bank Compliance Costs Equal More Than Half of Industry Profits, BANKING POL’Y 
REP., July 6, 1992, at 5.
212 2002 JOINT CENTER CRA REPORT, supra note 149, at 117.
213
 Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 326-29; see also Leonard Bierman et al., The Community 
Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 383 (1994).
214
 Drew Dahl et al., The Timing and Persistence of CRA Compliance Ratings, 23 J. OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH 113 (2003).
215 Id. at 123.
216 Id. at 130.
217 Id. at 113.
218
 David P. Ely & Kenneth J. Robinson, Is the Community Reinvestment Act in Need of 
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event studies in general are well-known,219 but carefully designed event studies 
can shed light on regulatory changes designed to enhance shareholder value.  
Yet an event study of a reform (like CRA) whose purpose was not solely to 
increase shareholder value, but rather to reduce compliance costs, increase
lending, and focus on “performance, not paperwork,” is more complicated to 
evaluate from an event-study perspective. For example, the CRA reforms may 
have had zero net effect on shareholders, while shifting compliance costs from 
less productive processes to investments that lead to more effective lending.  In 
addition, given that the 1995 CRA reforms continued to employ a standard, 
with room for regulatory discretion, it is not surprising that the reforms did not 
generate a measurable increase in shareholder value immediately after the final 
rule was released. Gains (or losses) to shareholders would take a long time for 
even informationally efficient financial markets to transmit, as banks and 
thrifts and their regulators gained experience under the new CRA standards.
As the authors acknowledge, their results “could also reflect substantial 
uncertainty over the benefits and costs that might arise from reform until it 
becomes clear how the new rules will be implemented.”220
C. RESPONSES TO OTHER CRITIQUES
1. CRA Reasonably Addresses Market Failures
Michael Klausner argued at the time of the 1995 CRA reforms that CRA 
was the wrong response to market failures that he deemed likely to exist in 
low-income communities.221  In particular, he contended that CRA impedes 
specialization among banks in serving low-income communities and makes it 
difficult for banks to internalize information externalities, either directly or 
indirectly through lending consortia. Klausner argued that banks and thrifts 
could not efficiently invest in the expertise needed to lend successfully in all 
the low-income communities within their assessment areas.  Moreover, he 
argued, if many banks and thrifts seek to serve the same low-income area, each 
lender will not be able to internalize its information costs, as successful lending 
will benefit competitors in that area.  Furthermore, with large numbers of 
creditors involved, coordination to develop loan consortia would be more 
difficult.  In addition, Klausner suggested that competition from big banks 
seeking to meet CRA obligations would hurt specialized lenders focusing on 
low-income areas.
Klausner argued that less competition among banks for scarce loans in low-
income areas, rather than more competition, would permit banks to internalize 
more of their costs and develop expertise in low-income areas.  Instead of 
CRA, Klausner suggested a quota for lending to low-income borrowers that 
could be met by trading obligations among banks. In his view, a tradable 
quota would permit banks to specialize in lending to particular communities
219 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuck et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate 
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1783 (2002) (discussing the problem of confounding events).
220
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221
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where they could invest in information, or in funding loans rather than 
originating them.  Specialization would mean less competition, greater cost 
internalization, and easier coordination among fewer lenders seeking to form 
loan consortia in low-income areas. Lastly, he argued that a tradable quota 
would cost less than the discretionary standards implicit in CRA.
Based on nearly a decade of experience since the 1995 reforms, I argue that
CRA is reasonably aimed at overcoming the market failures both Klausner and 
I believe to exist in low-income communities, and that the current CRA 
standard is preferable to the quota-and-trade system Klausner proposed.
First, fostering competition among banks and thrifts in serving low-income 
areas is good, not bad.  Banks generally do not want to be the sole lender in a 
low-income community.  Banks perceive less risk when other lenders are 
serving a low-income community after applying their own credit criteria 
regarding property values and neighborhood characteristics, loan terms, and 
borrower credit scores.  Larger volumes of lending from diverse sources add 
liquidity to the market that decreases the riskiness of each bank’s loan.
Second, CRA has helped, not deterred, banks in developing specialization 
in serving low-income communities.  One important type of specialization 
spans geographic areas: innovation in developing products that meet the credit 
needs of low-income areas with manageable risks.   And CRA does encourage 
banks to develop specialization in serving particular geographic areas.  For 
example, banks partner with CDFIs and community-based organizations to 
penetrate low-income markets where they have not operated at scale before.
Third, competition from banks and thrifts under CRA has helped, not hurt, 
specialized lenders; these lenders complement, but do not replace, large 
institutions.  Under CRA, banks and thrifts have entered markets where only 
specialized institutions such as ShoreBank had worked before.  But the effect 
of entry has been positive.  ShoreBank and other institutions like it 
demonstrated the possibility of lending in low-income communities and have 
partnered with banks on an ongoing basis.  Specialized lenders provide local 
expertise, cover some of the costs of lending in low-income areas (such as 
financial education and counseling), and take portions of the risk of a particular 
loan or project that banks do not want to bear.  In turn, banks have invested in 
CDFIs in record numbers, largely spurred by the CRA investment test.  
Investments in CDFIs strengthen the ability of banks and thrifts to serve low-
income markets.  As banks offer services once only offered by CDFIs, the 
local institutions move further “downstream,” reaching lower-income or 
harder-to-serve borrowers, and developing new approaches that mainstream 
institutions may later find cost-effective. Specialized lenders play important 
roles in low-income communities, but they are no substitute for robust and 
competitive markets that include mainstream banks and thrifts.222
Fourth, CRA provides a pre-commitment device that actually helps banks 
coordinate lending to reduce information costs. Because CRA requires all 
222 See supra, Part VI.
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insured depositories to lend to their entire communities, it reduces the free 
rider problems that would otherwise plague loan consortia.  As evidence from 
the last decade attests, CRA has spurred the development of loan consortia to 
learn how to serve low- and moderate-income communities more effectively.
The 1995 regulations treat loans made by such consortia as “community 
development lending” rather than home mortgage or small business lending.
Yet community development lending is an important part of an institution’s 
performance under the CRA lending test.  Moreover, institutions can and do
easily move consortia home mortgage or small business loans onto their own 
books as home mortgage or small business originations or purchases when 
appropriate, where they “count” toward the CRA lending test.223
Lastly, CRA after the 1995 reforms provides much of the flexibility and
other benefits Klausner’s proposal would have offered.  And it does so without 
the downside of fixed quotas for lending, which are not required for a trading 
system to work.  Under the 1995 reforms, banks and thrifts get equal CRA
consideration for both originating and purchasing eligible loans, creating a sort 
of trading system.  Institutions can rely on the origination expertise of others to 
purchase loans on the robust market for CRA loans.  The development of this 
CRA loan market increases liquidity and reduces loan prices. It also improves
transparency in CRA loan pricing, providing valuable information to 
regulators, communities, and banks and thrifts themselves about the 
performance and profitability of CRA lending.
2. CRA Does Not Make Banks Avoid Low-Income Communities
Macey  and Miller charged that CRA created incentives for banks and 
thrifts to avoid opening deposit facilities in low-income communities because 
of the expense of complying with CRA.224  Their contention was subject to 
challenge even at the time that they made it.225  Today, the revised rules mean
that view is clearly incorrect.  Under the 1995 regulations, assessment areas 
“[c]onsist generally of one or more [metropolitan statistical areas] . . . or one or 
more contiguous political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, or towns” that 
include the census tracts “in which the bank has its main office, its branches, 
and its deposit-taking ATMs, as well as the surrounding [census tracts] in 
which the bank has originated or purchased a substantial portion of its 
loans.”226  A bank or thrift “may adjust the boundaries of its assessment area(s) 
to include only the portion of a political subdivision that it reasonably can be 
223 See 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(a)(3), (d) (2004); Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 
Supplementary Information, Lending Test, Direct and indirect lending, 12 C.F.R. pt 25 (2004) 
(“Loans originated directly on the books of the institution or purchased by the institution are 
considered to have been made directly by the institution, even if the institution originated or 
purchased the loans as a result of its participation in a loan consortium.”).
224
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225
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226
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expected to serve.”227 However, assessment areas “[m]ay not reflect illegal 
discrimination” and “[m]ay not arbitrarily exclude low- or moderate-income 
geographies.”228  Banks can delineate their assessment areas as they see fit, 
subject only to these regulatory requirements.
The current definitions for assessment areas render Macey and Miller’s 
critique inapt.  Assessment areas are drawn broadly to comport with political 
boundary lines and usually include a diverse range of neighborhoods measured 
by income, race and other demographics.  Putting a branch into a low-income 
neighborhood in a metropolitan area where a bank operates does not affect the 
bank’s obligations under the lending test, which will already be based on the 
entirety of the community’s income spectrum.  Moreover, the regulation bars 
“arbitrarily exclud[ing]” low- or moderate-income areas regardless of whether 
the bank has a branch in such a neighborhood.  Finally, regulators have 
discretion to evaluate a bank’s lending outside its assessment areas, 
diminishing the importance of the areas’ precise boundaries.
3. Applying CRA to Insured Depositories Is Justified
Critics of CRA argue that it makes little sense to apply CRA to banks and 
thrifts while exempting credit unions, independent mortgage companies and 
other finance companies—let alone securities firms, insurance companies, and 
non-financial companies—from similar regulation.  There is some validity to 
the critique, but let me offer some basic reasons why applying CRA to banks 
and thrifts is not as illogical as critics suggest.  Federally insured depository 
institutions benefit from numerous government subsidies, such as deposit 
insurance and access to the Federal Reserve Board’s discount window.  The 
first subsection details these and other subsidies while the next explains why 
such subsidies provide additional justification for applying CRA to banks and 
thrifts.  The final subsection explains how depository institutions’ specialized 
role in financial markets justifies CRA’s application to them.
a) Subsidies
Deposit insurance subsidizes banks and thrifts by lowering their cost of 
capital. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has described:
[A] major reason the Congress is called upon to involve itself in … 
financial markets is the safety net. Institutions covered by it receive a 
subsidy because insured depositors correctly perceive their risk 
exposure as virtually zero. These depositors--and other creditors who 
benefit from the stability brought to the banking system by the safety 
net--are willing therefore to provide funds to banks at much lower 
rates than are available to competing institutions.229
227 Id. § 25.41(d).
228 Id. § 25.41(e).
229 Hearing on H.R. 10 – “the Financial Services Act of 1998” – Before the Sen. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Fed. Res. Bd. 
Chairman Alan Greenspan), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/ 
1998/19980617.htm.
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Most banks receive the benefits of deposit insurance at no annual cost to them.  
Under rules prescribed by the Deposit Insurance Fund Act of 1996, almost all 
banks—ninety-two percent—do not pay annual deposit insurance premiums.230
More than nine hundred institutions have never paid any premiums for deposit 
insurance, and many institutions that have grown rapidly have paid low 
premiums compared with their coverage.231  Even the weakest institutions pay 
only a $0.27 premium on every $100 of deposits.232 While these rules strongly
need reform, better risk-based pricing would not fully eliminate the 
governmental subsidy.233  The government subsidy probably benefits small 
banks disproportionately to their asset size.  Small banks rely more on insured 
deposits for funding than large banks.  Furthermore, small banks would have a 
relatively hard time attracting funding in the absence of deposit insurance
because they would be perceived as riskier.
Large banks and thrifts also likely benefit from a market perception that 
regulators will not let large institutions fail because the consequences to the 
financial system would be too severe.  Regulators fostered this perception 
through a series of interventions, including in one instance an explicit “too big 
to fail” policy statement.234 Important legal changes at the end of the 1990s 
that significantly curtailed the discretion regulators have to bail out uninsured 
depositors.235 Yet the market perception likely persists that the government 
will intervene to assist large institutions236 and that such assistance will benefit 
230
 Memorandum from Arthur J. Merton, Director of the Division of Insurance and Finance, 
FDIC, to Board of Directors, FDIC 16 (May 5, 2004), at
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/2004_02/bif_2004_02.pdf.
231 Hearing on Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs (2002) (testimony of Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman Alan Greenspan), at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2002/20020423.  
232
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), “Risk-Based Assessment System - Current 
Assessment Rate Schedule,” at http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/risk/assesrte.html
(visited July 19, 2004).
233 Hearing on Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, supra note 231 (testimony of Fed. Res. Bd. 
Chairman Alan Greenspan) (“[W]e should not delude ourselves that even a wider range in the 
risk-based premium structure would eliminate the need for a government back-up to the 
deposit insurance fund, that is eliminate the government subsidy in deposit insurance.”).
234 See Harold A. Black et al., Changes in Market Perception of Riskiness: The Case of Too-
Big-to-Fail, 20 J. FIN. RES. 389, ___ (1997) (finding that the 1984 announcement of the 
OCC’s explicit “too-big-to-fail” policy resulted in increases in institutional holdings in bank 
holding companies, even among those not named by the Comptroller, providing evidence of an 
indirect subsidy to banks from the policy).
235 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (prompt corrective action); id. § 1823(c)(4) (least cost 
resolution).  Congress enacted both sections in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). 
236 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER & RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, BANKING 
LAW AND REGULATION 248 (3d ed. 2001) (noting “the widespread public perception—
substantially confirmed by the handling of the Continental Illinois National Bank failure—that 
certain banks are “too big to fail”). But see Hearing on Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 
supra note 231 (testimony of Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman Alan Greenspan) (arguing that “the 
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creditors and shareholders even if they must bear some loss in the process.  
Evidence from the Federal Reserve Board’s intervention when the hedge fund 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) collapsed in 1998 suggests that 
markets may have perceived a “too big to fail” subsidy.  Large, complex 
banking organizations saw their cost of funds decline after the Federal Reserve 
Board’s intervention, although such effects are difficult to disentangle from 
investors’ general “flight to safety” following the LTCM collapse.237  The 
subsidy from a “too big to fail” policy may have grown over the last decade, as 
consolidation has led to the growth of enormous banking institutions, with 
fewer intermediaries holding a larger percentage of deposits.238
Banks uniquely receive subsidies from other sources as well.  The Federal 
Reserve Board’s sponsorship of the payments network,239 and its provision of 
riskless financial settlement by guaranteeing large payments among banks,240
are additional sources of subsidy to the banking system.241 Direct access to the 
Federal Reserve Board’s discount window provides assurance to the market 
about banks’ and thrifts’ stability.  It therefore allows institutions to obtain 
lower cost of funds, regardless of whether they draw on the window and of the 
price the Board charges. Lastly, banks benefit from subsidies through 
government-sponsored enterprises and other government programs.  For 
example, bank members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system 
accrue 90 percent of the $3 billion in flows of governmental subsidy to the 
FHLBs, while only 10 percent is passed on to home buyers in lower mortgage 
rates.242 Admittedly, the gross subsidies to banks are offset to some degree by 
the costs of bank regulation, including reserve requirements.243
market clearly believes that large institutions are not too big for uninsured creditors to take at 
least some loss”).
237 CRAIG FURFINE, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MORAL SUASION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
RESCUE OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 18-20 (2001).
238
 The share of deposits held by the top ten bank holding companies grew from 19 percent in 
1993 to 34 percent in 2003.  The largest bank holding company by deposit size held 7.6 
percent of all deposits in 2003, compared with 3.7 percent a decade earlier.  The number of 
banks and thrifts dropped over the last decade by 32 percent.  The number of banks with over 
$10 billion in assets grew from 64 in 1994 to 110 a decade later, and the share of deposits held 
by such large institutions doubled over the last decade,  from 30 percent in 1994 to over 60 
percent last year.  Author’s calculations, based on FDIC Statistics of Deposits, at 
http://www.fdic.gov/sod. 
239 See Federal Reserve’s Key Policies for the Provision of Financial Services, at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/pricing/default.htm (visited July 23, 2004).
240 Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and 
Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 3 (1999).
241 Hearing on H.R. 10, supra note 229 (testimony of Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman Alan 
Greenspan) (“The markets place substantial values on these safety net subsidies [such as the 
discount window and riskless financial settlement], clearly in excess of the cost of regulation. . 
. . [W]ere it otherwise, some banks would be dropping their charters.”)
242 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs,” May 
2001, available at http://ftp.cbo.gov/28xx/doc2841/GSEs.pdf, at 25-28 [hereinafter “CBO 
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b) Aligning Subsidies with Public P urposes
Given that insured depositories receive significant governmental subsidies, 
the question remains whether such subsidies provide any justification for 
applying CRA to banks and thrifts.  The first-best policy response to bank 
subsidies is to reduce such subsidies directly.  For example, one could reduce 
subsidies from deposit insurance by establishing better risk-based pricing and 
ensuring that all institutions pay some premium.  Regulators’ refusal to 
intervene in financial markets could reinforce that there is no institution “too 
big to fail.”  The Federal Reserve Board could continue to move towards more 
market-based pricing of access to the payments system and the discount 
window.244  GSE subsidies that are passed through to banks and thrifts could 
be reduced through higher capital standards and other means.
However, each of these first-best solutions to reduce bank and thrift 
subsidies has faced enormous political opposition and would entail significant 
costs.  Deposit insurance reform legislation invariably includes increases in the 
amount subject to deposit insurance, and even better risk-based pricing would 
leave some significant governmental subsidy remaining.  Refusal to intervene 
in financial markets is an important principle to announce in the abstract, but 
officials faced with difficult choices and uncertain information often intervene 
to prevent financial collapse.  Pricing payment system services at true market 
rates might result in socially suboptimal development of payment networks.245
Efforts to reduce GSE subsidies by increasing capital requirements and 
affordable housing goals while reducing indicia of government support have 
faced enormous political opposition.  Moreover, squeezing subsidies out of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may simply balloon subsidies going to the 
FHLBs and insured depositories.246
Study 2001”].  Some portion of the subsidy that accrues to banks is passed on to non-home-
mortgage borrowers of the banks.
243 See Jones & Kolatch, supra note 240.  Whether a net subsidy exists sparked vociferous 
debate during negotiations over financial modernization, with the Federal Reserve Board 
taking the self-interested position that such a subsidy was significant and thus new activities 
should be undertaken in affiliates within a holding company, and the OCC taking the self-
interested position that no such subsidy exists, so that new activities could be undertaken in 
subsidiaries of national banks.  The debate was effectively resolved by legislating “firewalls” 
between the bank and its affiliates and subsidiaries such that any net subsidy could not be 
effectively passed through to other entities engaged in new activities.
244 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, Press Release (Oct. 31, 2002) (noting changes to discount 
window regulations that would result in credit being provided through the discount window at 
rates above the target federal funds rate), at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2002/200210312/default.htm.
245 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 1, at 222 (arguing that the Federal Reserve Board should consider 
lowering prices for certain electronic payment services in order to expand access to banking 
services for the poor).
246 See White, supra note 4.  Moreover, FHLB “reform” has tended to expand, rather than 
restrict, use of subsidized advances, and given the fungibility of money, nominally restricting 
use of advances, rather than reducing them, is unlikely to prevent FHLB members from 
absorbing the advances as undifferentiated subsidies in any event.
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Given that we live in a second-best world in which these subsidies to banks 
and thrifts will remain, simply removing CRA would not restore credit markets 
to a “free market.”  Existing subsidies, taxes, and regulations distort the free 
market in a variety of ways.  As a theoretical matter, one cannot assert, given 
these distortions, that moving from an “nth” best world with CRA to the next
best world without CRA would be efficient.  In a regulated, subsidized credit 
market world, it is not improper to ensure that some portion of the subsidy 
goes to a public purpose by applying CRA to banks and thrifts.247
c) Role in Financial Markets
Market failures have plagued low-income communities and that minority 
households have faced discrimination in credit and housing markets.248  Given 
these problems, government regulation should encourage depositories to 
overcome them.  Banks play a special role in financial markets by focusing on 
relational lending and investing in techniques to “thicken” the markets within 
which they operate by generating and analyzing information on opaque 
values.249  This role is distinct from that of capital markets,250 which focus on 
information-rich, transparent, and larger firms. It is even distinct from that of 
independent mortgage companies, which focus on transactions rather than 
relationships and thus have not similarly developed the technologies and 
expertise that permit banks to manage higher-risk borrowers.251 CRA is 
consistent with insured depositories’ specialized role.
The fact that credit unions are not subject to CRA is an anomaly in this 
regard.  There is little justification in not extending CRA to credit unions, most 
of which enjoy federally insured deposit insurance, are subject to 
comprehensive regulation and supervision, and benefit from many of the 
subsidies available to banks and thrifts.  Moreover, credit unions enjoy tax 
exemption not available to banks and thrifts and are chartered with a public 
purpose to serve “people of modest means.”252  For that reason, CRA should be 
extended to credit unions.253
247 Cf., e.g., White, supra note 4 (explaining why eliminating the GSEs would not necessarily 
lead to more efficient policy outcomes).
248 See supra Part III.
249 See, e.g., CANNER ET AL., supra note 190.
250 See id., (citing P. Bolton & X. Freixas, Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure 
and Financial Market Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information, 108 J. POL. ECON. 324 
(2000); Boot & Thakor, Financial System Architecture, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 693 (1997); Boot 
& Thakor, Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?, 55 J. FINANCE 679 (2000)).
251 CANNER ET AL., supra note 190. This may help to explain why subprime lenders focus on 
making loans to existing home mortgage borrowers as to whose creditworthiness others have 
already invested in learning. 
252
 Credit unions are tax exempt, 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2000), because their mission is to serve 
“people of modest means,” 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (2000).
253
 I advocated this position as part of the Treasury team that developed a proposal to extend 
community investment obligations to credit unions, but the measure was defeated and was not 
included in the Credit Union Membership Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219 (Aug. 7, 1998).
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4. Current Enforcement Methods Compare Favorably with Enforcement
Through Safe Harbors
Peter Swire argued prior to the 1995 reforms that enforcement of CRA 
through both regular examinations and reviews after “episodic” protests of 
applications for mergers ought to be replaced with a safe harbor for institutions 
that achieve some given level of CRA performance.254  In his view, a safe 
harbor would provide a strong incentive for banks to make more loans or 
invest in CDFIs at lower compliance cost.  Under his proposal, regulators 
would set a target level of community development investment. If a bank met 
the target, the institution would not undergo CRA examinations or face CRA 
scrutiny during merger applications.  Variations of the Swire proposal, under 
which banks receiving an “outstanding” rating on their most recent 
examination would not face CRA scrutiny during merger reviews, were 
discussed in 1995, and have been introduced in Congress repeatedly since then.
A safe harbor based on a bank’s CRA rating has a number of 
disadvantages.  First, a bank’s CRA rating can become stale.  Circumstances 
can change after an examination, examiners may miss evidence with respect to 
a particular market, or applications may involve new markets not covered 
under the examination.  Banks and thrifts are usually examined every two to 
three years.  A bank’s performance may change significantly in the interim. 
The “safe harbor” would prevent regulators from considering such matters.
Second, CRA ratings are not conclusive.  The ratings are intended to reflect 
a bank’s performance in meeting the credit needs of all its communities.  But 
an outstanding rating does not necessarily mean that the depository 
institution’s record is exemplary in every market that it serves.  Many of the 
communities served by depository institutions are not evaluated during an 
examination. In the case of large banks serving multiple markets, regulators 
only sample a portion of these markets to determine the lender’s CRA rating. 
In addition, CRA performance in larger communities receives more weight. 
Thus, a bank may receive a “satisfactory” CRA rating even when there is 
documented poor performance in small communities.
Third, providing a safe harbor would eliminate or severely curtail the role 
of the public in shaping regulatory norms.  As I argue more fully in Part VI, 
public engagement in setting CRA standards, while costly, is a value worth 
preserving.  Under the safe harbor proposals, public input would be confined to 
regular examinations.  It would be inefficient and costly for small community 
organizations to provide extensive comment on every bank examination. 
Public comment is more focused in the context of a change in a financial
institution that is likely to have a significant impact on the community.  
Materials received during application processes often provide relevant and 
valuable information to regulators on an institution’s CRA performance.
Under the Swire proposal, regulators would set numerical targets for 
investment and institutions meeting that target would not even be subject to 
254
 Swire, supra note 18.
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examination.  The public role in CRA examinations would be eliminated.
Numerical targets would ignore important contextual factors that influence a 
bank’s or thrift’s ability to make sound loans in low-income communities.  A 
safe harbor could encourage banks to make less profitable and riskier loans 
than under the current approach, which takes into account the performance 
context within which the institution operates.  A numerical target also raises 
serious objections on the grounds of credit allocation.  Moreover, without 
regular CRA examinations, regulators would have no context in which to learn 
about how the best institutions meet the community’s credit needs—which
would seriously hamper the regulators’ ability to set appropriate numerical 
targets, and would also undermine regulators’ ability to share information 
about best practices with other institutions.  Such sharing of best practices 
lowers the cost of innovation and provides significant benefits to banks and the 
communities that they serve. Fixed numerical targets, whether promulgated as 
a rule or a safe harbor, should be eschewed.
Fourth, the 1995 CRA regulations provide incentives for banks to achieve 
outstanding CRA ratings that safe harbors would not.  The frequency of CRA 
examinations is based in part on previous CRA performance.  Moreover, in 
CRA reviews during mergers, the regulators place great weight on the previous
CRA examination.  Despite some cases to the contrary, a strong prior CRA 
record is usually a good indicator for successful completion of CRA reviews
during mergers.255  Thus, current policy combines efficient use of agency 
resources with incentives for good performance, while ensuring that new 
information that comes to light during applications can be properly assessed.
As part of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, 
Congress codified additional incentives for small banks with good CRA 
ratings.  Rejecting Senator Gramm’s proposals for both a complete small bank 
exemption from CRA and a safe harbor for small banks with outstanding CRA 
ratings, Congress enacted a provision that generally increased the time between 
CRA examinations for small banks with outstanding and satisfactory CRA 
ratings.  Under the Act, small banks with outstanding ratings will generally be 
examined every five years.256 Small banks with satisfactory ratings will 
generally be examined every four years.257  Notwithstanding these provisions, 
small banks will still be examined in connection with applications for deposit 
facilities and mergers, and may be examined more frequently when the 
regulator determines that there is reasonable cause.258  While in my judgment 
such time periods are too long, they do provide an incentive for small banks 
with less frequent mergers to perform better under CRA.  Unlike safe harbors, 
the Act retains regulators’ discretion to examine banks more frequently when 
255 But see Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 328-29, 334-37 (citing examples of community 
protests of institutions that had generally received good CRA ratings on prior examinations).
256
 12 U.S.C. § 2908(a)(1) (2000).
257 Id.  § 2908(a)(2).
258 Id.  § 2908(b), (c).
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appropriate and to undertake a CRA review when small banks merge or apply 
for deposit facilities, which can have significant effects on local communities.
5. Localism
Critics charge that CRA had its origins in “localist” rhetoric that has no 
place in the globalized financial marketplace.  In a sense, they are correct.  
Some support for CRA has been, and is, rooted in old-fashioned notions that 
the local bank should lend locally or even that the local bank should use funds 
raised locally to lend locally.  Today, bank geographic restrictions have largely 
given way to real competition in interstate banking and to massive 
consolidation in the industry.  An emphasis on local lending loses a lot of its 
meaning in this context.  Moreover, geographic diversification is an important 
element of most banks’ safety and soundness.  Still, there are some reasons to 
favor local lending, in the sense of having some local presence from which
banks gain expertise and use their superior knowledge to find creditworthy 
borrowers and make profitable loans.
Yet supporters of CRA need not rely on localist theories, given that market 
failures and discrimination provide adequate foundations for CRA.  Besides, 
CRA’s current formulation does not lean heavily on localist policies.  Large 
institutions operate across wide geographic areas and can raise funds and make 
loans consistent with their nationwide (or international) business plans.  
Institutions are not measured based on how the size of their lending in a 
particular location relates to the size of their deposits in that location, but rather 
to the lending of their peer institutions and other contextual factors.  Loan 
consortia, as well as the active secondary market for CRA loans, which permits 
banks to purchase loans in order to enhance their CRA performance, further 
diminishes the “local” nature of CRA-eligible lending.
V. CRA COMPARED WITH OTHER CREDIT MARKET REGULATIONS
Critics of CRA have argued that if the government must intervene in credit 
markets, it should do so through other means. The presence of market failures 
are an insufficient determinant of policy. The government may be ill equipped 
to intervene, and may choose strategies that either make the problems worse or 
cost more than their benefits.  Government agencies might not possess the 
requisite information to regulate effectively, the agencies may not be able to 
induce the private sector responses sought, the bureaucracy might not faithfully 
execute the laws, or the political process might lead Congress or the 
bureaucracy to create laws that improperly favor the regulated entities or some 
other preferred groups.259  The extent of these problems cannot be assessed in 
the abstract. One needs to compare CRA with other potential systems for 
redressing market failures.260 Thus, to evaluate CRA, I compare it to a series 
259 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, supra note 23, at 8-10.
260 See, e.g., NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994); STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 23 (applying such types of comparative analysis).
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of other policies designed to expand access to capital.  This Part examines 
existing alternatives, while the next Part focuses on broader potential ones.
I classify credit market policies into five types. First, CRA sets forth a 
broad affirmative obligation on insured depository institutions to lend in their 
service areas.  Second, negative prohibitions, such as the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA),261 bar discrimination against minority borrowers.  
Third, disclosure laws may be thought of as having two sub-types.  Some laws, 
such as the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),262 assist in the 
enforcement of other legal rules or social norms by requiring public disclosure 
of lending data.  Other disclosure laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA),263 rely on providing information to consumers to ensure a well 
functioning market, backed by enforcement of the disclosure requirement.  
Fourth, Congress enacted substantive regulation of loan products in the Home 
Owners Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).264 Fifth, government subsidies are 
pervasive in the housing credit market.265  This Part compares CRA to the 
other four approaches to credit market regulation.  I argue that on many 
measures, CRA is no worse, and in some cases better, than these alternatives.
Further comparative institutional analysis based on empirical research will be 
critical to understanding the relative efficiency of these laws.
A. BACKGROUND
This Section sets out a brief background on each of the relevant laws.  A 
trio of laws—CRA, HMDA, and ECOA—was enacted in the 1970s to address 
perceived problems in credit markets.  HMDA requires most home mortgage 
creditors annually to disclose to the public information about home mortgage 
loans made or purchased, as well as loan applications denied.266  Regulations 
require disclosure of race, ethnicity, sex, and income of borrowers.  Unlike 
TILA,267 HMDA is not designed to enhance borrower information.  Rather, 
HMDA is designed to increase the ability of the public, regulators, and fair 
261
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f.
262
 12 U.S.C. § 2801. The Federal Reserve Board implements HMDA under Regulation C, 12 
C.F.R. pt. 230.1.
263
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602(aa), 1639(a)-(b). The Federal Reserve Board implements TILA 
under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226.1.
264
 Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994).
265 See, e.g., White, supra note 4 (arguing that it “is possibly only a slight exaggeration to claim 
that when it comes to housing and especially home ownership, the ethos of public policy has 
been (and continues to be) ‘too much is never enough’ ”).
266
 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801, 2803 (2000).  HMDA was enhanced significantly in 1989, for example, 
by requiring data to be not only reported to the regulators, but also disclosed to the public.
267
 TILA was designed to help consumers compare the costs of credit offered by requiring the 
disclosure of the Annual Percentage Rate (APR), the finance charge, the amount financed, and 
the total of all payments.  The theory was that enhanced disclosure would improve price 
information and thereby enhance competition.  See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 635 
(arguing for disclosure rather than product regulation). Unfortunately, TILA is extraordinarily 
complex.  See, e.g., Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F. 3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, 
J.) (“So much for the Truth in Lending Act as a protection for borrowers.”).
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lending enforcement agencies to assess whether lenders are engaged in 
discriminatory practices and how lenders are meeting their CRA obligations.  
Because HMDA does not include information on creditworthiness, loan terms, 
or property characteristics, HMDA data alone provide poor measures of 
discrimination.  However, wide availability of these data has empowered the 
public to assess on financial institution performance.  
ECOA prohibits creditors from discriminating in the provision of credit on 
the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or 
age.”268  For home mortgage lending, that prohibition is also reinforced by the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968.269  The federal banking regulators supervise and 
examine depository institutions for compliance with ECOA and may take 
enforcement action against institutions found to discriminate.  While the 
Federal Trade Commission enforces ECOA against non-depository creditors, it 
lacks the authority to supervise or examine these creditors.  The Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has responsibility for investigating 
complaints under the Fair Housing Act, and the Department of Justice has 
responsibility for bringing cases alleging a “pattern or practice” of fair lending 
violations under either act against any creditor.
Congress enacted HOEPA270 in 1994 to respond to unscrupulous lending 
practices in the subprime home equity mortgage market.  For some “high cost” 
loans, HOEPA imposes restrictions on certain contract provisions, provides for 
enhanced disclosures, and enhances remedies for violations.271 HOEPA 
restricts prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and negative amortization
under some circumstances. Lenders are forbidden from engaging in a pattern 
or practice of making high-cost loans without regard to the borrower’s ability 
to repay from income (rather than from home equity).  For any mortgage loan,
the Federal Reserve Board has regulatory authority to prohibit acts or practices 
that the Board finds to be unfair, deceptive, or designed to evade HOEPA.  The 
Board can also prohibit acts or practices in connection with refinance loans 
that the Board finds to be abusive or not in the interest of the borrower.
In addition to product regulation, HOEPA provides directly and indirectly 
for enhanced disclosures for borrowers facing high cost loans.  HOEPA 
directly enhances disclosure by requiring creditors to disclose mortgage terms
268
 15 U.S.C. §1691.
269
 42 U.S.C. §3605. The Fair Housing Act also covers other forms of discrimination in 
residential real estate transactions beyond fair lending violations.  
270
 Pub. L No. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994).  
271 HOEPA covers mortgage refinancing loans and closed-end home equity loans with annual 
percentage rates more than 8 percentage points above the yields on comparable Treasury 
securities or loans with certain points and fees that exceed 8 percent of the loan amount or an 
amount adjusted for inflation (just under $500 for 2004).  The statute sets a default rate of 10 
percentage points above comparable Treasuries, but the Federal Reserve Board has the 
authority to adjust downward to 8 percentage points or upward to 12 percentage points.  The 
Board adjusted the APR to 8 percentage points in 2001. Final Rule, Federal Reserve System, 
12 C.F.R. Part 226, Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, Dec. 20, 2001.
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three days in advance of closing.  Indirectly, HOEPA product restrictions tend 
to drive more of the cost of the loan into the APR so that consumers can better 
understand the costs of the loan and comparison shop.
Finally, there are a series of subsidies to credit. Most housing subsidies are 
not aimed at improving access to credit for low- and moderate-income 
borrowers or redressing housing discrimination.  Rather, they mostly subsidize 
the “American dream” of homeownership for all.  Subsidies to home mortgage 
credit include government insurance (through the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) , and the Government National Mortgage Association
(“Ginnie Mae”)) and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),272 including 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank (FHLB) system.  Tax expenditures and grant programs, including the 
home mortgage interest and property tax deductions, as well as a wide range of 
other programs, also affect housing markets.  I leave analysis of the housing 
subsidies in the tax code for others,273 or another day.  Here I focus only on 
comparing CRA to FHA and the GSEs as illustrative.274
During the Great Depression, Congress established FHA, the FHLBs, and
Fannie Mae to fill a gap left by the collapse of the private mortgage insurance 
industry “under the weight of a default rate approaching 50 percent and 
foreclosures exceeding 1,000 per day….”275 FHA, which operates within
272
 “In general, GSEs are financial institutions established and chartered by the federal 
government, as privately owned entities, to facilitate the flow of funds to selected credit 
markets….” Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs,” 
May 2001,  at http://ftp.cbo.gov/28xx/doc2841/GSEs.pdf, at 1 [hereinafter “CBO Study 
2001”].
273 See, EDWARD L. GLAESER & JESSE M. SHAPIRO, THE BENEFITS OF THE HOME MORTGAGE 
INTEREST DEDUCTION (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1979, Oct. 
2002), at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2002papers/2002list.html (demonstrating that 
the home mortgage interest deduction largely benefits upper income married homeowners who 
would have owned a home in any event); BRADY ET AL., REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE 
UTILIZATION OF THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION (Office of Tax Analysis Working 
Paper 88, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 2001) (finding that the subsidy from the mortgage interest 
deduction benefits high income homeowners more than twice as much as homeowners earning 
at or below the median); see also Steven C. Bourassa & William G. Grigsby, Income Tax 
Concessions for Owner-Occupied Housing, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 521, 523 (2000); 
James R. Follain & Robert M. Dunsky, The Demand for Mortgage Debt and the Income Tax, 8 
J. HOUSING RES. 155 (1997); James R. Follain & Lisa Sturman Melamed, The False Messiah 
of Tax Policy: What Elimination of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Promises and a 
Careful Look at What It Delivers, 9 J. HOUSING RES.179 (1998); John C. Weicher, Comment 
on Steven C. Bourassa and William G. Grigsby’s “Income Tax Concessions for Owner-
Occupied Housing,” 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 547 (2000).
274 In addition to subsidies in the credit markets, subsidies affect other aspects of the home 
mortgage transaction, and other subsidies assist households who rent, including the section 8 
voucher program and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.  While these non-credit-market 
subsidies are beyond the scope of this article, they nonetheless alter the market context for 
home mortgage credit, and themselves may be alternatives to subsidizing the credit market.
275
 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 119, at 358.
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HUD, insures home mortgage loans made by private lenders in the event of 
default. FHA is intended to serve borrowers “who lack the savings, credit 
history or income to qualify for a conventional mortgage.”276 Ginnie Mae, also 
within HUD, provides a credit enhancement to pools of FHA loans and places 
them for sale on the secondary market. From its inception in 1934 to 2001, the 
FHA insured nearly 30 million home mortgages.277  In 2002 alone, FHA 
insured $150 billion in mortgages for nearly 1.3 million households.278
The housing GSEs—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs—were 
created to “provide liquidity and stability to the home mortgage market, 
thereby increasing the flow of funds available to mortgage borrowers.”279
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue debt to buy and hold mortgages in 
portfolio, and insure mortgage-backed securities issued to investors.280  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are restricted to the market for conventional, conforming 
loans,281 and essentially fund all net new loans meeting those criteria.282 The 
FHLBs were created to provide short-term loans (“advances”) to thrifts in 
order to stabilize mortgage lending in local markets.  Today, FHLB 
membership is broad, including the largest commercial banks, and advances to 
members can be issued on a variety of collateral and used for any purpose.283
The GSEs are subject to capital requirements and regulatory oversight.  
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) regulates 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.284 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac currently hold 
capital well in excess of the amounts required,285 but recent accounting
problems at Freddie Mac have undermined confidence that the GSEs, and their 
regulators, have an adequate grasp on their risk. HUD sets affordable housing 
276 DEPT. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET SUMMARY 13 
(Feb. 3, 2003) available at http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy04/budgetsummaryu.pdf, 
[hereinafter “HUD BUDGET SUMMARY”].
277
 Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, About Housing, at
www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/hsgabout.cfm (visited Aug. 6, 2004).
278 HUD BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 276, at 13.  36 percent were minority.
279
 Statement of CBO Director Dan L. Crippen before the Committee on Financial Services, 
May 23, 2001, available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/28xx/doc2839/GSE-Testimony.pdf, at 1.  See 
also, Treasury Dept., “Government Sponsorship of the Federal National Mortgage Association 
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,” July 1996 [hereinafter “Treasury Study”].
280
 Treasury Study, supra note 279, at 1. Fannie Mae was a government corporation, but 
Congress divided its functions into two parts, and Fannie Mae became a GSE in 1968.  Ginnie 
Mae, the part that remained government-owned, insures securities of FHA loans.
281 Id. Conventional loans are those not backed by government insurance.  Conforming loans 
are those that are under the dollar limit set annually for GSE purchases.
282
 CBO Study 2001, supra note, at 28.
283 Id.; see also CBO Study 2001, supra note 242, at 4.
284
 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
4501-4641 (2000); OFHEO, Press Release, OFHEO Issues Capital Classifications for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, June 30, 2003, at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/ofheocc063003.pdf
[“OFHEO 2003 Capital Classifications”].
285 Id.
Credit Where It Counts 51
goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The Federal Housing Finance Board 
regulates the FHLBs.
B. CRA COMPARED WITH FAIR LENDING LAW
Critics of CRA contend that, if CRA is aimed at redressing racial 
discrimination, the government should simply enforce ECOA instead.286
ECOA does seem to help increase lending to minorities.  For example, the 
share of bank and thrift lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and 
areas that went to minority borrowers increased from 21 to 28 percent from 
1993 to 1999. Most of the increase occurred during a period of intense Justice 
Department focus on enforcing fair lending laws, from 1993 to 1995.287
Yet CRA may help uncover some practices with discriminatory effects that 
both disparate treatment analysis and disparate impact analysis as they are
currently formulated have a hard time detecting or remedying.  For example, 
ECOA’s disparate treatment and impact tests cannot easily detect 
discriminatory overages, yield spread premiums, risk-based pricing, or
segmented markets.288  Moreover, relying on ECOA lawsuits alone to advance 
anti-discrimination norms has its own limitations.  Few ECOA lawsuits have 
been brought.  Developing proof of lending discrimination is costly and
difficult. When credit scoring is not the sole basis for a lending decision, 
lenders have a high degree of discretion, particularly in the case of applicants 
who are neither highly qualified not unqualified.  Even when credit scoring is 
the sole basis, disparate treatment might arise when creditors subjectively 
evaluate data before entering it into the credit system, when creditors provide 
different levels of assistance to borrowers in completing credit applications, or
when creditors permit overrides of credit scoring in close cases. Given the 
complex and proprietary nature of credit scoring systems, and the difficulty of 
proving that any two applicants are similarly situated except for race, disparate 
treatment is hard to prove.  Disparate impact analysis is often no easier.  
Creditors have essential information about their loan portfolio and proprietary 
credit evaluation systems and the weights placed on all the variables in their 
system. Plaintiffs do not have such information, and creditors resist revealing 
their methodology because of competitive concerns.289
286
 Klausner, supra note 18, at 1563-64.
287 LITAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 27.  The Justice Department cases resulted 
in important consent decrees.  See Consent Agreement, United States v. Long Beach Mortgage 
Company, No. CV-96-6159 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 5, 1996); Consent Agreement, United States v. 
First National Bank of Vicksburg, No. 5-94-CV-6(B)(N) (S.D. Miss., Jan. 21, 1994); Consent 
Agreement, United States v. Shawmut National Corporation, No. 93-CV-2453 (D. Conn., Dec. 
13, 1993); Consent Agreement, United States v. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, No. 1-92-CV-2198-CAM (N.D. Ga., Sept 17, 1992).
288 See generally ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77.  But see Cason v. Nissan, No. 3-98-0223, 
(M.D.T.N. May 25, 2001) (ECOA suit based on discriminatory overages in automobile market 
leading to settlement order).
289 See generally ROSS & YINGER, supra note 77.
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ECOA’s weaknesses do not necessarily imply that CRA is the only, or 
even the best, answer to credit market discrimination.  ECOA itself sets out 
important anti-discrimination norms, and should be strengthened.  And
building on the strength of HMDA, “cross-modal” strategies, such as a 
disclosure law requiring creditors to disclose the borrower’s credit score and 
the creditor’s rate sheet, could help address price discrimination.  A new law 
on product regulation could bar the payment of yield spread premiums, which 
disproportionately fall on minority borrowers.
Still, CRA plays an important role in reinforcing the anti-discrimination 
principles underlying ECOA and in expanding access to credit for minority 
borrowers.  Minority households are disproportionately represented among 
low- and moderate-income households and in low- and moderate-income 
communities.  CRA has encouraged banks and thrifts to increase their lending 
in such communities significantly, and minority households now constitute a 
larger share of such lending than they did a decade ago. CRA’s focus on low-
income neighborhoods may address structural inequalities facing African 
Americans and other minorities more effectively than ECOA’s disparate 
impact standard, which is hemmed in by equal protection jurisprudence and the 
business necessity defense.290 Moreover, CRA goes beyond ECOA’s focus on 
credit discrimination to address broader market failures affecting low-income 
borrowers and communities.  While CRA helps to reinforce ECOA, fair 
lending laws are no substitute for CRA.
C. CRA COMPARED WITH DISCLOSURE LAW
Disclosure laws are perennial favorites in the legal literature.291 I agree 
that disclosure can help to improve the home mortgage credit market.  
However, I take issue with disclosure advocates on three grounds.  First, 
disclosure serves a broader set of purposes than usually posited.  Second, I 
have a healthier dose of skepticism about the effectiveness of disclosure in 
helping households than legal scholars have recently espoused.292  Third, I 
argue that disclosure is no substitute for CRA.
There are two basic types of disclosure: disclosures designed to improve 
market efficiency by making consumers better shoppers and disclosures 
designed to help regulators enforce other laws and push markets towards 
compliance with social norms.  TILA represents the first type, requiring
disclosures to individual consumers regarding the cost of loans that they
290 See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 499 (2003) (lamenting “the growing tendency of equal protection 
jurisprudence to obscure the dynamics of group hierarchy and to truncate the memory of 
historical discrimination”).
291 See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and 
the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Christine Jolls et 
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
292 See Camerer, et al., supra note 291 (arguing that HOEPA disclosures respond adequately to 
consumers’ need for more information about high cost loans).
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negotiate, calculated as an APR.293  This type of disclosure seeks to remedy 
asymmetric information and improve market competition and efficiency.294
HMDA represents the second type of disclosure, requiring information not 
only for the consumer but also for regulators and the market generally.  These 
broader disclosures reinforce positive social norms, promote market efficiency, 
and enhance the regulatory effectiveness of other laws.295  The collection and
public disclosure of information is the essential underpinning of CRA, ECOA, 
and HOEPA in expanding access to credit.  Public debate over this 
performance likely contributed to increased lending to minorities in the 1990s.
Yet relying on HMDA alone to overcome market failures and 
discrimination could in theory lead to “over-enforcement” of anti-
discrimination and community investment norms.  HMDA information does 
not contain measures of creditworthiness, loan terms, or property 
characteristics that influence creditor decisions. Relying on HMDA data alone 
can lead to dramatic overstatements of lending discrimination.  Similarly, 
HMDA data do not provide any context for understanding creditors’ ability to 
lend in low-income communities, so banks and thrifts might face undue 
pressure to make unsound loans.  Conversely, relying solely on public 
disclosure could lead to under-enforcement of equal protection and community 
investment norms.  Without fair lending laws, HMDA’s disclosure might 
convey less approbation.  Without CRA, disclosure under HMDA that a bank 
did little lending in low-income communities would have little consequence.
Although HOEPA’s disclosure requirements and TILA facilitate 
comparison shopping by consumers, in some cases too much information is 
provided for consumers to use, and in other cases too little,.  Even outside of 
the subprime market, there is little reason to think that consumers understand 
most aspects of mortgage transactions.296  Decision theory suggests a need for 
simplicity: individuals faced with complex problems simplify them to one or 
293
 12 C.F.R. pr. 226.18(e), 226.4(a) [need year of code edition cited].
294 See The Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose for TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; 
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1280-81 (2002); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 
267, at 635 (“Because more consumers will become informed if information acquisition costs 
are decreased, reducing these costs is thought to be the preferable response to the problem of 
imperfect information.”) (footnote omitted).
295
 The Federal Reserve Board recently amended its HMDA regulations to require lenders to 
report certain price information about high-cost loans.  HMDA reporting could be improved 
further by requiring information on interest rate and fees.  See Treasury Comments on the 
Federal Reserve Board’s proposed rules under Regulation B, C, and Z.  
296 See JOINT STUDY ON THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT 
PROCEDURES ACT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/tila.pdf; see also Lauren E. Willis, 
Decisionmaking & the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending (draft Jan. 
2004, on file with author).
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two major decisions.297  In addition, mortgage brokers can take advantage of 
borrowers, who trust mortgage brokers to provide them with full and accurate 
information and to provide them with the best loan product.  Yet it is in the 
broker’s interest to provide the borrower with the highest rate loan that the 
broker can convince the borrower to accept.  Brokers can earn higher yield 
spread premiums for placing borrowers into more expensive loans than ones 
for which the borrower could qualify.  Unlike retail consumer markets in 
which commodities are nearly impossible to price differentially (e.g., Cheerios 
in supermarkets), individual transactions for home mortgages present the 
possibility for price discrimination based on sophistication and willingness and 
ability to shop for better terms.298 With credit scoring, creditors know whether 
borrowers qualify for a less expensive loan, while most borrowers do not.299
The efficacy of disclosures is diminished by inadequacies in the nature and 
timing of disclosures,300 their limited effect on consumer behavior, and 
consumers’ cognitive limitations.  First, TILA disclosure typically occurs after 
a deal has been negotiated and the consumer has invested substantial lender-
specific search and negotiation costs.301 Second, TILA disclosure may not 
actually be noticed, read, or understood by consumers, who often have limited 
finance or English-language skills.302 In one survey, 75 percent of respondents 
either agreed somewhat or agreed strongly that TILA statements are 
complicated.303 Third, TILA disclosures may inundate the consumer with so 
much data that the most important aspects of the contract, such as the APR, are 
swallowed by the details.304 The need for simplicity conflicts, however, with 
the goal of producing comprehensive disclosures that would permit consumers 
297 See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (3d ed. 2000); ROBIN HOGARTH, 
JUDGMENT AND CHOICE (2d ed. 1987); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING (1993).
298 See JACKSON & BERRY, supra note 114, at 63.  Ayres has documented similar price 
discrimination in automobile sales and other markets.  See AYRES, supra note 109.
299
 FICO scores are now available to borrowers upon request. Empirical research is needed on 
whether this access has been used.
300
 William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules 
Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan 
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1128-30 (1984); Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, 
A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV. 711, 715-16 (1979) (discussing 
the timing problem). Early disclosure is now required by Regulation Z, 226.19(b), 226.5a, 
226.5b.
301 See Eskridge, supra note 300, at 1129 (noting that home buyers tend to submit only one 
loan application because most lenders charge a nonrefundable application fee of several 
hundred dollars); Landers & Rohner, supra note 300, at 717-21; L.G. Tesler, Searching for the 
Lowest Price, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 40 (1973).
302
 Elizabeth Renuart, Comment, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage Market: 
Suggested Reforms in a Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEX. L. REV.
421, 432 (2003).
303
 Thomas A. Durkin, Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit 
Insurance, FED. RES. BULL. 201, 208 tbl. 9. (2002).
304
 Eskridge, supra note 300, at 1133-35; Landers & Rohner, supra note 300, at 722-25. 
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to comparison shop based on the real price of loans. Fourth, this effect is 
exacerbated for low-income and minority buyers, for whom alternative credit 
options are more limited. Low-income buyers are the least likely to be aware 
of alternative credit options and the least likely to shop for alternate financing 
arrangements.305  Each of these problems is exacerbated in the subprime 
market, making disclosure laws even less likely to be effective.306
Disclosures can and should undoubtedly be improved,307 but the current 
structure of the home mortgage market in low-income communities suggests 
that disclosure will not significantly affect either consumer or creditor 
behavior.  Financial education can play a role in helping consumers understand 
disclosures better. It is hard to find scholarly literature or policy advocates 
who do not end a discussion of disclosure with a call for consumer financial 
education.  The problem is that financial education is notoriously hard to do 
well. And expenditures for it lead to strong positive externalities, so it is quite 
difficult to induce market participants to offer financial education to the 
borrowing public at anything like the scale it would take to matter.
These problems explain why disclosure laws are no substitute for CRA.  
CRA gives strong incentives on banks and thrifts, those most able to alter their 
behavior in response to the problem of information asymmetry and collective
action.308  CRA can enhance competition in fragmented markets where 
disclosures seem unlikely on their own to significantly affect market structure.  
CRA also enlists expert agencies to further its goals, rather than relying solely 
on the public to change creditor behavior either in response to HMDA data or 
one loan at a time through TILA disclosures.
D. CRA COMPARED WITH ABUSIVE PRACTICE PROHIBITIONS
305 See, e,g., Jack Guttentag, DOES IT PAY TO SHOP FOR A MORTGAGE? (1998), available at 
http://www.mtgprofessor.com/tableofcontents.htm; Jeanne Hogarth & Jinkook Lee, Consumer 
Information for Home Mortgages: Who, What, How Much, and What Else?, 9 FIN. SERVICES 
REV. 277 (2000); Jeanne Hogarth & Jinkook Lee, The Price of Money: Consumers’ 
Understanding of APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING, 
SPECIAL ISSUE ON PRICING AND PUBLIC POLICY 66 (1999).
306 See Barry Zigas & Paul Weech, The Rise of Subprime Lending: Causes, Implications, and 
Proposals, Lending to Borrowers with Blemished Credit: Challenges and Opportunities 26 
(Fannie Mae, Discussion Draft, Oct. 2001); supra Section III.C.
307 See, e.g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA); Simplifying and Improving the 
Process of Obtaining Mortgages to Reduce Settlement Costs to Consumers, 67 Fed. Reg. 
49,134 (proposed July 29, 2002) (proposing significant simplification).  But see Comments of 
the Staff of the Bureau of Economics, the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the Office of 
Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission, Before the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, in the Matter of Request for Comment on Proposed Amendments to the 
Regulations Implementing the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Docket No. FR-4727-P-
01 (Oct. 28, 2002) (arguing that HUD’s proposal would not assist consumers).
308 Cf., e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing the “cheapest cost 
avoider”).
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HOEPA’s record has been decidedly mixed.309 Given the characteristics of 
the lower-income consumer credit market—high demand from a population 
with imperfect or limited credit history, many lightly regulated players and 
little competition from mainstream lenders—the potential for abuses is ripe.  A 
Treasury-HUD report that I co-directed proposed a four-part approach to 
curbing predatory lending: improve consumer literacy and disclosure, prohibit 
harmful sales practices, restrict abusive terms and conditions, and improve 
overall market structure.310 None of the legislative changes have been enacted, 
but the Federal Reserve Board issued a rule addressing the harmful sales 
practices and abusive terms often associated with high-cost mortgages using its 
existing authority under HOEPA.311 This rule takes significant steps towards 
limiting abusive practices, but congressional action would improve matters 
further,312  The Board’s requirement that creditors document and verify a 
borrower’s ability to repay will help deter asset-based lending.313 Rule 
changes made in December 2001,314 under the Board’s HMDA authority,
complement its efforts on predatory lending by requiring disclosure of certain 
rate spreads and of whether a loan exceeds HOEPA triggers.315  Many other 
improvements to abusive practice regulation are possible, as states are 
experimenting in this area and various cross-modal strategies have promise.
CRA could play an increasingly important role in reducing abuses.  Banks 
and thrifts can, and should, play an important role in improving competition in 
the credit market for lower-income consumers.  Low-income markets can be 
profitable for banks,316 and recent census data confirm that minority and new 
309 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending: A Joint Report (June 2000) (co-
directed by the author) (gathering extensive evidence of predatory practices despite HOEPA).
310 See id.; Barr, supra note 127. 
311
 Final Rule, Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. Part 226, Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 
65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001).
312 Congress could bolster the Board’s action in a number of ways, including: banning the 
financing at or before closing of single premium credit insurance, products often “packed” into 
subprime loans; requiring lenders to report the full credit histories of borrowers to the credit 
bureaus; requiring lenders to offer the borrower a choice of a loan without a prepayment 
penalty; and including “yield spread premiums” in the points-and-fees trigger for HOEPA.  See
U.S. Department of the Treasury Comment on Regulation Z (Truth in Lending Act; Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act) Proposed Rulemaking Docket No. R-1090. Yield 
spread premiums permit lenders to pass on the cost of a mortgage broker fee to the borrower in 
the form of a higher interest rate rather than in the form of a cash payment at closing.
313
 Stronger requirements might deter asset-based lending even more.  See U.S. Department of 
the Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, supra note 309
(suggesting documentation of ability to repay be signed by broker and acknowledged as 
received by borrower 3 days prior to closing).
314
 Federal Reserve System, Home Mortgage Disclosure; Final and Proposed Rule, 12 C.F.R. 
Pt. 203, 67 Fed. Reg. 7,221 (Feb. 15, 2002).
315
 The rule could be strengthened by requiring disclosure of all rate spreads, points, and fees, 
as well as other loan characteristics.  See U.S. Department of the Treasury Comment on 
Regulation C (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act) Proposed Rulemaking Docket No. R.-1001.
316 See, e.g., Performance and Profitability, supra note 176.
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immigrant communities will need to be a growing share of any bank’s
customer base.  Banks can get ahead of the curve by moving more quickly and 
creatively to serve central city markets where these growth populations tend to 
live and work.  Competition from banks and thrifts can help to drive out 
abusive practices and improve price transparency in these markets.  Low-
income borrowers may be ending up in a bank’s subprime unit or affiliate 
when they could qualify for better terms.  Banks and thrifts should have in 
place procedures to “upstream” these borrowers with good credit histories into 
their prime units.  Regulators should give CRA consideration for “promoting” 
borrowers from the subprime to the prime market.  In this way CRA can help 
thwart abuses in the subprime market without cutting off access to credit.
CRA has other advantages over HOEPA’s product regulation approach.  
CRA covers all bank and thrift loans, not simply loans that are “high cost.” 
CRA is designed to expand access to the full array of credit products, not 
simply to weed out bad actors or discourage predatory lending.  In addition, 
HOEPA’s product regulation approach is more prescriptive than CRA.  CRA 
does not dictate that banks or thrifts provide or withdraw any particular loan 
product or service, but leaves decisions about business strategy and product 
design to the banks and thrifts.  Lastly, unlike HOEPA, CRA attempts to bring
low-income households into the financial services mainstream.
E. CRA COMPARED WITH SUBSIDIES
One alternative to CRA is to rely more on subsidies.  In principle, subsidies 
should be used “to make marginal private costs equal to marginal social costs, 
and to make marginal benefits equal to marginal social benefits.”317 In 
practice, this is hard to do.  Substantively, it is hard to get private market actors
to respond to government subsidies unless the subsidies are robust.  Politically, 
it is hard to prevent the subsidies from becoming too robust.  Subsidies are 
pervasive in the home mortgage market.318  In this section, I focus only on the 
GSEs and FHA as alternatives to CRA, while in Part VI I explore other, 
hypothetical subsidies that could be deployed. With respect to Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the FHLBs, the subsidies are large in comparison to the 
benefits accruing to low-income, moderate-income, and minority borrowers.
The GSEs benefit from their relationships with the federal government 
in a variety of ways.  They are exempt from state and local taxation,319 are
exempt from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration,320 can 
317 STIGLITZ, supra note 23.
318 See, e.g., White, supra note 4, (arguing that it “is possibly only a slight exaggeration to 
claim that when it comes to housing and especially home ownership, the ethos of public policy 
has been (and continues to be) ‘too much is never enough’ ”).
319
 CBO Study 2001, supra note 242.
320Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed in 2002 to begin voluntarily to register their common 
stock with the SEC under section 12(g) the 1934 Act. Registration under the 1934 Act will 
subject Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to SEC disclosure requirements. Once registered, Fannie 
and Freddie will remain subject to such requirements in the future.  The FHLBs have not 
consented to SEC registration.  The GSEs remain exempt from registering new issuances of 
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borrow from the Treasury,321 and issue debt that banks and thrifts can hold 
under capital standards that favor the GSEs over private conduits.322  Unlike 
privately issued securities,323 GSE securities are exempt from SEC 
registration,324 are treated as government securities under the Exchange Act,325
and are exempt under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.326  Most importantly, the GSEs benefit from the credit 
enhancement of an implicit guarantee that the federal government will 
intervene in the event of financial collapse.327  Despite the disclaimer by both 
the federal government and the GSEs that there is no federal guarantee, there is 
a general belief by the market to the contrary.  That belief may arise because of 
the GSEs’ congressional charters, the indicia of federal support, or the notion 
that they are “too big to fail.”  The implicit guarantee permits the GSEs to 
issue debt at a lower cost, and to hold less capital than similar private firms.328
Measuring the subsidy provided to the GSEs is the subject of intense 
debate.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that the benefits 
accorded to the GSEs were worth $13.6 billion, of which Fannie Mae received 
$6.1 billion, Freddie Mac $4.6 billion, and the FHLBs $3.0 billion.329  CBO 
estimated that a “little more than half ($7.0 billion) of that total subsidy in 
2000 passed through” to mortgage borrowers through lower interest rates on 
conventional, conforming loans.330  CBO estimated that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac retained $3.9 billion (37 percent) of the subsidy for their 
mortgage-backed securities under the 1933 Act.  See STAFF REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE 
IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS, A STAFF REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES DISCLOSURE (2003), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/disclosure.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2003) 
[hereinafter MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT].
321
 CBO Study 2001, supra note 242, at 13-14.  
322
 Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 3, Appendix A, §3(a)(2)(vi)-(viii).
323
 Most privately issued MBS are sold in registered transactions. MBS DISCLOSURE REPORT, 
supra note 320, at 25.
324 See 12 USC § 1723c (Fannie Mae) and 12 U.S.C. § 1455g (Freddie Mac).  As government 
securities, Ginnie Mae’s securities are also exempt. See section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (2000), and section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act, id.. § 78c(a)(12).
325
 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(42)-(43) (2000).
326 Id.. § 77aaa-bbbb; id. § 80a-1 to 80a-64.  GSE securities are subject to anti-fraud provisions 
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See id.  § 77q(a); id. § 78j(b); 17 CFR § 240.10b-
5.
327
 Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac 10-11 (1996), at http://ftp.cbo.gov/0xx/doc13/Fanfred.pdf [hereinafter “CBO 
Study 1996”].
328 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF THE 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION (July 11, 1996), at 3.
329
 CBO Study 2001, supra note 242.
330 Id. at 1.  CBO did not calculate the benefits of the affordable housing goals in determining 
the net GSE subsidy. The GSEs’ public purposes go beyond access to credit for disadvantaged 
borrowers, so I first use estimates of the net subsidy to the GSEs after accounting for such 
broader purposes, and then discuss the affordable-housing mission of the GSEs.
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shareholders or other stakeholders.331 As for the FHLBs, CBO estimated that 
they passed on only $300 million of their $3 billion subsidy to mortgage 
borrowers, with 90 percent of the subsidy accruing to the benefit of the FHLB 
member banks or reducing interest rates on other types of loans borrowed from 
FHLB members.332  These estimates are sensitive to assumptions about the 
funding advantages GSEs receive and about how to model the pass-through to 
borrowers.333  For present purposes, the point estimates are not critical.  I will 
assume that the amount of the subsidy is some nontrivial amount above zero.
The GSEs contribute to access to home mortgage credit for low- and 
moderate-income households. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s performance 
has surpassed HUD’s affordable housing goals since they were first formally 
promulgated in 1997,334 and HUD increased those goals for 2001-04,335 and 
again for 2005-08.336 However, the share of GSE purchases financing 
affordable housing under the goals lagged that of the primary market during 
the 1990s.337 In the early 1990s, the GSEs held less of the credit risk 
associated with lending to low-income or minority borrowers and areas than 
did FHA and Ginnie Mae, as well as depository institutions, both as a share of 
the GSEs’ own activities and as a share of the market.338 In addition to the 
affordable housing goals, other factors contributed to this activity, such as the 
331
 CBO Study 2001, supra note 242, at 5.
332 Id.
333 Compare id. (finding that GSE securitization lowers interest rates on conventional, 
conforming mortgages) with Andrea Heuson, Wayne S. Passmore & Roger Sparks, CREDIT 
SCORING & MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION: DO THEY LOWER MORTGAGE RATES?, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BOARD, FINANCE & ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 2000-44 (2000) (arguing that 
lower interest rates lead to higher levels of securitization, not the reverse).
334
 In 1992, Congress enacted a new affordable housing requirement for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. HUD had set up the first affordable housing goals regulation for Fannie Mae in 
1978.  OVERVIEW OF THE GSE’S HOUSING GOAL PERFORMANCE, 1993-2001, at
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/GSE/gse2001.pdf, (visited Aug. 10, 2003), n. 2.  The GSE 
definition of low- and moderate-income households, 100 percent of area median income, 
includes households with higher incomes than as defined for CRA. Under CRA, low- and 
moderate-income households have incomes less than or equal to 80 percent of area median. 
335 See Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., “Issue Brief,” January 2001, at 3-4, available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/gse.pdf [hereinafter Issue Brief].
336 See HUD, Proposed Housing Goal Rule – 2004, at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/gse/summary.doc.
337
 Treasury Department, Office of Government Sponsored Enterprise Policy (Sept. 15, 2000) 
(on file with author); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GOVERNMENT 
SPONSORSHIP OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERAL HOME 
LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 56-60 (July 11, 1996).
338 See Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore, Credit Risk and the Provision of Mortgages to 
Lower-Income and Minoirty Homebuyers, 8 FED. RESERVE BULL. 989, 1000 tbl. 3, 1004 tbl. 4 
(1995). The authors surmised that primary market participants performed better because they 
had greater access to information about the creditworthiness of borrowers or the conditions of 
neighborhoods, and used greater flexibility in underwriting than did the GSEs.
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GSEs’ business strategies and the shift in the primary mortgage market 
towards greater levels of lending to low-income borrowers.339
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have also contributed to affordable housing 
in other ways.  Both GSEs sponsor home counseling programs.  The GSEs 
train loan originators and support community organizations to increase 
affordable lending. The GSEs have used more flexible underwriting criteria 
for loan purchases.  Greater flexibility in the secondary market can help to spur 
greater flexibility in the primary market, but these innovations have also 
occurred among home mortgage originators themselves.
The FHLBs also provide modest subsidies for affordable housing and 
community development through the Affordable Housing Program and 
Community Investment Program.  However, the bank members of the FHLBs 
enjoy extensive low-cost advances that essentially subsidize the full range of 
bank activities.340  The FHLBs made $16.9 billion in net advances to members
in 2002, with $490 billion outstanding at the end of that year.341 In addition, 
the FHLBs have begun to experiment with untargeted secondary market 
operations in the hopes of competing with the other GSEs.
The GSEs pose risks and carry high costs.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
shareholders and FHLB members retain a significant portion of the subsidy, 
and the portion passed on to consumers is spread diffusely through the market, 
reaching many home buyers who would purchase a home in any event.  The 
FHLB subsidy is spread even more diffusely than that of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.  The GSE duopoly hinders competition in the secondary market 
for conventional, conforming loans, although the jumbo and subprime 
secondary markets are thriving.  Taxpayers would face a large, contingent 
liability in the unlikely event that the GSEs failed.  The large role of GSEs in 
the debt market may raise the price of Treasury borrowing and squeeze credit 
in other markets. Moreover, the government faces the difficulty of managing 
risk from an implicit guarantee, rather than an explicit, budgeted one.342
FHA provides mortgage subsidies through insurance. FHA provided $157 
billion in insurance on home mortgage loans to 1.3 million households in 2002. 
FHA’s secondary market counterpart, Ginnie Mae, guaranteed $175 billion in 
mortgage-backed securities that year.  FHA specializes in serving borrowers 
339
 The shares of CRA loans sold on the secondary market increased from 54 percent in 1993 
to 67 percent in 1998.
340
 CBO Study, supra note 272.
341 FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS 
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS FIRST QUARTER 2003, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/Z1/Current/zlr-1.pdf (visited Aug. 10, 2003) at 33 
tble. F. 124, Government-Sponsored Enterprises (Flows), 78, tble. L.124, Government-
Sponsored Enterprises (Levels).  Taxpayers may be an indirect beneficiary of advances 
because they reduce the interest rate exposure of FHLB member banks, and to the extent that 
this makes it less likely that banks will fail, deposit insurance funds benefit.  CBO Study, supra 
note 272, at xii.
342 See Treasury Study, supra note 279, at 77-81.
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who make “low down payment[s], have high debt-to-income ratios, and/or 
have tarnished credit.”343 These borrowers tend to be first-time, minority, or 
low-income and tend to live in low-income or minority-concentrated 
neighborhoods.344 A higher share of FHA lending goes to low-income and 
minority borrowers, and low-income areas, compared to the GSEs.345  During 
the 1990s, the share of FHA lending going to low- and moderate-income 
minority borrowers grew more rapidly than did the share of conventional 
lending to those borrowers.346  FHA also serves a role in regional markets with 
falling wages, increasing unemployment, and dropping house prices.347 At 
times, FHA has competed with conventional lenders.348 A dilemma for FHA is 
how to reach further into the market while managing risk.349  As the 
conventional market serves the more credit-worthy portion of FHA’s pool of 
borrowers,350 adverse selection will leave FHA with higher risk.  That problem 
is exacerbated because FHA lags the private sector in credit scoring and risk 
management.351  The FHA portfolio is becoming riskier.352
In sum, government subsidies generate windfalls for the GSE shareholders 
and others.  A large portion of those whose mortgages are purchased by the 
GSEs would likely have had access to the credit markets in any event, even if 
at a higher price. GSE subsidies are not transparent, making it difficult for the 
public to weigh its costs and benefits.  FHA subsidies are more transparent 
because the cost of the subsidy appears as user fees and as an item in the 
federal budget.353  The cost of transparency is, however, direct taxpayer 
liability for the FHA.  FHA may not have the management capacity and 
technical expertise to manage risk as effectively as private market participants.
343 SARAH ROSEN WARTELL, SINGLE-FAMILY RISKSHARING: AN EVALUATION OF ITS 
POTENTIAL AS A TOOL FOR FHA 11 (Millennial Housing Commission, June 2002) [hereinafter 
ROSEN, FHA RISKSHARING].
344 Id. FHA’s success in serving first-time homebuyers may be overstated, since studies 
suggest that these households would become homeowners anyway at a later age. Pennington-
Cross & Yezer, supra note 119, at 367.
345 Id. See also Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 119, at 362 (noting FHA role in serving 
minorities).
346 See Treasury Study, supra note 279.
347
 Pennington-Cross & Yezer, supra note 119, at 362.
348
 In part, this may be a sign of success. FHA’s innovative underwriting practices, when they 
work, can be replicated by the private market.  Id. at 363-365.
349 See, e.g., HUD BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note, at 13
350 See ROSEN. FHA RISKSHARING, supra note 343, at 17 (noting that PMIs increased the 
portion of  high LTV loans insured to 10 percent of their insured loans and that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac had increased the portion of high LTV loans purchased to 4-6 percent). 
351 See id. at 16; THOMAS H. STANTON, THE PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ENDOWMENT FOR 
THE BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT CREDIT SCORING AND LOAN SCORING: TOOLS FOR IMPROVED 
MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS 4 (1999).
352 See ROSEN, FHA RISKSHARING, supra note 343, at 21.
353
 GSE activity is noted in federal budget documents, even though the GSEs are not “on 
budget.”
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CRA has important advantages over existing subsidy approaches.  
Needless to say, CRA provides no windfall to banks and thrifts.  CRA targets 
all its efforts at expanding access to credit and financial services for low- and
moderate-income borrowers and communities, so there is no wasted effort on 
generalized policies subsidizing housing consumption.  CRA is less risky than 
subsidies through GSEs or FHA.  If CRA increased risk because of expanded 
lending to low-income borrowers, that risk would be diffused over the well 
diversified portfolios of thousands of depositories, all of which are 
comprehensively supervised for safety and soundness and required to hold 
adequate capital.  Moreover, banks and thrifts have expertise in finding 
creditworthy borrowers and in using extensive risk-mitigation techniques that 
are more difficult for secondary market participants to operate.  It is certainly 
possible to design subsidies far better than the ones we have, but our 
experience over the last 70 years should augur caution.
VI. CRA COMPARED WITH OTHER ALTERNATIVES
Critics have argued for a range of other policy alternatives to CRA.  The 
previous Part compared CRA with existing legal regimes of negative 
prohibition (ECOA), disclosure (HMDA and TILA), product regulation
(HOEPA), and subsidy (through the GSEs and FHA).  This Part compares 
CRA with ideal types of alternative arrangements that have been suggested by 
critics, including income transfers or demand-side subsidies, supply-side
subsidies, and rules as compared with CRA’s standards.  I contend that 
alternative institutional arrangements to CRA, including relying solely on the 
market, would likely produce inferior outcomes or be quite costly in transition.  
A. CRA COMPARED WITH INCOME TRANSFERS OR DEMAND-SIDE 
SUBSIDIES
Assume for the moment that the purpose of credit market regulation is to 
redistribute “something” to the poor so that afterwards their social welfare is 
higher.  The public finance literature usually assumes that income is a good 
proxy for social welfare, and that the “something” being redistributed should 
thus be income.  That income redistribution should be confined to the tax and 
transfer system and should not be a goal of legal rules is a familiar assertion in 
public finance, and with good reason.  At least in principle, income transfer 
can usually be accomplished at lower cost than if redistribution were 
accomplished by changing legal rules.  Kaplow and Shavell take the strong 
form of this argument, contending that legal rules should never take account of 
distributional consequences and should only aim for efficiency.354
354 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 
(2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); see also Chris William 
Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).  Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal rules should not be modified to 
favor the poor because “society can instead use the income tax system (here interpreted to 
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Macey and Miller argue that CRA could be characterized as a tax on banks 
and thrifts aimed at redistribution and that income transfers should be preferred
in accomplishing this goal.355 CRA is not, at least not explicitly, aimed at 
redistribution, but rather at correcting perceived market failures.  Even if the 
goal of CRA were to be recast as income redistribution, it is not obvious that 
the tax-and-transfer system should be preferred over CRA.  One may want to 
use legal rules in place of transfers because income taxation is itself 
distortionary,356 and income transfers may have high administrative costs.357
If income is transferred as an in-kind subsidy the costs may be higher than 
through “cash” transfers—or even through legal rules.358 First, in-kind 
subsidies are considered less efficient than cash subsidies because the recipient 
may only use the in-kind subsidy for specified purposes.359 To the extent that 
the recipient undertakes the specified actions to the same degree as if given a 
cash grant, the in-kind subsidy costs more to administer. To the extent that the 
subsidy changes behavior, the subsidy does not increase the recipient’s welfare 
to the same degree as if she had received a cash subsidy to pursue her own 
preferences.  Second, in-kind plans are paternalistic in telling the 
heterogeneous recipients that they should derive utility from the provision of a 
particular service.360 In-kind mechanisms may impose a higher value on a 
service than an individual may have given it. Third, in-kind programs are 
often more administratively costly than direct transfers.361
Nor is transferring income as “cash” without controversy.  There is no 
consensus on the appropriate distribution of income.  Moreover, even if one 
were to decide how much income to redistribute, the means are contentious.  
The inefficiencies associated with the welfare system are well known.362
Similarly, the literature debating tax expenditures is voluminous.363
include programs that transfer income to the poor) to redistribute income.” Kaplow & Shavell, 
29 J. Legal Stud., supra, at 822.  But see Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing 
Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003) (arguing 
that legal rules may optimally redistribute social welfare under some circumstances).
355 Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 296.
356 STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 23.
357 For example, government income transfers to the unbanked often require costly financial 
services transactions to convert a check into cash.  See Barr, supra note 1. 
358 See generally STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 23.  
359
 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 23, at 254-65 
(presenting arguments concerning the substitution versus income effect).
360
 See generally Edgar K. Browning, A Theory of Paternalistic In-Kind Transfers, 19 ECON. 
INQUIRY 579 (1981).
361
 See, e.g., STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 23, at 349.
362 See, e.g., Committee on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives, The 2000 Green 
Book: Background Materials & Data on Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Comm. On 
Ways & Means, Appendix L, Monitoring the Effects of Pre- and Post-TANF Welfare Reform 
Initiatives (17th ed., Oct. 6, 2000).
363
 For the debate over tax expenditures, see, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX 
REFORM (1973); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Tax Reform, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budget: 
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Furthermore, the distinction between tax and transfer programs and regulations 
is not obviously meaningful conceptually, and questions about program design, 
regulatory structure, and the appropriate incidence of the tax—whether on 
banks or other taxpayers— in relation to the tax structure generally, would all 
remain.364  In addition, transition costs from laws that redistribute income to a 
tax and transfer program would diminish the benefits of such a change.
If the main goal of CRA were to redistribute income, as a theoretical
matter it seems more desirable and efficient simply to eliminate CRA and other 
credit market regulation and subsidies and to shift to a much more progressive 
income tax.  If regulations and subsidies are intrinsically inefficient and also 
distort the work-leisure tradeoff, and one assumes away transition costs and the 
political difficulty of the task, then income redistribution through significant 
expansion of the tax and transfer programs may be preferable.365 But all these 
conditions seem unlikely to hold in the real world.
One could also think of credit market regulation as about redistributing not 
income, but access to credit.366 Suppose that society seeks neither to correct 
market imperfections, nor to guard against discrimination, nor to redistribute 
income, but instead to redistribute access to credit to low- and moderate-
income and minority households.  Why would society have this goal?  
Redistribution of home mortgage credit might advance a goal of spreading the 
positive externalities associated with owning a home.367  Redistribution of 
mortgage credit would also have “expressive” value,368 by conveying that low-
income and minority households are full members of our society because they 
can participate in the “American dream” of home ownership.
If this is the intended form of redistribution, then CRA may be more 
efficient than income redistribution.  Income is, after all, only a proxy for 
social welfare.  Directly redistributing the thing that society wishes to 
redistribute may be less costly than using income redistribution to achieve the 
same aim.  Society may have to redistribute a large sum of income to 
underserved borrowers to induce the credit markets to leave them as well off as 
they are with current regulations and subsidies.  Moreover, it would be hard to 
convey the same “expressive” effect regarding inclusion in the American 
A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for 
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The 
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986).
364 See, e.g., David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 995 (2004).
365 See Kaplow & Shavell, 23 J. LEGAL STUD., supra note 354.
366
 For a thoughtful discussion of the role of legal rules in distributing non-income goods, see 
Logue & Avraham, supra note 354.
367 See GLAESER & SHAPIRO, supra note 273.
368
 On “expressive” benefits generally, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard Pildes, Expressive 
Theories of Law, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).  But see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive 
Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).  I discuss this further 
in exploring the benefits of standards over rules, infra, this Part.
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dream through income redistribution if some aspect of the difficulty these 
households have in accessing credit markets is not solely due to their income.  
For example, if racial discrimination, market failures, lack of wealth, poor 
credit history, or neighborhood racial or income characteristics are factors, 
then income redistribution alone would likely be inadequate to address them.
The broader point is that CRA is not primarily justified by redistributive 
goals, but by the need to address market failures and discrimination.  It would 
be highly inefficient to attempt to redress these market failures by increasing 
the incomes of millions of individuals, regardless of whether they attempt to 
access the home mortgage market and regardless of whether they would 
experience barriers to credit from market failures or racial discrimination.
B. CRA COMPARED WITH SUPPLY-SIDE SUBSIDIES
At some level, subsidies can become substitutes for regulation.  If the 
government pays private sector participants a sufficient amount, for example, 
they will take a second look for creditworthy borrowers in low-income, 
moderate-income, or minority communities in the same way that they would 
under a regulatory regime.  Developing such a subsidy regime is not without 
difficulties.  First, one would need to decide whether the particular market 
participants or taxpayers should bear the cost of addressing the market failure.  
Second, one would need to determine the amount of subsidy necessary to have 
the desired effect without generating undesirable windfalls to recipients.
With respect to the former issue, for example, if lenders practicing 
statistical discrimination are paid sufficiently, presumably they would be 
willing to stop engaging in that form of discrimination.  The question is 
whether we as a society think that private market participants should be 
permitted to engage in “rational’ discrimination.  In that area, ECOA bars 
statistical discrimination.  That is, we prohibit discrimination even if it is 
“rational” and we do not think taxpayers should have to pay to stop market 
participants from employing statistical discrimination on a prohibited basis.
Presumably, society would have an even greater aversion to subsidizing 
institutions to get them to stop discriminating on the basis of racial animus.
With respect to the latter issue, subsidies to financial institutions for 
lending in low-income communities could be expanded, but previous 
experience, documented in Part  V, suggests that windfalls would be difficult 
to control.  In addition to subsidies to banks and thrifts more generally, 
targeted subsidies to specialized lenders can be an important means of 
expanding the reach of the private lenders.  
For example, the Treasury Department’s Community Development 
Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund, established in 1994,369 is designed to 
create a national network of financial institutions focused on low-income 
communities.  The CDFI Fund has provided over $535 million to locally 
based, private sector CDFIs, as well as mainstream banks and thrifts. These 
369 Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
325, title I, Sec. 104, Sept. 23, 1994, 108 Stat. 2166, codified at 12 U.S.C. 4703.
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local CDFIs have a strong track record of producing tangible results.370  For 
example, Self-Help Credit Union of North Carolina has provided over $1 
billion in financing to 16,000 home buyers, small businesses and non-profits in 
North Carolina.  The Reinvestment Fund, serving the Philadelphia region, has 
made $200 million in loans, investments and grants and leveraged an 
additional $800 million in public and private capital for affordable housing and 
community development.  The Reinvestment Fund has helped to build 6,000 
units of affordable housing, to create 16,000 jobs, provide 6,000 new child care 
slots, and build numerous new community facilities.
CDFIs around the country are helping to transform low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods. They are drawing in mainstream banks and thrifts to 
invest with them.  CDFIs are often the market pioneers in their community, 
using their local market expertise and knowledge about the community to 
make loans and investments others had overlooked. The CDFI Fund has 
played a critical role in growing this industry.  The Fund’s investments have 
helped its awardees to increase their capitalization, develop stronger 
infrastructure and operations, and expand their reach.371 The growth of CDFIs
is critically important to expanding lending in low-income communities, and I 
worked hard at the Treasury Department to grow this field.
However, the small size and scale of these CDFIs suggests that it would be 
inefficient to switch from relying on the banking system to a system based 
solely on such specialized lenders.372  Moreover, without the impetus of CRA, 
it is doubtful that banks and thrifts would have invested so heavily in CDFIs 
over the last decade.  Eliminating CRA in favor of CDFIs would thus require 
an even greater infusion of governmental funds to continue CDFI growth, and 
CDFIs might also lose out on the technical expertise, business judgment, and 
advice that banks have brought to the table over the last decade.  In addition, 
there would be enormous costs to shift to a system of targeted subsidy.
More serious objections could be made to switching to a system in which 
the government delivers the benefit directly, creating a need for a government 
loan distribution system parallel to the banking sector.  Not only would the 
transition costs be enormous, but the government would probably do badly at
providing financial services in this way.  Even if the government were good at 
it, such services would unfairly compete with the private sector.
370
 Details on CDFIs from CDFI Fund, at http://www.cdfifund.gov/awardees/index.asp.
371
 In 2001, the Fund’s $74 million in CDFI awards leveraged $150 million in outside capital 
for CDFIs, and its $45 million in incentives to mainstream banks and thrifts brought $244 
million in investments in CDFIs and another $1.1 billion in direct loans in low-income 
communities.  The CDFI Fund found that its 106 awardees from fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 
1998 had made $3.5 billion in community development loans and investments since receiving 
their award, or $31 in financing for each dollar received from the Fund.  CDFI Fund, FY 1999 
Annual Survey Preliminary Findings (May 8, 2001), at 
http://www.cdfifund.gov/news/pdf/1999_CORE_FY_Survey.pdf (visited Aug. 6, 2004).
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 Compare, for example, the $535 million in CDFI Fund investments, 1993-2000, with the 
more than $1 trillion in CRA loans over same time period.
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C. CRA’S STANDARDS APPROACH COMPARED TO A RULES 
APPROACH
The CRA statute, and its implementing regulations, can be characterized as 
employing a legal standard, rather than a rule.  Schlag defines rules as having 
an “empirical” trigger and a “determined” response while standards are defined 
as having an “evaluative” trigger and a “guided” response.373  The CRA statute 
directs the banking agencies to “assess the institution’s record of meeting the 
credit needs of its entire community…” and to “take such record into account” 
in evaluating applications for mergers, acquisitions, branch openings and 
closings.374  The structure of the agencies’ responsibilities under the statute is 
evaluative and guided rather than determined.  Under the regulations, a bank’s
or thrift’s “performance under the tests and standards in the rule is judged in 
the context of information about the institution, its community, its competitors, 
and its peers.”375  That is, bank regulators provide no fixed requirement for 
banks to undertake a certain level of activity, but rather make a judgment about 
the institution’s performance in the context in which it is operating.
The debate over whether standards or rules should be preferred has a long 
pedigree.376  Three basic approaches emerge in this debate.  First, scholars 
have identified philosophical underpinning of rules and standards.377  Second, 
other scholars have rejected the notion that formal distinctions between rules 
and standards have any meaning.378  A third group of scholars have attempted 
to discern general principles for deciding when standards or rules are more 
appropriate.379 Among the last group, law and economics scholars have used 
transaction cost economics to argue that the higher cost of articulating rules ex 
373
 Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1985).
374
 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2000).
375
 Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156 (May 4, 
1995).
376 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-73 (1944); MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 149-55 
(1991); Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 181 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. 
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377 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 376, at 1688 (arguing that standards reflect altruism while 
rules reflect individualism); Rose, supra note 376, at 609 (contending that debate is over what 
our relationship with strangers should be).
378 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 376; Schlag supra note 376.
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 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 376, at 1710 (listing qualities associated with rules and 
standards).
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ante is worth it when large numbers of people engage in the activity being 
regulated, multiplying the transaction costs many times over.380
Critics of CRA have argued that its standards approach results in arbitrary 
and inefficient enforcement, permits rent-seeking by banking agencies and 
community groups, and violates basic notions of the rule of law.381  CRA’s 
critics tend to espouse rhetoric that would support the notion that deep 
philosophical differences underlie the distinction between rules and standards, 
but the anti-formalists are right that standards can be made to look like rules, 
and vice versa, undermining the importance of such a gulf.  Legal directives 
can take forms arrayed on a continuum from those that are more standard-like 
to those that are more rule-like.  Thus, for the purposes of analyzing CRA, I 
adopt a pragmatic approach, and ask whether something like the standards 
approach of CRA is preferable to a more rules-based approach in this area.
Translating transaction cost theory into application is difficult because it is 
hard to measure the costs and benefits of alternative rule and standards 
formulations.  Kaplow argues that after promulgation, standards increase 
transaction costs relative to rules.  The lack of certainty in standards for 
meeting community needs under CRA does have compliance costs.  Lacking a 
numerical target imposed by regulators makes it more difficult for firms to 
know whether their CRA initiatives will result in the rating they seek. Firms 
may “overcomply” with CRA, particularly given the social norm of 
disapprobation that accompanies a low rating.382  Each examiner may review 
bank performance using implicitly different standards, leading to inconsistent 
evaluations even by a single regulator.  Examiners may vary in their standards 
across regulators and regions, magnifying the likelihood of inconsistency.
Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for preferring a standard to a rule for 
CRA.  First, a standard is likely to be more efficient than a rule.  Kaplow 
suggests that the cost of rulemaking will be higher ex ante than the cost of 
developing a standard.  How much higher will depend in part on how detailed 
the rule must be to cover the array of factual situations in which it is supposed 
to apply.  It would be quite costly to come up with a rule for CRA that was 
nuanced enough to fit the myriad contexts in which financial institutions lend.
One would want to adjust for: local market conditions; competition; the 
structure of the local housing market; the presence or absence of community 
organizations helping with screening and educating potential borrowers; the 
strength of local homeowners and civic organizations; local, state and federal 
funds available for homeownership assistance; the particular characteristics of 
380 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 376.  But see Posner, supra note 376, at 107 (arguing that the 
logic of economic optimization implied by Kaplow’s approach leads to an infinite regress 
rather than a basis for decision-making); Rose, supra note 376, at 609 (criticizing law and 
economics approaches).
381 See infra, Parts II & III. 
382
 For a strong form of this argument, see Posner, supra note 376, at 113-116 (describing 
overcompliance with social norm against wearing western-made motorcycle helmets in Soviet 
Union).
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the bank or thrift; and other factors.  Delineating these factors in advance 
would be enormously costly, with a high chance of getting them wrong.
To lower costs ex ante, one could adopt a simple set of rules instead.  One 
might imagine a system that involved levying fines on banks for failure to 
comply with numerical lending targets.  Setting fines for violations of CRA 
would comport CRA enforcement more closely with other areas of bank 
regulation.  In the 1990s regulatory reform process, the regulators considered 
including fines for banks achieving only a “needs to improve” rating on their 
examination, but dropped the idea, in part because the Department of Justice 
opined that such fines were not authorized by the statute.383
Yet CRA’s contextual standard has significant advantages ex post over an 
approach with fines for violating rules.  Clear, quantitative requirements on all 
firms would be inefficient.  Different firms have different cost structures, scope 
and scale, and operate in markets with different demographics and competitive 
structures.  Firms make loans at different times under different market 
conditions.  Setting a single rate (or rates) of lending in advance would likely 
cause some firms to be unable to meet the standard despite their best efforts, 
cause others to make uneconomic loans, and cause still others to meet the rule 
without any serious effort to lend to low-income borrowers.  By contrast, the 
CRA standards permit banks to respond to local needs based on their own
institutional organization, market assessments, and business plans, without 
being judged on the basis of national norms.  Rather, examiners look to local 
context and business strategy. Standards also diminish the extent to which 
regulators need fear that CRA would lead to “credit allocation,” since the bank 
makes the judgment about whether, and to whom, to extend a loan.384
A second reason to prefer a CRA standard over a rule is that using 
standards permits banks and local communities to participate in the formation 
of the legal directive.  Banks subject to CRA help to shape the content of the 
383
 See Joint Final Rule, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156, 
22158 (May 4, 1995).
384
 Although critics label CRA “credit allocation,” regulators have avoided quotas or 
approaches involving the government in decisions about the precise level of lending or the 
proper parties to which to lend. See, e.g., Fed. Res. Bd. Chairman Alan Greenspan, Economic 
development in low- and moderate-income communities, Remarks at a Community Forum on 
Community Reinvestment and Access to Credit: California’s Challenge, Los Angeles,  CA 
(Jan. 12, 1998), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980112.htm; see 
also Performance and Profitability, supra note 176, at 96:
The legislative history indicates that the Congress did not intend for the CRA to 
result in government-imposed credit allocation.  The expectation, rather, was the 
banking institutions would be proactive in seeking out and serving viable lending 
opportunities in all sections of their communities.  At the same time, it was expected 
that lending activities would be undertaken in a manner consistent with the safe and 
sound operation of banking institutions. The regulations that implement the CRA 
reflect those goals. They provide for flexibility and direct that performance be 
evaluated in the context of the specific circumstances faced by each institution.
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standard, not merely through the notice and comment rulemaking process, but 
also in CRA’s application to their local context.  CRA enforcement through 
public disclosure, rating the institution’s performance, and taking public input 
also permit greater citizen participation in the decision about application of the 
rule. This enhances local organizations that in turn improve the potential 
performance of loans made in their community.  While public involvement 
adds to the transaction costs of CRA enforcement, these benefits of civic 
engagement should be weighed also.  This kind of “bottom-up” form of law-
making can have important advantages over clear rules.385
CRA may be characterized as a form of output regulation but without any 
numerical target.  Compared with input regulation, for example, requiring 
certain kinds of underwriting, this type of output regulation provides for 
greater flexibility and enhances rather than stifles innovation.  Output 
regulation, increasingly favored in the environmental protection context, can 
be more efficient than input regulation because it lets firms choose how to 
shape conduct to meet output requirements.386  CRA lacks numerical 
requirements normally associated with output regulation.  The lack of certainty 
can put enormous strain on regulatory discretion and add costs.  Yet it has the 
advantage of letting banks, as well as their local communities, have a say in the 
manner in which bank performance will be judged. This increases the 
likelihood that the performance will be judged according to an appropriate
standard for the institution and the local market context.
Third, some of the down sides generally associated with standards, such as 
arbitrary and unaccountable decision-making and agency rent -seeking, are 
mitigated in the case of CRA.  The regulator’s CRA review becomes public 
and so can be subjected to analysis.  The review includes notice and comment 
proceedings, often with the opportunity for hearings, which enhances 
transparency and permits all affected parties to provide input.  Regulators, 
community organizations, and banks and thrifts have repeated interactions over 
time on the same issues, unlike parties who appear before a judge only once.  
These factors increase accountability and minimize the opportunities for abuse.
Fourth, the form of a legal directive as a standard rather than a rule conveys 
social meaning and affects enforcement.387  Examples from other credit market 
regulation may help to elucidate the point. ECOA’s rule that statistical 
discrimination is prohibited, as opposed to a rule that subsidized creditors for 
deciding not to engage in such discrimination, is based on our deeply rooted 
sense that distinctions based on race, even if “rational” in the short run, are 
wrong.  Thus the law prohibits the conduct rather than subsidizing adherence 
to the rule.  Social meaning attaches to other forms of regulation even in areas 
that are less deeply felt.  For example, ambivalence about the desirability of 
385 Cf., e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
452 (2000).
386 See generally STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, supra note 23, at 276.
387 See generally Anderson & Pildes, supra note 368.
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high-cost lending can be conveyed by HOEPA’s simultaneous requirement of 
additional disclosures and restrictions on loan terms without any usury cap or 
other stringent provisions that would effectively bar such lending.
The form of the legal directive also can enhance compliance because the 
law helps to create social norms and to reveal instances in which actors 
transgress those norms.  For example, HMDA contains no substantive legal 
rule, but reveals information about the extent to which creditors may be falling 
short of meeting the credit needs of minorities or low- and moderate-income 
communities. Even if no enforcement action is taken under ECOA, and even if 
no mergers are denied under CRA, HMDA data can change creditor behavior.  
That may be so because the public cares, in general, about the social norm of 
equal access to credit, and because the creditors care about their reputation 
with the public.  Of course, the social norm may push behavior beyond what is 
efficient or fall short of what was intended by the promulgators of the standard.
CRA’s broad standards and “enforcement” mechanisms—public disclosure 
of examination results and consideration of the institution’s CRA performance 
during merger applications—have long been derided by both proponents and 
detractors of CRA.  Community advocates urge stricter rules and harsher 
consequences of failure.  Bankers lament the lack of clear rules or safe harbors
and the intrusive role of the public.  Yet it is this interplay, this conversation, 
between banks and communities that is one of CRA’s chief virtues.  A rule 
setting forth lending requirements would cut off this dialogue.  It would also 
send a message that banks are to disregard creditworthiness, business strategy, 
and local context, which is not the goal of CRA.  In this respect, CRA’s legal 
directive appropriately takes the form of a standard rather than a rule.
CRA’s broad standard expresses the value of inclusion in lending.  Because 
interpretation of CRA’s standard requires community input, CRA expresses an 
inclusive ideal of participation in rule making that should be counted among 
the law’s benefits. The expressive effects of law should be considered 
alongside the operational effects.388 Even welfare economists acknowledge 
that expressive factors, like other non-consequentialist factors, may be 
included in concepts of utility or well-being that aggregate to social welfare.389
Thus, under either an expressive or a utilitarian theory of value, to the extent 
that CRA’s norms of inclusion resonate with low-income, moderate-income,
and minority borrowers, such expression ought to be regarded as a benefit of 
CRA.  CRA conveys that borrowers who have been left out of the economic
mainstream ought to be treated with respect by lenders and regulators alike.  
This expressive function of CRA can bring real benefits, as attested to by 
members of these communities.
388 Cf. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 368.  But see Adler, supra note 368.
389 Cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1009 (2001) (asserting that “welfare economics takes into account any effect of a legal rule 
that is pertinent to anyone’s well-being”, while criticizing fairness-based theories of policy 
evaluation).
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VII. POLICY REFORMS
The banking agencies issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPR) in 2001 seeking input on what changes should be made to CRA.390
After a long review, the proposed rule was issued in February 2004.391  The 
agencies left the existing CRA regulations largely in place, but significantly 
expanded the scope of institutions defined as “small” under the rule and 
therefore subject to only a streamlined lending test, rather than a full-scope 
CRA review. The agencies also specified that CRA examinations would
consider evidence of certain illegal or abusive credit practices.  In July, 2004,
the agencies abruptly withdrew the proposal,392 when the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) announced that it would unilaterally raise the small bank 
threshold to $1 billion.393 Indications are that the FDIC will quickly follow 
suit, while the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC have declined to do so.394
Meanwhile, Congress is considering whether to reform CRA.395
In my view, the Board and the OCC were correct to be cautious about 
revising the CRA regulations at this time, and the OTS and FDIC were wrong 
to unilaterally raise the threshold.  I first discuss the general reasons for 
maintaining CRA’s basic framework, and explain why raising the small bank 
threshold is ill-conceived. I then turn to policy reforms that could deepen 
CRA’s effectiveness while increasing flexibility for banks.
A. MAINTAIN CRA’S BASIC FRAMEWORK
1. General Considerations
First, despite problems with aspects of implementation, the regulations
have worked exceedingly well in expanding access to credit—far more so than 
any involved in the 1995 revisions could have expected. As I have 
documented, CRA has significantly expanded access to credit.  The Board’s 
study suggests that this significant expansion of credit has come at a relatively 
modest cost, if any, in terms of performance and profitability.
390
 Joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations,  
66 Fed. Reg. 37602 (July 19, 2001).  The agencies had committed to undertake this review at 
the time of the issuance of revised regulations in 1995.  See Joint Final Rule, Community 
Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22156, 22177 (May 4, 1995).
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 See Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Bank and Thrift Agencies Publish Proposed 
Rulemaking Regarding the Community Reinvestment Act, Feb. 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2004/0040206/default.htm.
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 Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Board’s Intention to Withdraw Proposed 
Amendments to Community Reinvestment Act regulations, July 16, 2004, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2004/20040716/default.htm.
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 OTS, Press Release, OTS to Modify CRA Small Institutions Benchmark, July 16, 2004, 
available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/7/77426.html. 
394 Heller, supra note 16.
395 Id; see also, Heller, supra note 15.  
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Second, the costs to banks, and to the agencies, of changing the regulations 
could be high.396  It has taken quite some time for banks and the agencies to 
work through complicated interpretive issues, operational and information 
system problems, and, perhaps most importantly, the training of bank 
employees and agency examination staff.  Community-based organizations, 
state and local governments, and other bank partners have organized their 
community development activities in response, to some degree, to the current 
structure of CRA.  New regulations might necessitate changes in those 
activities, with high transition costs.  The start-up costs associated with 
changes in regulations account for a significant part of compliance costs. 397
Third, current economic uncertainties present complex problems for banks 
and serious hardships for the most vulnerable households.  Now may not be the 
most opportune time to re-examine basic rules governing bank performance in 
serving the needs of low- and moderate-income households and communities.
2. Retain the Current Definition of Small Banks
The agencies proposed to increase the asset level at which institutions are 
considered “small” under CRA.  Currently, banks and thrifts are small if they 
have assets of $250 million or less, and are independent or are part of a holding 
company with under $1 billion in bank and thrift assets.  Under the proposal, 
banks and thrifts would be considered small if they have assets under $500 
million, whether independent or affiliated with a holding company of any size.
While the proposal would not have a major effect on the percentage of assets 
in institutions considered large, the proposal would have cut in half the number 
of institutions subject to the large retail institution test, reducing coverage of 
full-scope CRA review to about eleven percent of all banks and thrifts.
With respect to the threshold, the agencies presented little evidence that 
banks between $250 and $500 million faced special burdens from the full-
scope review.  If such particular burdens exist, it would be better to deal with 
them through modifications of the investment and services tests, rather than 
eliminate the tests for those firms entirely.  Regulators have the authority to be 
flexible on the investment test.398 As for the service test, small institutions 
often have a comparative advantage in providing retail services tailored to their 
local communities. These services are often vital to low- and moderate-
income households, partly because such services are gateways to access to 
credit.  Because there is little justification for not applying a service test to 
small banks it seems all the more ill-advised to expand the category of 
institutions not subject to the test.  Lastly, smaller institutions often have a 
396
 For a discussion of the compliance costs of changing regulation more generally, see 
Elliehausen, supra note 207.
397
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398 See infra Part VII.E. See also, Ryan Trammell, Understanding the Relationship Between 
Investment Test Examination Criteria and Investment Test Ratings, Federal Reserve Board of 
San Francisco, Center for Community Development Investments (Aug. 2004), at 
http://www.frbsf.org/community/resources/QIfinal.pdf (visited Aug. 18, 2004) (finding that 
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comparative advantage in relationship lending to small businesses.399  Thus, it 
makes little sense to avoid collecting small business data and evaluating 
institutions on their small-business-lending performance.
Even more problematic is the proposal to ignore the asset size of the 
holding company when determining whether to consider the bank “small.”  
This is so for two main reasons.  First, banks within holding companies that 
have less than $500 million in assets are less in need of regulatory “burden 
relief” than similarly sized independent institutions.  Holding companies 
provide scale economies to their subsidiaries in complying with bank 
regulations.400  Banks that are part of holding companies face lower regulatory 
burdens from the same regulation than their non-affiliated counterparts of 
similar size.  Thus, affiliation should generally be weighed, not ignored, in 
determining tradeoffs between regulatory burdens and benefits.
Second, banks that are part of holding companies have available to them 
the range of expertise of the holding company, which is useful for developing 
programs to meet community needs under CRA.  The holding company is part 
of the bank’s performance context.  Along with its subsidiaries, it can offer a 
range of services to the bank in helping the bank meet its CRA performance 
goals, such as innovative loan products, securitization, or expertise in 
investment and other matters.  These affiliates do affect a bank’s CRA 
performance, and the bank should therefore be assessed using the CRA test for 
large retail institutions which includes the investment and service tests and 
which takes account of the expertise and resources of the parent institution.
For these reasons, the agencies were correct to withdraw the joint rule 
increasing the small bank asset thresholds, and the FDIC and OTS were wrong 
to pursue even higher thresholds unilaterally.  Under the FDIC and OTS plans, 
banks and thrifts with less than $1 billion in assets, regardless of holding 
company affiliation, would be considered “small” for purposes of CRA.  The 
OTS plan would exempt over 800 thrifts—88 percent of all thrifts holding over 
$160 billion in assets, with 15 percent of total thrift assets—from the CRA 
large bank retail examinations.401  The FDIC plan would exempt over 4,600
FDIC-supervised banks and thrifts—over 86 percent of FDIC-supervised 
institutions, with $640 billion in assets.402
399 See, e.g., Robert B. Avery & Katherine A. Samolyk, Bank Consolidation and Small 
Business Lending: The Role of Community Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 291 (2004) 
(finding that small banks gain market share from large banks during consolidations); David A. 
Carter, James E. McNulty, & James A. Verbrugge, Do Small Banks have an Advantage in 
Lending? An Examination of Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small 
Banks, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 233 (2004) (finding that small banks have an informational 
advantage in evaluating small business loans); Jonathan A. Scott, Small Business and the 
Value of Community Financial Institutions, 25 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 207 (2004) (discussing 
small bank informational advantages).
400
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402 Id.; author’s calculations.
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B. COMBAT PREDATORY LENDING
The ANPR had asked if agencies should consider whether loans made are 
harmful or abusive. The agencies began to address this issue in the 
interagency questions and answers issued in 2001.403 Under that approach, 
examiners are directed to take account of certain unlawful loan practices.  In 
addition, examiners are to take note of programs designed to transition 
borrowers from high cost loans to lower cost loans. Over the last decade, 
affiliations between insured depository institutions and non-bank subprime 
specialists have increased. Thus, the effectiveness of the agencies’ approach 
will depend on adequate supervision of the relationship between the bank and 
its affiliates to assess whether borrowers with good credit history are
“upstreamed” from subprime affiliates and offered prime products; whether
borrowers with poor credit histories have an opportunity to demonstrate 
creditworthiness and move into prime products; and whether borrowers are 
inappropriately steered to higher-cost products or divisions. The principles set 
forth in the interagency questions and answers will need support from agency 
examinations extending beyond the bank or thrift itself.
The Proposed Rule was much narrower.  The agencies would have only 
taken account of illegal credit practices in affiliates that the bank or thrift chose 
to include in its CRA record.  Affiliates engaged in unlawful practices but not 
included by the bank or thrift in its CRA submission would not be considered
in evaluating the bank’s performance under CRA.  Moreover, the proposal 
focused on only one particular form of abuse—“asset based lending”—to the 
exclusion of other predatory practices.  Focusing solely on asset-based lending 
would have sent a message that other abuses would not affect an institution’s 
CRA rating. Thus, the agencies were correct to withdraw this proposal.
The ANPR does not ask, but should, whether consumer loans should play a 
more central role in CRA examinations. Currently, such loans are only 
considered at the option of the bank, or in cases where consumer lending 
constitutes a core feature of the depository’s lending activities.  As evidenced 
by the rise of non-bank consumer lending in low-income communities, some 
low-income individuals have consumer credit needs that are not being met by 
banks.  Greater competition in the consumer market might help drive out sharp 
practices.  The agencies should consider ways of encouraging banks to assess 
how their consumer lending could contribute to meeting CRA obligations.
C. ENHANCE THE INVESTMENT AND SERVICE TESTS
The balance among the lending, service, and investment tests set forth in
the preamble to the 1995 rule has worked well.  Lending has rightly been the 
focus of a statute aimed at the “credit needs” of communities, but the 
investment and service tests play critical roles as well. Investments help 
expand access to credit by enhancing the capacity of specialized local lenders 
403
 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Community Reinvestment Act 
Regulations; Interagency Questions & Answers Regarding Community Reinvestments; Notice, 
66 Fed. Reg. 36,619, 36,622 (July 12, 2001).
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such as CDFIs to provide credit, and by stabilizing a local community with 
direct investment, thereby enabling loans to be made in the community in a 
more safe and sound manner.  The importance of services to the provision of 
credit has been less well understood in the past, but recent research shows that 
services also play a critical role in expanding access to credit.404
1. Investment Test
Investments help banks to meet the credit needs of low- and moderate-
income communities.  Investments help build local financial and community
infrastructure and stabilize and grow the broader economic base of low- and 
moderate-income communities. The interagency questions and answers 
provide appropriate flexibility for examiners to consider investments made 
outside of an institution’s assessment area if the needs of its community are 
adequately served.  With such flexibility, participation in a broad range of 
investment options are available in today’s marketplace even for reasonably 
small firms.  Based on anecdotal evidence, examiners may not be fully using 
existing flexibilities, and institutions may not be taking advantage of the full 
range of investment options.  Additional examiner guidance about investments 
should encourage examiners to provide greater weight to innovative 
investments (for example, investments in CDFIs) than to larger-volume, low-
risk investments (for example, standard mortgage-backed securities).405
The ANPR asks what weight should be given to originated loans, 
purchased loans, and asset-backed securities of CRA-qualifying loans.  The 
current regulation treats loans originated and purchased the same, and asset-
backed securities as investments.  In principle, one could measure, regardless 
of the structure, who bears the origination cost, the servicing cost, and the 
credit risk; quantify such factors as a percentage of the loan; and then assign a 
portion of each loan corresponding to each bank’s share.  In practice, the 
expense is highly unlikely to make the effort worthwhile.  Banks should be 
able to provide examiners with information about their business strategy, and 
to allocate securities to the investment or lending test according to that
strategy.  Examiners could make qualitative judgments about the extent to 
which the firm is serving credit needs however the activity is categorized . 
2. Service Test
The provision of financial services is critical to meeting the credit needs of 
low- and moderate-income communities.  Low-income individuals with bank 
accounts have better access to, and pay less for, transaction services, short-
term consumer loans, small business loans, and home mortgage loans. Access 
to an appropriate bank account, for most low-income “unbanked” individuals, 
404
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405
 A much better understanding of institutions’ relative performance under the test could be 
had if the agencies compiled annual institutional and aggregate data on the dollar amount, 
location, and type of investment made.  The lack of such information seriously impedes 
evaluations.  Given the relatively small number of large-sized qualified investments, collecting 
and reporting such information should not pose a serious burden on banks or thrifts.
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would mean lower transaction costs, greater consumer protection, more access 
to loans, and increased savings as a cushion against financial emergency.406
The 1995 regulations provide sufficient flexibility for analysis of an 
institution’s performance, but agency examination procedures do not provide 
enough guidance as to how to measure an institution’s activities in ways that 
matter to low-income consumers. The service test has received perfunctory 
attention from examiners,407 with public evaluations containing little analysis 
of whether low-income consumers use bank services. Examinations under the 
service test could be vastly improved by taking three steps.
First, examiners should evaluate the extent to which institutions offer low-
cost accounts designed to meet the needs of low-income individuals.  Low-cost 
electronic accounts with direct deposit, little or no risk of overdraft, the 
opportunity for the accumulation of savings, and bill payment or electronic 
money order, may hold special promise in this regard.  Examiners should make 
a qualitative judgment about the institutions’ products, taking into account
research into low-income consumer needs, the costs to institutions of providing 
accounts, and the requirements of sound banking practice.
Second, regulators should evaluate banks based on the number of low- and 
moderate-income account holders at their institution.  Quantitative measures of 
usage should provide a portrait of an institution’s performance under the 
service test, and data collection on the numbers of accounts provided should 
not in and of itself be burdensome.408
Third, and conversely, the agencies should give negative consideration to 
activities that undermine the provision of quality services to the poor.  For 
example, participation by banks in arrangements with other parties that do not 
provide adequate consumer protection or raise compliance, operational, or 
other risks should receive negative consideration as part of the performance 
context under the service test.  Agencies should ensure that banks are not 
406 See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century, CAPITAL 
XCHANGE, June 2001, at  http//www.brookings.edu/es/urban/capitalxchange/article4.htm; 
Jeanne Hogarth & Kevin O’Donnell, If You Build It Will They Come? A Simulation of 
Financial Product Holdings Among Low- to Moderate-Income Households, 23 J. CONSUMER 
POL’Y 409 (2000); Constance Dunham, The Role of Banks and Non-Banks in Serving Low-
and Moderate-Income Communities, paper prepared for Federal Reserve System Conference 
on Changing Financial Markets & Community Development, April 5-6, 2001.
407 MICHAEL STEGMAN ET AL., CREATING A SCORECARD FOR THE CRA SERVICE TEST (Kenan 
Institute, 2001).
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merely “renting” their charters to these firms, but are engaged in monitoring 
and supervision to ensure compliance with applicable law. This may require 
targeted, risk-based examination of these parties, as has been conducted by the 
OCC with respect to national bank relationships with payday lenders.
D. RELY MORE ON FLEXIBLE APPROACHES
1. Provide Guidance on Qualitative Factors
The ANPR had asked whether the regulations strike the right balance 
between qualitative and quantitative factors, and among lending, investment 
and service tests. As Board stated in its Proposed Rule, in theory, the 
regulation itself is flexible on both counts.  In practice, qualitative factors are 
more difficult to evaluate, which in examinations tends to diminish their 
importance.  The regulations’ focus on actual performance has largely worked
in increasing lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas.  The 
challenge now is to preserve those gains in focusing on measurable results,
while integrating quality concerns into examinations.  Without changing the 
regulations, the agencies could provide examiners with more detailed 
guidance, which will tend to raise the quality of the qualitative analysis over 
time.  For example, the current interagency questions and answers note that 
institutions would receive favorable consideration for instituting programs that 
graduate borrowers from the subprime to the prime market.  It may be useful to 
provide examiners with tools to assess how the presence of such a program 
affects the ability of a bank or thrift to meet the credit needs of its community.
2. Develop the Strategic Plan Option
The strategic plan option represents, in principle, an important alternative 
method of evaluation, particularly for firms with non-traditional business plans 
and operations.  In fact, the strategic plan option is likely to become more 
important over time, as firms use an increasingly wide variety of means—
including the internet, ATMs and POS, interstate and global branches—to 
collect deposits, make loans and investments, and provide services.  Firms are 
increasingly meeting the credit needs of communities through a variety of 
affiliates.  The fact that so few firms have used the strategic plan option argues 
strongly for the need to make the option easier to exercise, in part by providing 
assistance in development, speeding up review, and providing greater certainty 
and speed in examination of firms that have adopted such plans.
3. Broaden the Performance Context
The flexibility provided by the performance context assessment is one of 
the most critical aspects of the CRA regulation.  It permits the locally based 
decisionmaking contemplated by Congress in enacting CRA.  The performance 
context permits financial institutions to respond to local needs based on their 
own institutional organization and business plan, without being judged on the 
basis of national norms.  Examiners instead look to local context and the 
business strategy of the bank or thrift.  The performance context also permits 
greater citizen participation in the formulation of the assessment, which may 
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increase its accuracy and perceived legitimacy.  The performance context also 
gives examiners the opportunity to evaluate the extent to which the bank’s or 
thrift’s relationships with affiliates or third parties enhances or diminishes the 
ability of the depository to meet the credit needs of its community.  Based on a 
non-scientific review of a number of public evaluations from examinations of 
large banks, however, examiners could benefit from additional training and 
education in more clearly linking an understanding of performance context
with an assessment of performance.  Moreover, examiners should explicitly 
look to affiliates and subsidiaries in the holding company structure for an 
understanding of the bank’s capacity to perform under CRA.
4. Allow More Flexibility in Assessment Area
Assessment areas, which are tied to geographies surrounding deposit-
gathering facilities, provide a reasonable standard for most institutions.  
However, in an era in which banks collect deposits, raise funds, and make 
loans across states, national borders, and over the internet, “community” will 
need redefinition.  A more tailored approach might permit institutions to define
more broadly their own low- and moderate-income target markets or
emphasize different product and geographic markets in different contexts, with 
strong anti-gerrymandering protections.  For example, a bank might compete 
with non-bank lenders to make affordable loans to subprime borrowers in areas 
where it has no branches, rather than emphasizing prime loans in a tight market 
where it does have branches.  Adopting a more flexible approach to assessment 
areas is more complicated for the agencies to administer, and in some ways 
riskier for banks and community organizations, than the current approach.  
Nonetheless, CRA will need to evolve with the marketplace to remain 
effective.  A prudent course is for the agencies to experiment with a flexible 
approach to delineating assessment areas in the strategic plan option.
E. MONITOR AFFILIATE ACTIVITY
As financial institutions increasingly rely on a broad range of affiliations to 
carry on their businesses, it is both possible and desirable to take account of 
affiliate activity while respecting the fact that CRA applies only to insured 
depositories.  Permitting banks, at their option, to include activities of affiliates 
in meeting the credit needs of their community, with current safeguards against 
gerrymandering, is consistent with this approach. It is also critical to an 
accurate measure of CRA performance.  Some borrowers may be ending up in 
a bank’s subprime unit, or subprime affiliate, when in fact they could qualify 
for a mortgage on better terms.  Banks and thrifts should have in place 
procedures to “upstream” these borrowers with good credit histories into their 
prime mortgage units.  The regulators should give CRA consideration for 
“promoting” borrowers from the subprime to the prime market.
Moreover, the other agencies should adopt the current approach of the 
OCC, which considers a bank’s subsidiaries’ assets in determining the 
performance context in which a bank operates.  The assets and activities of all 
of the affiliates of a bank should also be considered in assessing the 
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performance context within which a bank meets its obligations under CRA.  
After all, a bank’s affiliates are hardly irrelevant to the bank’s business 
decisions, including how to meet the credit needs of their communities.  The 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act made a financial holding company’s 
commencement of newly authorized activities, or its merger with newly 
authorized entities, contingent on satisfactory CRA performance by all of the 
affiliate banks or thrifts.  A bank’s affiliates have a strong interest in ensuring 
adequate CRA performance by all the insured depositories of the holding 
company.  The agencies should include the assets and activities of affiliates in 
assessing performance context for CRA examinations of banks and thrifts.
Finally, CRA regulations already provide that evidence of illegal credit 
practices will affect an institution’s CRA rating.  The laws governing such 
credit practices are equally applicable to banks and thrifts and non-depository 
creditors.  Illegal credit practices of an affiliate that has been included at the 
option of the depository institution for purposes of a CRA examination are 
relevant to its rating, but so too are the illegal credit practices of affiliates not 
so included.  Regulators should not turn a blind eye to illegal practices. Given 
the high cost of examining all affiliates for such practices, enforcement of 
other credit laws should occur through risk- based examinations of affiliates.  
The results of such compliance examinations should be taken into account in 
understanding the performance context of affiliates under CRA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Enormous progress has been made over the last decade in expanding access 
to credit for low-income, moderate-income, and minority households.  
Contrary to the contentions of previous legal scholarship, I have argued that 
CRA effectively responds to important market failures and helps to address
racial discrimination.  Using recent empirical evidence, I have shown that CRA 
has helped to expand access to credit to low-income, moderate-income, and 
minority households over the last decade.  I have also demonstrated that 
CRA’s costs have been exaggerated.  I have explained why a wide range of 
other critiques of CRA miss the mark. Furthermore, comparing different 
modes of credit market regulation and subsidy has helped to reveal some 
hidden strengths and weaknesses of CRA, and to rebut the contention of 
CRA’s critics that CRA should be abandoned in favor of various existing and 
potential alternatives. In light of these assessments, I have suggested areas of 
reform that would help CRA continue to expand access to capital. My 
conclusions have been based on recent empirical studies, but I recognize that 
as credit markets develop, scholars and policy makers should reassess CRA.  
